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'RUSSIA has a t last spoken ! After ycars paticnlly spent in

,

:

4

.:$

.
rh

J x o r l i r g t l ~ cdcscr slrc reachccl in 1584 thc bordcrs of the
promised land. Her first act on arriving there was Lo ol~jcctto
the fronticr uhich J.orc1 Granvjlle had proposed in Oclobcr,
1872, whidi she, by the despatches of her Chancellor, dated
respectivcIy in I)ccc*nber,1872,and January, 1873, had acceptecl,
and which in Russian ancl English Innps alikc has, cvcr sincc,
bccn n n r k d xs thc frontier. Yielding, in a wcnk monwnt, to
an objection posed solcly for the purpose of dcriving sonle
practical advantagc from the rc-opening of n sct~1c:l clucstion,
J.ord Granville arranged with Rossla that Conlnlissioncrs
shouId be sent f ~ o mboth countries to thc spot, to fis there thc
exact line of demarcation which was to bc the limit of Russia's
advance towards India. In conscquencc of this agreement a n
English Commissioner, of clist~nguishcd service in India, proceeded witho~tt dcIny to the point agreccl upon. H e found
Lherc the ~alleys.the rivers, thc mountains, the peoplc, but no
Kussinn Cotn~nissioner! T h e Russian Comn~issionerwas.
indeed, conspicuous by his absence, but, to counterbalance that
absence, parties of Russian soldiers crossed the line' which
sinie 1872-71 had been accepted AS the boundary of the coan'try, and seized psitions, useless far comn~crcinl,most important for str~tcgical,prlrposes-positions \vllicl~,sincc the year
53, ancl cvcn hrfore that year,liad paid tribute to Herilt-the
rth-western province of tlie dominions of England's ally, the
~ f of
r Aigl~dniskin!
I'r) show the nrrcssity, if we wish still to hold India, of t h e
::fgntion, by ari ally of England, of the positions Russia has
seizcd ; to demnustrate lhc absolutc right of tlie Amir to t l ~ o s c
d
positions, and the la\vlessncss of the act of Russia in seizing
them ; to- set clearly before thc public the chcrished ultimate

\

4
aim \vllich promplctl Russia to thc conqucst of the desert ; an;;
to point out how the displ:~yof an iron resolution alonc c<A#
nvcrt from IHcrBt ancl India t l ~ ctllrcatcncd clangcr, I have
writtcn the pngcs that follow. I I~avcwritten then], not as a
T
party man, but as an Englishman. Not as a party man, first,
l~ccnnsc,lxlieving that t11c two great partics in the State havc
nlikc blt~ndcrecl, I hnvc pointccl out with impartiality the ~nistakes of both. Not a s a party man, secondly and spccia"~*,
bccnr~sein a n~atteralfecting the lnaintcnance of an Em-thc voice of patriotis111 should silence the sclfish contention,
party. For, in very dcetl, it is an Elnpire which is now :r,
st;tke, and it is by patriotic efforts alone that the splendid creation of our fatllcrs and our fi~tl~crs'
Others can bc ~naintained.
The form in whicl~this little book is publislled will 1na1:c it
accessible to all classes. It will tell those classcs thc trut11,
ancl, telling then1 thc truth, will impose upon t11-m a sacrcd
duty. That duty is, above all things, to insist that the Ministers of England shall maintain, with respect to our Indian
Empirc, the old historic:~lpolicy of England; that the Ministers
of England shall compel lii~ssinto withdraw her unjust prctensions, to rctire behind thc frontier which ?.he has violatctl.
If thc pcople of Great ISritain fail to perforln this duty, they
will become partners in a policy, born of infirmity of purposc
ancL cowardice, which will lose (or us our Indian Enlpirc !
In my oi~tspokcncriticisms I lnag have struck at cl~erishecl
p~ejuclices and wo~mclcd personal valiities. In dealing with a
crisis which is partly the consccpencc of mistakcs in the past,
it was inlpossible absolutely to avoid doing this. But to those
wl~omay be aficcted by my criticisms, and to all, 1 s o ~ ~ l d
thus appcal, using the words of the greatcst of English writers i
Who is hcre so base that would h e a l~ondsman? If any,
spcak ; for him hnvc I offcndecl. Who is Ilere so rude that
wo~~lcl
not bc a Briton ? IF any, speak; for him llav
offended. Who is here so vile that will not love his
If any, spcak ; for him h a x I offentletl. I pause lor
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AFGHANIS'I'AN,
the land of the Afghdns, is the borderland,
the frontier bulwark, of the empire of the Mogols, as that
empire was constituted when the earlier princes of that
race ruled I n c h I t is bordered on the east by thc Panjdb,
on tlie south by Balilchistin, 011 the \vest by Persian
K1~or:lsLn and the desert of Eaksu, on tlie north and
north-west by a line drawn fi.om Snrnkhs, just above IiobntAbdullah Iihin and Andkhoi, to Khoja Snleh on tlie Oxus,
nncl from the latter to a point on ils tributary h e I<oktcl~a,
beyond Fnizkbbd. Speaking roughly, the terrilory p a y be
divided into five distinct parts ; to the north-east, is
I<dbulist:in or jfgl-iAnis~Anpro'per, the country of ~vhich
I<dbul is the capital, betwcen the Hindu Kush to its north
and Ghazni and the SaGd Koh to its south, and from the
diaibar Pass to the Koh-i-Bnba; to the north of that
niain, sloping to the Oxus nncl its tributary, is Bndnkslinn,
wit; its dependent district or Vnlthan, from tlie Snrikul
on the east to the junction of the Koktcha river with tlie
Oxus, the latter forming the northern boundary of this

10
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T h X ?/SSO-A
fghm Q ~ ~ c ~ t i q,-u .
--

ATglilin provincc tllrougll its entire estcnt; lo lhc west of
Bndnltshnn, Afgliin 'I'urkist:in, comprising llie districts mf.
Kunduz, liliulm, and Ualkh; fur~licrwcst\vnrd still, t h c
districts of Akshn, Scripul, Maimen6, Silibbcrjun, and Andklioi, the latter of which i:; the cstrenlc Afg1i:in fsonticr
possession to the north-west ; to the wcst arid south-wcst,
Khordsbn or Znbulistdn, comprising Herit, tlie land of thc
upper AllirgIiAb, Cdrdistdn, t l ~ cI-Iazbreh moul~tninlands,
the Innds watered by tlic Helniund nncl the desert of
Sihtdn. T h e natural bonndnry to the north is the ningnificcnt range of the Hindu ICusli, sloping northmnrds
Lo\vnscIs the Oxos, which, in n inilit:~ry sense, forms its
by~ tlie famous
ditch. Separntccl from the Hinclu I < L I S
Bnmih Pnss, but continuing its course westwq& rises the
cver snowbearing Koh-i-Baba, spouting irom its southern
slopcs the water which forms the Helin~~ncl,
which runs a
course of about four hundred niiles to the south-west. TO
this lofty rangc are linked on likewise, Lo the westwnrd,
two pardlel ranges, the Snfdcl Koh and tlie Siah-Kohl
which enibrnce the valley of the Heri-rfid. The first of
these is equally well Icno\\-n as the Pnropamisan range.
Between 1ler:it and I<dbul, rmining soutl~nnrdsas far as
Lhc Argnnddb, n tributnsy of the Hclmund, the lofty peaks
and chains of the Sinh-Koh, separnted iron1 cnch olher by
slrenlns issuing froin its southern slopes, form the unexplored coitntry of the IlazCLreh. To the east, running '
almost directly north and south, is tlie great Sulaiindn range,
almost at right angles with the Snf;.'d Koh, which strikes
off froin it westward nt a point below I<dbiil. This
Sulaimdn range, which reaches as far as Balilchistdn, f o r k
a natural boundary between India nnd Persia. The stony,
barren nature of tlie country as the ir~ountainslopes tocthe
latter, affords n striking contrast to the richness and
fertility of the \dleys on the Peslia\mr side. It is through
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this range that the ILibul river, forcing its way, has formed
t% famous IChaibar Pass, the pass which forms the ro:id
of communication be~ween1Lll)uI 2nd thc Indian frontier.
I t offers liltcwise n mode of communication betwccn
Eastcrn Afghhis~dnand Sindh by nienns of the Gomal
Pass. Ectwcen Lhese two grcat ranges, the Sulnimin and
the Paropamisan range, which alnlost inclose in a right
angle the high lands of Afghdnistin proper, thcrc run in a
dingonal direction, from the north-east to the south-west,
several distinct mountain ranges, amongst which those
which rise to the east of Kandnhar are the most con.
siderable. T o these natural uprisings to the north-east,
the depressions to the south-west form a complete contrast. I-Icr6, at a height of about 1,350 feet :ibovc the sca,
is to be found the I-Ianlun or SGstnn lake, from tcn to
thirty miles broad, and more than eighty lnilcs long,
surrounded by deserts, but showing many traces of former
ivealth and cukivation. Of the rivers, it may briefly be
said that the largest, the I-Iclmund, aftcr running, as I hnvc
stated, a course of 400 miles, empties itsclf into the Scistan
lake, which reccives also the waters of the Aclrasl<an from
thc north, and of the Farrah-rud from the east. T h e principal contributaries of the I-Ielmuncl are, the AlgAnddb, \\lhich
rises in 01112 of the ranges between Icdbul and Kandahar,
and flows in n south-westerly direction, and the Dori. The
Kdbul rivcr pierces the mountains between Jellalabad and
l'eshdwar to increasc the waters of the Indus.
The climate partakes the character of the country. The
extreme cold of the high ranges runs pnrnllel with the exh
trenle heat of the valleys. There prevails in many parts
likewise a mediunl climate, extremely pleasant, and very
mdch resembling that of the highlands of South Africa.
The country is rich in natural products. Iron and lead
abound in all the mountain ranges, especially in the slopes

r

ml~ichenclose the valley of the Heri-rud : there, too, areto be found in abundance the willow, the poplar, -%&
olive, maize, ricc, saltpetre, and every variety of fruit.
The fertility of that valley has caused the city which is
its emporium to be styled the granary and garden of
Central Asia. " \ire ascencled," wrote Arthur Conolly
from Herit, in 183 I, " by one hundred and forty steps to
the top of the highest minarct, and thence looked down
upon the city, and the rich gardens and vineyards round
and beyond it-a scene so varied and beautiful that I can
imnfiine nothing like it, except, perhaps, in Ital'y." But,
though the valley of the Heri-rud is the most fcrlile, it is
not the only spot in Afghanistan favoured by nature.
Vegetable products abound everywhere. Appks, apricots,
figs, plums, and gmpes are plentiful all over the country.
The tobacco of Kandahar is famous. In the slopes in its
vicinity coal, and more recently gold, have been discovered. Hemp, cotton, rhubarb, the .castor-oil plant,
orange trees, citrons, maize, roses, tulips, are likewise
abundant.
To this brief outline of the couritry and its productions
I m u [ - add a few lines regarding its people. The Afghdns,
in this respect resembling the children of Israel, from whom
they claim, though it is considered without sufficient
Icason, direct descent, are an aggregation of many distinct
tribes, each of \vhich. possesses its own chief, Western
Afgh5nisldn is the headquarters of the Duranis-to which
the family of the reigning Amir belongs-and the Ghilzais,
the most numerous of all the tribes. T o the east are thc
Berduranis, counting amongst them the Uussufmis, w ~ o
have come niostly in contact with thc Uritish. Eetween
these two principal divisions are smaller tribes, each Gith
its own laws and its own clinracterislics. I t is calcihted
~ h n t whilst the population of IGibulistin or Eastern
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Afghinistdn numbers ~ o o , o o o ;that of Scistdn 280,000;
of'&mduz 400,oo ; of Kh61n1 300,000 ; of Balk11 and
the city which 11as supplanted it, Takhtnplil, 64,000 ; o f
Andkhoi and Shibberjan 60,000 ; of Aksha ~ o , o o o; of
Maimend ~ o o , o o o; of Badakshan and Vakhan 300,000 ;
that of the valley of the Heri-rud amounts to r,r7o,ooo.
I t is worthy to be noted that the vast majority of thcse last
are either pure Tadschiclts (aboriginal inhabitants) or men of
miscd Persian and Turki blood. Uut there are, likewise,
the men of HazAreh, numbering nearly 200,000, who are
distinctly of Turanian origin ; and the IG~zilbdshis,pure
Persians by descent, who number some Go,ooo. These
constitute the Muhan~n~aclanpopulation, and if we add to
them 600,oog Hindus and Jfits from Indin, who constistute the mnin industrial portion of the community, and a
sprinkling of Armenians who bclong to thc same category,
v e shall ol~taina very hir estimate of the actual number of
the inhabitants.
The estimates regalding their character d o not always
agree.
Mountstuart Elphinstone, whose insight into
Asiatic character was remarkable, k s probably right when
he pronounced the Afghdn to be a. lover of libcrty, bmve,
devoted to his family, true to his friends, but envious,
avaricious, obstinnte, and merciless. The best of all the
tribes arc the Duranis and Ghilznis. Originally shepherds,
~ p a s t ~ ~ r vast
i n g flocks in their native hills and valleys, these
have preserved to a great extent their patriarchal custon~s.
But however calm and stolid they may be ordinarily, it is a
iact that they too, when roused, display to the full the
wost qualities of the national character.
Of all the provinces acknowledging the rule of the
Xinibof Rabul Herit is the richest and most fertile. Inportant as is the part which it has already played in
Central-Asizn history, the future which is before it is more

.

imporlnnt still. I n this pear, or in the years immediately
following this peal; thc city of I-Icr:It will he consLitq[ecl
e i ~ l ~ eL1r1c strong barrier which will stop Lhe appronch of
Rnssiil towards India ; or it will bccome the gatc through
which thc Russian army, preceded by holdes of Turkolnan
cavalry, will attempt to follow in the steps of Alcxanclcr the
Grcnt, of Cbcngiz Khbn, of Taimdr, of Nadir Slldll, and
of Ahmad ShAh. To Hcr:it, then, I propose LO devote n
scparnte cllaptcr.

'

CHAPTER 1T.

.
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-

THEIChanate of which thc city of Herdt is the capiial,
forniccl from wcst to cnst like n n.edgc, strctclics from tllc
slopcs of {IC Paropnmisan range to the marshy lake of
SEistnn ; on the west it is bounded by Pcrsivn I<hor;is:in; on
thc cast and south-east by thc provincc of Kandahar and
thc Siah-Itoh. .Iklnecn the s p r s of that mountain and of
thc Pnro~)amisus,and even morc to thc north, thc I-Icri-rlicl,
which flows iirst west\vnrd and takcs nftemards n northerly
clircction, watcrs n tableland which, fertile bcyoncl fcrtilily
even as it is knovn in the East, conslitutes an oasis surrounded by stony riclgcs, sandy wastes and by stcppes.
l'his favoured district covers an arcn of 120,000 square
miles, and supports ncnrly n million and n linlf of inhabitants. I n thc nortl~crn portion d ~ c l l the I<azilbashis,
Sliinhs in rcligion and Persian in origin; thc Aimnks,
S~inisin faith and the descendnnts of ~ h cIraninn Tndschicks ; and thc Haz4rchs, n Turaninn mcc, spenBing the
'1Nrlti Inngungc and Shialis by religion, klorc to the south
the l m q d m r e allnost all Tadshicks, with n sprinkling of
AfLJidns, of T~ukornnns,and of Hindds.
The cily n.hich gives its name to this fertilc region lies'

four miles north of n point of the Heri-&I, \rlicre that river
is spnnncd by n bridge with twenty-six arches. I t is a b o ~ ~ t
4 2 0 nlilcs to the mcst of thc Afghlin capital, KAbul, about
2 0 0 south-east of Meslicd, and 20s rides south-cast by
south of Sardihs. It forms a kind of irregular pamllclogrmn ~urrounclccl by n thick mud wall from twelvc to
cightccn fect high, backed by n brick wall ten feet
high and providcd with thirty Lowrs iund livc wellfvrtificd gatcs. H e r i t has greatly fallen from Lhc high
position it held when it was described as the Pcarl of Lhe
\\'orld.* Thc ruins in its vicinity tcstify to its f o r m r
greatness. I'rom that position it fell, partly perhaps in
consequence of thc rivalrjr of nleslicd, supported by the
\vealth and influence of Persia, b u ~mainly because of the
constant \KITS and thc long-continucrl oppression which in
thc course of n hundred and filly ycars have caused the
dccrcase of the population from a hundrcd thousand to a
littlc IIICI~C than onc third of that number. ~eriit,.'howcver, Llie capital of thc fcrtilc oasis \ v h covers Lhe
approaches to lntlia, tlic ccntrc point for the caravan routes
of Ccntral Asin, must crc long rcsumc licr lost position.
Again will slit bccomc, \\:hcthcr undcr English auspices or
under the auspiccs of Russia, tlic granary and girden of
Ccntml Asia. T h e crucial women1 has nonr arrivcd to
dccidc wlietlicr hcr splendid resources will be used for the
invasion of India by Russia, or for the defence of India
against that aggressive power.
A glance at the past history of Hefit wit11 be sufficient
to prove the vitnl importance of this qoestion. The Mog01
rulcrs who preceded Lhc British in the occnpation of Ingia
d\vays recognised thc necessity of guarding in their own
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lmnds the key of that portal. When in the decny of their
e q i r e they lost that key, two invasions from the north
speedily followed. T h e invaders destroyed and retired,
but the clestruction they effected so weakcned t h e hfogol
dynasty that it fell an easy prey to the first invader fi.0111
beyond thc seas.
But it was not the Mogols alone who recognized the
importance of HerCit as the outlying bulmarlc of Indin.
With one solitary exception, that of Bdbcr-to be presently
noticcd- every invader from thc north has deemed the
conquest of .HerClt as the first necessary preliminary to nn
So thought Alexander thc Grcnt
attack upon India.
(327 B.c.) ; SO thought Chengiz K h i n (1219-za AD.) ; so
thought Tainylr (1381 AD.).
I n thc time of Edbcr indeed
H e l i t was thc s h ~ ~ ~ t l c c obetwecn
ck
the Pcrsians and thc
Uzbeks, and l3;iber, \\rho possessed ICtbul, solvcd LIE cliesLion whilst thcy were fighting by cutting into the Her6t line
. a t Kandahar (15%~-ZGAD.). At a later period, 1731, t11c
conqueror of Persia, the KhorasClni Nadir Shfih, did not
dare to drcnnl cven of the conqucst of India until he had
conque~edboth I-lerit and Kandahar. H e did not grudge
the four months \vhich he found necessary to take the first,
nor the ~!lirkenrcquired to subdue he opposition of the
sccond. His successor in thc career of conquest, Alimad
Sh:ih, a Durnni Afghdn, follo\vccl the samc lines (1747-61);
.and, by his success, crushcd thc vitality out of thc ruling
dynasty of India. An AfghAn, cherishing the snowclad
hills of his native country, he conquered, plundcrccl, and
retired. Under sinliliar circun~stances,n European invader,
who*to gain a similar result should have travcrscd sandy
deserts and crossed rocky steppes, would conquer-and
rcmailf !
The conqucst of Ddlhi by Ahmad Shih, May 1757 ; his
C
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or thc Impct'inl city thc year follo\ving
and the cro\~ningvictory o f P;hipat (January 1761) &alt
tllc rciglling clyllasty of I~lclina blo\v under \vhich it rccled
and from \~hich it nevcr recovered. T h e vcry same year
\yllicIi sonr the 6rst conqwst of Dilili witnessed likewise,
on
plain of I'lasscy, n victory which plantcd Lhc British
firmly in Gcngnl. \\%ilst Ahmad Slidll rctircd, satiated
\\.it11 slaughter and with plunder, the 1:ritish rcmnined a n d
pushcd iorxwcl. T h e ediEcc o i klogol dominion was
rotten to Lhc core. I t fell, less Tronl the ciiorts of t h c
British than from the decay which Iiad sapped its foundations. Until 1857-S Inclia hacl ncwr, in the true sense of
thc tcrnl, becn conquered by the ~ r i t i s h . T h e nntivcs of
Indin \yho prefcrrcd the yule of law to the rrle of anarchy
and spolintion, had ionght urider the British banner for the
principles whicll sccured to tliem the possession of their
own lands, the safety of their wivcs and children. Fighting
on tlicsc li~ics,--the figlit nlniost invnrkl~ly.forced upon
~hcm--tile British advancccl steadily till t h y rcnched ~ h c
fronticr linc of thc Sutlcj. 'l'he country beyond that frontier
linc, tlic country of thc Five Rivers, Lhc Pnnjib, was rulccl
at tlic tirnc: by onc of tlie most astute sovereigns who has
cwr sat upon an eastern tlironc. But in 1836-7 Ronjit
Singh was growing old.
I n thc mountninous country
beyond his northern frontier Dost Muha~nnlnd,n young
ruler of the Barockzyc clan of the Dnrilni tribe, was rising
into noticc in tlic castem world. Herht, which hnd not
bccn heard of since Ahmad ShAh had sacked it, on the
clcatl~ of Nadir Sliih, in r1/49, but which during tlie long
0
period had been declining under the rnisrr~lcand oppression of its foreign masters, came once lnorc to b e talkccl
about. A Prrsiim army, it was runloured throughot~tthe
bazaal-s of India and Central Asia, was marching against

'

the capital of the fcrtilc country m l c r e d by the Hcri-rlid,
anU with that army, controlling its movements and inslructing its soldiers, marched 1iltcn.ise Inany Russian officers and
somc hundrccls of Russian soldiers. l'he rumour spreading onwards rcnched thc Govcrnor-Gencml of India in
Cnlcuttn : it m s pnsscd on to thc Secretary for Foreign
Affairs in T,ondon. l'hat nlinister recogniacd a t a glance
all its significance, all its importance. T h c nnl-uc of thnt
ministcr was Lord Palmerston !

CHAPTER 111.

THE keen vision of Lord Palmerston had detected, I
have said, a t a glance, all the significance, all the
importance of the news that a Persian army, guided and
controlled by Russian officers, was marching on Herdt; he
had recognized that, should that march be suwessf~~l,
Hertit
would become a Pcrsian Herkt controlled by Russia. The
armed intrigue must be met and baffled at all hazards.
The issues which were so quickly discerned by Lord
Pdmerston in London \\,ere not, unforhnately, so clear
to the ~ i s i o noi the: Governor-Gcneral of India and his
Council. T h e most obvious method to accomplish the
desired end would have been to lend efficient support to
the ruler of Afglidnistdn. It was certain that Dost
h4ulianimad desirccl as little as Lord Palmerston the
occupation of the second city of his dominions by a RussoPersian army.
That there esistcd rlificillties in the way of a course so
pointed is true. T h e greatest of these difficulties lay in
the fact that whilst Dovt hl~~liammad
exercised supreme
authority in Krlbulistdn, or eastern1 Aiglidnistdn,his infln%nce
in Kandahar and K e d t was little more than nominal. I n
the former his brothers held sway, and his brothers, jealous
of his authority, were very much dispose^ to accefi the
SkQh of Persia as their suzcrain : thcy hnd even made
advances to Russia.
Ti
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I n Herdt tlic position was still lcss favourable. There
ruhd Prince ICLinl~m,son of the ex-Shill of Afghhistbn,
hlahnlud Shili, a monster of wickedness and debaucl~cry,
r virtually as nn independent prince. He, too, disliked the
idea of being conquered by Persia ; but he hated still more
the prospect of being relieved by Dost hfuhnmmad, for he
had murdered the eldesl: brother of that chief, and eflicient
aid from such n sourcc would nlcan death to himself.
Such, thcn, was the position, .as it presented itself in
1837, to thc Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland,
and his advisers. 11 niust be admitted that is was beset
mith difficulties; for efficient aid to the ruler of ICiibul, an
aid sufficient to enable him to march to the relief of Herdt,
would tlirowpt once that city into thc hands of Persia,
For it was clear that Prince IGimran would make t e r m
with the Persians rather than ~ L l b ~toi t Dost Muhalnmad.
Lord Auckland despatched at that timc an embassy to
Dost Muhainm,ql, on, what mas termed, a co~nmercial
mission. The chief member of this embassy was
Captain Alexander Burnes, an officer of the Bombay army,
posscssing rarc ability, n colloq~~ialknowledge of the
Ianguagcs of Central Asia, and a, thorough acquaintance,
acquired by travelling aIone drcssed as a, native in the
countries beyond the Osus, mith the habits and modes of
thought of the children of the soil. Hurlies reached I<ibul
thc 20th of September, 1837, and was cxtre~ncly well
reccived by the Amir. He found him, however, more
intent upon the recovery of Peshdwar, which had been
filched fro111 him some years before by Ranjit Singh, than
on*the rccovery of E-Ier5t. Brlrnes, whilst holding out to
him no hope that his views moulcl be regarded mith favour,
forlhrded repdrts of his interviews with the Amir to the
Governor-General. Before he could receive a reply mother
agent appeared llDOn the field.

Tllis nc\v ngcnt was a young Russian ofliccr nanied
Vil;tevic[l. Viktevich was n Lithuminn, n,lio, exiled f o r ~ h i s
sllarc in a l>olish Conspiracjr, lind spcnL his time in travel
in Cerltrnl Asia, had gained Lhe pardon of his Governmcnl,
and \vho wns now enlployed to undertalte a secret mission
to l<.ibul. T h c objecl of his mission was to counler,2ct
and render nugatory the influence of Burnes.
At tlle first it appeared as though the young Lithuanian
would fail. Dost Muhammad, still hopeful of a favourable
rcply from India, scarcely noticed him. But whcn, o n the
~ 1 s February,
t
a reply came from the Governor-General '
intininling courteously but plainly, that whilst lie was ready
to treat with the Aniir on niatters affecting the lJersian cxpcdition, hc would not aid him to recover$esh81vnr, h e
changed his tone. Turning to the Russian agent, the Amir
obtnincd from him all tlie promiscs hc desired. I n rcturn
Viktevich oblnincd his sanction to concludc an alliance
betn.ecn tlic l<nndaliar brothers of thc Aplir and Persia.
On the zGth April, Burnes, uttcrly hopeless of success,
turncd his back on Kibul. T h e failr~reof his endeavour
to mnke a friend and ally of the then n'cr f i z & ruler of
Afglidnistin matlc I~orclPalmerston resolvc to supplant
him by z sovereign who should be nothing clse in his
foreign policy than a tool and agent of thc Illritisli. Under
his instructions, thcn, Lord Auckland brorlght n royal
member of the family of ShAh A h m d , the ex-king Shiih
Shuja, from his enforced esile a t LudiQnd, and dircctcd the
assenlbly of a considerable army to replace him o n the
thronc of Kdbnl.
before the arnly could b c fully assembled, the o b e c t
which Lord Palmerston had most a1 licart had beell
accomplished in an unforcscen a n d uncx$&ed mdlncr.
A YolW Englishman, Eldrecl Pottinger, had entered
the Bo~ubayArtillery in the year 1827. Active, illdus-
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trious, eager to gain kno\vledgc and quick in acquiring
it, .young I'ottinger had carly obtainccl n political staff
appointment in Sindh under his uncle, Coloncl, afterwards
Sir Henry, Pottingcr, Anxious Lo csplore the countries
and to make himseif acquainted with thc habits and
manncrs of the pcople belwcen the Indus and the Osus and
beyond the Inttcrriver, Eldred obtained, in 1837, his uncle's
px'mission to visit thosc lands as an independent travellcr.
Tlisguising himself as a horsedenler from l<achh, young
Pottinger crossed Llic Jndus and, travelling in a manner
the lenst likely to atlract attention, tool; the road Lo 1Libul.
From that capital he resolvcd to proceed to I-Ierdt, but,
a\vare that in the disguise of a saintly cllnrnctcr his nationality would :b still less likely to be cliscovercd, he threw off
thc garb of n horseclcnlcr and assumed that of n Snincl or
Holy man. After many adventures, including a dangerous
detention by a Hazireh chief nhich promised at onc time
to put a forcible,end to his wanderings, Pottinger rcaclled
H e r i t in safety. This was on the ~ S t hAugust. H e was
still there wllen, n 1nont11 Inter, information reached the
city that n IJersinn army was marching against it. On t h e
arrival of this news the ruler, Prince ICirmran, was at his
wits' end. His prime ministcr and factotum, Ydr Muhammad, sho\wl, however, a resolution worthy of the occasion.
Not only did he announce his deternlination to defend the
city to the last, but he took all the means of which h e
was master to strengtl~enits defences and to increasc the
garrison.
Never was a danger more real. T h c Russian minister
at"l'ehernn, Count Simonitch, had not only advanced fifty
thousand tomaunns to thc Shhh, but had promised that
potentate tllatif he would take HerAt the balance of the
debt due by Persia to Russia should be remitted. H e
went even fi~rther. H e gave him, to aid in the attack; a
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I<ussinn gcncml, General Barolski; encouraged him to
crlll,loy Genel.aI Snmson, a Russian in the Persian service ;
nntl, ,,-it]l tllat gcncral, two thousand Russian soldicrs \\rho,
c
were ollicially described as deserters q
to E ; ~ \ . appearances,
fro111 tllc Russian arlny !
~ ~ ' 0 1]<Idled
1
Poltinger the information that a Pcrsinn
anuy so c o ~ ~ l ~ l ~ n and
n d e so
d assisted was advancing against
JIer;it I~sotlucedan electric effect. A British officer, possessing skill, energy, daring, and that self-reliant chmacter
the disl,ln). of which by the sons of Great Britain has made
t l ~ cllritisln eunpire, he fell that the time for disguise had
I':~~s"d,that Ile must avow himself and take his part in the
c l c r c l l l ~of~ the threatened city. H e did avow himself to
thc minister, nns well received, \\.as presentgd to P h c e
K;[nlran, and was authorized by both to assist in the
dclence.
l'hc :ic;e began the zznd November follo\ving. I t
13stt.d Inore than nine ~nonths-till the 8)h of September,
I S ~ S . Of that siege Eldred l'ottinger, tlw only Englishman within the walls of the city, was the hero. True
it was that the earthwork defences were cru~nblingand
in disrepair : true, that the parapets were so rottcn that
t l q fcll like timber beforc the fire of the light guns of
rhc lmicgers : true, that the Russian allies of thc Persians,
furnisl~edwit11 the modern appliances of Europe, inspired
thc garrison with the fear that they were mining under the
walls. This was all true, but the indomitable English~nan
was l ~ ~ e ever
n t to repair bl.eaches, to lead a rallyillg
~ ) x t yto
, m e t mine wi1h countermine. During the siege
he, at the request of Prince ICBmran, visited the PersFan
camp with proposals for accon~modation. These, 110\17e\'cr, were refilsed, and the attack reconnuenced Elore
furiously than before. But the steadlast purpose of the
P-rison was not to be shaken : they repaired every l ~ ~ e ~ ~ l ~

I

and repulsed cvery assault. O n the rgtli April, Major
D'Arcy 'l'odcl, an oflicer of the Bengal Artillery, who liad
been Tor many years employed in the Persian army and
liad won the rcspcct of all with whom Ile had come in
contact, entered the city, under a flag of twce, wjth a
liicssage from t l ~ cShih. H e was tlic first Englishman
who had ever appeared in HerCit wearing n Dritish
unifornl, and his tight-fitting clothcs, contrasting with tlic
loose garnients of the Asiatics, rouscd tlie most vivid
curiosity. Major Todd came lo announce that tlie S h d i
was ready to acccpt Hritish ~i~edintion.He returned with
the message that Prince IGimrtui was equnlly agreeable
t o such a course. Not for n moment, ho\\~ever,did hostilities ceaje in consequence of that agreement. T h c
siege wns conducted as vigorously as before. Shortly ali-erwards, ho\vcvcr, the Shill withdrew from his offer Lo acccpt
tlie arbitration of Lhe British.
Month follo~vecl month, a n d thc Russo-Persian army
still plied the city with shot and shcll. Every clay, ho\rever, brought fresh niiserp to the besieged. Food became
very scarce; thc stench caused by the want of sewers or
a n y means of drainage almost unendurable ; in the nionth
of May famine and pestilence stallced hand in hand through
t h e streets. Under the influence of these dread twinsisters the defence bcgnu to flag, and the breaches remained unrepnired. Everything presaged a n early and
fatal termination of the siege.
I t is under such circumstances that a great lnnn is
redly divine. I t is not too much to say that at this con'Juncture Eldred Pottinger became, in tlie eyes of the
Herdtis, the object of their trust, their veneration, their
every hope. 3 H e was to them what Gordon was in 1854 to
t h e people ofI<liartoum. These feelings were specially mnnifested on thc aqth Junc. On that day the besiegers made a

~vcll-planned and vcry clctennined attack on four parts of
LIE city. At tlirce of tlicsc thcy wcre rcpulsecl. Gut at
tlie fourth, they had almost carried tlie breach when tlie
Vizier, Y;ir hluliamnied, a c c o m p ~ i i e dby Pottinger rcached
tlic spot. Y51. Muhammccl was a h a v e man, bnl; he was
c o ~ c dby thc sight which met his gaze-the sight of the
garrison giving way before tlicir adsnncing foe. H e
urgecl tliem to rally, but h e was too owrcomc hinlself to
giw tllcni the csnniplc. Thcn was I'ottinger's opportunity. H e made a despairing appeal to thc Vizi'er,
inspired him wit11 a portion of his own rcsolntion; the^^,
\\4h his aid, Ile rc-fornicd thc now e n c o u r a p l defenders
nud forccd l m k llle foc.
'Thc month of July passed without any jenewal o f
activity on the part of thc besicgers. 011the I rth of the
following month tlie Shih receivcd in his camp a n English
officcr, Coloncl Stoddart, deputed to inform him that the
continuance of tlic siege meant war with I$ngland. Little
less than onc wont11 later tlie Persian amiy retired behind
its own frontier !
Tlic conclusion that, bccnuse tlic Persians after a siege
of tcn months' duration werc in the end repelled, IIercit
\\as thcrcforc impreg~ial)lc, would be entirely fallacious.
Eldrcd l'ottioger dclibcrately dcclared that Muhammed
Shbh might havc taken tlie city by assault within twentyfotlr hours after his appcaraiicc bcforc its \sails if his
troops had bccn efficiently comniandcd. We may go
f~irthcrand add-to use the language of tlic historian of
the cvents of that period-the late Sir John Kaye-that
but for the hcroism of the young Eonibay Artilleryma~F;
Herbt would tundcr h e actual circunistances have fallen !
With the raising of the siege of Rcrdt tllecnecessity (or
Ellglisll il~terWlltionin the affairs of AfghBnist$n had disappeared. The object originnlly contemplated . by Lord

0

w

Pnlnicrston had bcen accomplisliecl. Russia Iiad I-eccivcd
n chcclc in h ~ cndcavour
r
to use l'e~si:~as n cnt's paw to
filch away the nlost important of 311 the posi~ionscovering
.India. If England, on the rctirenlcnt of the Persian
army, had entered into an arrangement with Dost
34uhammad, an arrangement for which he was then eager,
the relations between India and the inountninous country
which is nnturally its frontier redoubt, would have l ~ e e n
scltlecl on a firm bnsis. But, unfortunalely, before the
raising of the siege of I-Ierit had lrecomc Itnowli, Lorcl
Aucklnnd had pledged liilnself to S h i h Shuja, and it n.as
dctermined to carry out the policy of substitnting for a
ruler of doubtlul fidelity n prince who in all his forcign
relntions m ~ u l dbc the tool of England.
It is not necessary herc to do more than record the fnilurc
of that unfortunate policy, After nearly four years of despcrate venture, it resulted in the restoration to suprenlc
sway in ICdbul pf the prince whom we had expelled.
Embittered as he naturnlly was against the 'people who
had @q)elled him, Dost h4uhamn1ad returned to ICdbul
\\tit11 a far higher idca of the resources of the I3ritish nation
than he had held before his enforced esile. H e had visited
Calcuttaand seen their ships, their arsenals, their fortresses,
and, thougl~many years elapsed before h e ,entered into
friendly relations w i h his old enemies, he mas resolved
from the first moment of his return to do nothing to tempt
them to renew their attack upon himself. It is true that in
the death-throes of the struggle for the Panjdb, he allowed
one of his sons to lead a cavalry brigndc to assist the Sikhs
i? the battle which consun~matedtheir overthrow ; but after
the British frontier had been permanently a d \ m c e d beyond
th? Indus, hmemained for a time quiescent. The renewed
intrigues of Persia for the recovery of I-Ierdt forced him at
last to renew friendly relations with his old enemy.

I n that year, 1854, his son Ghulam Haiclar visited
l'csh:i\wr for that purposc. H e \\.as met tlierc by the late
Lord Lawrence, at t h e time plain John Lawrence, Chief
Commissioner of the Panjib. On that occxsion the
famous agrcemcnt was signed in whicl~ the h n i r of
PIfgI1Bnist;in covenankd to b e the .f~icnclof the Sricncls,
and the enemy of t h e enemies of thc I-Ion"'". East Inclia
Company."
If we rcflcct for n moment. upon this most important
agreement, we shall arrive a t the inevitable conclusion that
it nccomplished litlle Inore than the carrying of political
relations back to thc point a t which they \ \ w e when Burnes
visited Kbbul in 1837-8. It blotted out the intervening
events. T h e first Afghdn war hacl, in x word, lost for us
eighteen years which might have well been ~ m p l o y e din
cementing relations necessary for the safety of the British
empire in India.
Doubtless the political aspect which pron~pted the Amir
r
to send his son to Pcsh;har, had ninny p o ~ n t so i si~nilarity
wit11 the political aspect of 1837. O n both occasiolis Herkt
was threatenecl by the same Asiatic power, stirrcd up by the
salne European po\wr. But if the English had grown
miser, so likemisc h c l n o s t h.Iuhammad. E-Ic no longer
talked of reco\wing Pesh:iwnr. H e saw the full significance of the movement about I-IerAt, and he wantecl the
support of the English to baffle it.
I n 1854 England \\m at war with Russia; that power
therefore, only eserciscd a legitimate right when, the
barriers of a n independent Caucasus still existing, she
incited Persia to renew hcr attempts upon the fortified ciCy
which 11nd repulsed her in 1838.
The incitations of Russia produced corresponding action
on the part of Persin. She sent an army in the autumn of
I 556 against Herit, a n d that city, no longer defended by
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an Eldred Pottinger, surrendered to her in the month of
Octobcr of the same year.
But Lord Pnlnlerston was Priine Minister of Englnncl ;
and Lord I'almerston was firnlljr resolved that I'ersin should
not hold the city, and with the city the province \ ~ h i c l ~
would constitute n new base for an army hostile to British
Icdia. Herht had, I have said, fallcn in Octobcr rSj6.
On the 1st November, Lord Palmcrston declnsd war
against Persia, and despatchcd an army to nttack her on
her most vulnerablc side, in the Persian gulf.
Ncver hns an expedition been better planned or better
esecuted. Never certainly has energetic action obtained
nlore promptly the desired result. U7ar was declared, I
11ave said, t& 1st November, 1856. Peace was signed the
4th March, 1857. In the interval, Persia had been dereated
in two battles. By the terms of the peace she agreed to
restore Herlit to the Afghbns !
Before the signature of the Peace, the British acting by
the mouth of Mr. John Lawrence, had signed another
ngrcelnent with the Amlr promising him a monthly allowof Aro,ooo and arranging for thc pern~ancntresidence of
n British agent-n
native of India-at ICbbul. I n the
course of the years immediately following, Dost M u h a ~ l ~ mad brought Western AfghLnistiin, including Herdt, more
completely under his own personal sway.
On his death, in 1863, a civil war ensued for the snccession. That war lasted, with varying fortunes, for five years.
I t was only in January 1869, that the most capable of the
sons of Dost IvIuhammad, Sher Ali, obtained over his last
r&mining rival, the present Amir hbdul Rahmnn, a victory
so crushing that from that moment all opposition ceascd,
an8 AfghdnistAn with its borders as they are described in
the first two pages of the first chnpter became united under
one head.

CHAPTER IV.
THE PROCRl$iS

OF

RUSSIA TOWARDS INDIA.

IN1854 Nicholas, Czar of all the Russins, struck his long
]meditated blow for the possession of Constantinople. H e
failed, and he died. His successor, Alesander II., maclc
11eace with the t\vo great westci4n powers who had baffled
his father, and announced oslentntiously t h q it was his
intention to devote hirnself to domestic reforms. As an
carnest of his sincerity 11cnbolisl~edserf don^.
But whilst hoodwinked Europe waspraising thc sagacity,
the pudcnce, nnd the moderalion of the young Czar, that
astute prince was straining his empire to break down Lhe
nlountain barrier \rhich barred his free accps to thc stcppcs
of Central Asia. T h e very year that witnessed the signa:nre of the Pence of Paris (April 1556) saw him hurl a n
army of 150,ooo mcn against the passes of tlic Caucasus.
Fiercely did thc heroic mountnincers resist. But numbers
prevailed. At the end of three years the strongholds of
the Caucasus had bcen storn~cd;the hero who had led
the resistance, the illustrious Schan~yl, was a prisoner
( G September 1859)~and the mountaineers, \\~hohad for
so many years successfully defied Russia, had abkndoned
their native fastnesses to seek refuge within the dominioEs
of the Sultan.
T h e Caucasus conquered, Kussia, who for soine y!ars
had been working her way across thc low undulating plains
which lie between the Alatan rnngc and the Jasartes, made

:~P~wgwss
of Russin toaunt-&

*

I~rdic~.

.3 1

her spring across that river. The IChanate of IChokand,
having a population of ~ h r e emillions, was the first object
of her attack. For the moment she spnrccl it to effect the
capture of the city of ' I ' c I I c I N I ~ ~ I ~ c I . This caplurc brought
her into collision n,ith thc troops of Rok11;Era-a collision
which resulted in the clcfcnt of the i h i r of that place and
the occupation of the town of Turkistan, two hundred and
twcnty miles from I<lio!tand.
T o allay the apprehensions of England thc 12ussinn
Priny Minister, Prince GortscIialioK, proceeded (Noveml,cr,
18G4) to issue n ltincl of mnnilcsto. I n h i s ren~arkablc
document the P r i n k justified the permanent occupation of
the two t o w s I havc.mcntionecl, on the plea that hos~ilities
ngninst theq had been rcnclered necessary by L-liepredatory
instincts of the populations bordering the Russian frontier.
Hc proceeded, then, to imply, thou,nh lic was careful not
to state absolutely, that the final point of Russian advance
had bcen renclpi
Russia," hc declared, " was now in
the presence of n nlore solid and compact, lcss u n s c ~ ~ l c d
and better organized social state ; h i n g for us wi!h
geographical precisio2 the limit up to n~hich we i n ~ ~ s t
aclvancc, and at which KC must halt."
The ink with which this manifesto was penncd was
barcly dry, when Russia clelil~~rntely
departed from Lhc
pacific programme which it slcetchcd o:lt. Under the pretence that son~eof 11cr officers whom she had dispatcl~ecl
to Bokhdm to negothtc, l i d been ~ ~ n d dd?tained
y
in that
city, she rcnewecl her hostilities with the Amlr. Tasl~kend,
an important town in the valley of the Chirchik, with a
$oopulation of So,ooo souls, the grcnt emporium of Central
Asia for cottcln and rice, some ninety miles from Khoknnd,
fcl? before IRr troops (June 1865). Eut no sooner was
she assured of this conquest than she again appearccl
before Europe with protestalions ancl- excuses. Again did
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slle decl.irc (Septcmbcr 1865) by thc voice and despatcllcs
of the Prime Minister, that the Czar " h a d no desire to
acItI further to his dominions." Scarcely, again, was the
ink o l the despatch dry, when (186G) lhc troops of the
Czar lnncle a spring upon and captured llie wallcd town of
Khojerld, tlie key of the Jnsartes, seventy miles from
IJtokand, like 'l'ashkend, a great rnanuhctory of cotton
goods, and possessing a population of 20,000. Bcforc
Europe could learn even of this ncw conquest h s s i a n
troops lind overrun the provincc of Kllolzand, lrnown also
as Fcrylinnn, Ey n ukasc dntcd July 1867 tlie Czar
formally nntlcscd one Inlf of this rich and fertile province
with an area of more than 2S,ooo square milcs to the
Russi:\n cnipire. 'The remaining half he conferred for the
nioment, and only for the moment, upon a native chieftain,
to be hcld under thc suzerainty of the Russian crown.
The time 11.~1 now arrivcd when Russia conccived it
necessary to tiinke a still more i m p o r t a ~ t step. Cokllrira had bccn snubbcd and humiliated, but in the n~incls
of tlic populations of Central Asia the influence of the
po\vcrful Amir of that independent state was still prcponderant. It \\.as necessary to cause that influence
visibly to diminish. I t is always cnsy to pick a quanel.
Gcncral I<aufnm, the new military cornnlander in Central
Asia, proceeded then to establish n fortif ed post in clangcrous contiguity to the fanlous city of Sarnarlchand, a hundrcd and thirty miles to the east of the capital. T h e
insult was resented and war ensued. T o a war between
forccs so unequally matched there could be but olle result.
Russia occupied and annexed Snmarkhand. I t was tlfc
most important conquest she had till then acliieved. I t s
immediate result wns to force the most venfiated &ieP of
Ccntrnl Asia, the Amir of Bokll:tra, to become a tributary
of the Czar !

i
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These events happencd in ISGS. I was in India at the
timc, and I can wcll recollect tlic profound impression
whicli the capturc and annexation of the famous city of
Samarkhand produced in the bazaars of that country.
The I;me of Samarkha~~cl
had spread ovcr all Asia. I n
thc imaginations of it's several populations it was the
sccond city of tlie world, scarcely inferior, iT at all inferior,
to the R h - t h c Constantinoplc-of the Caliph of the
h1uhammadan faith. And now Snmarkhand had fallen !
What wonder if thc mind of the untrnvellcd Oriental could
scarcely grasp thc greatness of the pcoplc who had captured it !
The reader will do wcll to bcar in nlind that thc annesation of Sainnrkhand mas almost synchronous with the termination of the five years' civil war in AfglirinistAn.
During that civil war the relations between India and its
mounlainous borderland had not improved. For whilst
thc Viceroy of IncGa, Sir John Lawrence, had cncleavourccl
to maintain a rigid i~nparliality betwecn the contending
rivals, tlie victor, Shcr Ali, loudly complnincd of tlie little
friendliness which had bcen clisplayed towards himsclL
\Vhilst thcn the year which witnessed Slier Ali solc rulcr of
Afghbnistrin found the relations between that country a n d
13ritish India extremely st~ainecl,it saw Russia plantcd on
the castern Oxus and its tributm.ics, within striking distance
of the north-eastern portion of the dominions of the ruler
of ICdbul.
I t mould appear thnt this near approach of Kussin
attracted the attention of the Bri~ish Government. Forgettiifg that Russia is really an Asiatic powel; and thnt ,
those who deal with her in diplomacy sl~ouldalways bear
in niintl that deczption, or excellence in the art of dccciving, is regarded as the chicfcst virtue in an Asiatic politician, Lord Clarendon, enrly in 1869, suggested to Princc
D
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Gortschalioff the desirability of constituting Afghrinist:ln n
ncutml zonc. T h e astule Chancellor of the Russian
cmpire caught the idea with en~l~usinsm.H e hasteried Lo
declare that his mastcr the Czar, ('looks @on A&/rhishin ,
ns coru)fefe(yorrlsidt tAe s p h e r e 7c1it'hinwhirh h k s s i n NlOy k
nrllcd ujolr to txo-cise her ~ @ ~ I L W C C . " l\~Ieanwllile,howcvcr,
the Govcrnmcnt of India had objected, and very properly
objected, to Lord Clnrendon's proposal. Afghhistdn, said
the Governor-General in so many words, can .never be n
ncutrnl zone for India-: it is bound to Indin geographicnlly and politically, and must continue so to be hound.
And in that light it is necessary that Afghdnisldn s110~1ldbe
rcgnrdcd by Russia !
Upon this question Lhe negocialions with Russia were
prolonged for two years, the Biissinn ~overr?mcntcontinuing to protest throughout that period that '( Russia had n o
frirthcr intention of going south" and that "estension of
territory was extension of wenkncss." Ultinlately it was
decided by the two Powcrs that the bo~u~dary
of i~fgllinistin should be fixed, and it was agreed that a11 the co~mtrics
in the cffcctivc possession of Shcr Ali, and those which
hnd previously nckno\\~lcdgcdtllc rule of Dost l\4uhnmnlad,
sliould be comprised within that boundnry. It was further
nrrangcd that tllc meinornndn and pnpcrs on this subject
shoulcl bc submitted to General ICaufil~an,as thc person
nearest the spot capable of judging thc question, in order
that he might report to the Russian Government what
were the actual boundaries. T h c matter drifted on.
General Kaufiunn sent no report. Finnlly, on Octobes, 17,
1872, Lord Granville wrote a dispatch Lo Lord August~is
Loftus, for conmunication to the Russian Government, in
which he stntcd that the British Goverru~lent,not Jlnving
received any inrormation from Rnssia, had been obligcd
to define the frontier in the inode they considered most

just. Lord Granville the11 mnrkcd out the scvcral lincs of
dcmarcalion ns I Iinve slated thcm in thc first chnpter.
'J'his fronticr nrns acccptcd by Russia, and thc acccptancc
notificcl by Prince Gortscl~alioffin dispatches datcd the
71h (19th) Deccnlbel; 1872, and the 19th ( ~ 1 s t )January,
, 1873.
Mean\vhilc Russia had becn perlina.ceously
maturing the plans mhich she had long nursed with respect
to 1Chiva. T o enablc the render to undcrslnncl this suhjcct
thoroughly I must digrcss for i~ ~nomentfrom thc conl.inuous course of the story.
Even so far back as the time of Peter tlie Great, Kliivn
had been an object of Bussinn greed. The clisastrom fale
llo~vever,wliich atlenclcd an cspcdilion, clcspatclicd in 1716
by that famous m o n x d i had for long aclccl as n clcterrcnt.
Threc nttcrn$s to csplnrc were subscc~uentlymnclc, prior
to the ascension oS thc Empcror l'aul ; ~ l i cfirst by n simple
ngcnt in 1731 ; thc scconcl by a survcyor ten ycnrs Ialcr;
and thc third by a n oculist fnvourccl by the Empress
Catherine, nn~ned%lnnkcnagnl,i n r 793. Elanltcnagnl on his
return wrote n narrative of his trawls, in nhich he paintccl
in terms so glowing tlie wcnlth of Khiva. and its importance
as n commcrcinI centre that it inflamed the Emperor Paul,
--who though murdered because his murclcrers called hiin
mad, hncl ever a nlethocl in his maclncss-to
re-open tho
iclen so long held in nbcynncc. I-Ic actually despn~cl~ccl
Count Orloll' at the head of a considcrxble forcc in 1301
Lo carry out his vicws. Orlolf h;id rcnchccl Irgiz, now
known as Fort Uralsk, whcn Ilc I~cardof the nssnssination
of his mastcr. He returned, and during the vast Europcan
co~lylicntionswhich follo\~ecl thc ncccssion of Alcxmder
I., the subject was laid on the shelf. I t was Laken up
again& 18x9, yhen Captain Mou~nvieffwas despatched
from the arniy of Lhe Caucasus to reconnoitre the cnstern
shores of the Caspian, to sclccl therc n spot for the erecI-) ?

tion of n fort, and to procccd Llicncc to Kliivn. Escortecl
fricnclly 'I'urkon~nnsAIoumviefl' rmchccl Khiva in
l,y
safety. l'hcr~., howc\~er,he was seized by order of thc
]<]l,i~l, inlprisoned, nncl detnincd ior ncmly seven wecks
1,cforc 11c was allo\vcd to return. I t w o d d scem that his
l>rescncc in I<.lli\.a cscit-cd the strong suspicions of the
]<h.in nnd his advisers, for, subscqucntly to his return,, the
'I'urkomans of the desert innugurntcd a system of pillage
\\,it11rcspcct to the Russimn cnmvnns such 3s lliey llnd never
rlrenmt of bcforc. Possibly their action was stinlulatcd by
the r~n\vontcdnl)l)cnlnllcc of Russim solcliers nt various
p i n t s in the steppe, avo\vcdly wit11 the purpose of affording
~irotsction to their trading countrymen. 'I'hcre is littlc
reason to doubt that cvcn thcse nomads s p p e c t e d that
:;rn~ed pnrlies who occnpicd military iorts on the steppe,
nominnlly to protect R ~ ~ s s i acaravans,
n
might grndually
tnkc root therc, and even advance furtlicr.
Thc system of plundcr innugnratecl ,by the Iil~iunns
that, in 1839, Gencral
bcca~nc at last SO 1111b~nmblc
IJcrovski was despatchcd from Orenburg, with 5,235 men
and trrcnty two guns, to punish the Klidn, The intcnse
cold of the winter, the difliculties and inhospitnlities of
thc stcl)pc, f o u ~ h thnrcl, h o \ ~ \ ~ cfor
r , Iillivn, After losing
onc h i r d of his forcc bcfore nccomplishing half thc dist:uicc bct~vccnOrenburg and the threatened city, Pcrovski
ws conlpelled to sctmcc his steps. The suficrings of l ~ i s
force during the retrcnt were cxtsemc.
IVith thc esccption of thc dcspatch of two minor
missions in 1841 and 1842, 110111 nbortivc in their results,
no further serious movc with respect to Khiva was n h d e
by Russia for ninctcen ycnrs. I n the menn\vhile howcver
two English officcrs, one Captain (now*General) james
Abbott, who has written a most interesting nccount- o i his
nlission ; the clllcr, the late Sir Kich~!io~idSlial;espeare,

hnd pcnchLctl to Kliiyn fro:n I-Tezit, m d lincl pcr:il~adcd
tbe Klilin Lo rclcnsc L ~ I Cl<rlssinrt prisoners still languishing
I c a t t y .
hftcr that thcre followed the lull of ninctecn
ycnrs. Eub, in I S ~ S nl
, ~ h very
c
time, bc it rummbcrcd,
when, nftcr thc Crimcnn wnr, the Ixmier of Caucasus wns
bcing nss~iletl, Gencml IgnaticK, suhscquently the welllaiown ambassador a t Constnnlinol)lc, was dcspatcllcd on a
spccinl mission to I<iii\rn nntl Jhlillh.n, l'he mission of
Ignnticff a n s outmnrclly one mercly of compliment, rind it
led t o no result. 11:may in f:tct bc pronounced a fnilurc,
for, nolmithsl-:lnding.istnding his grent pcrsunsivc pon.cra, thc astute
Russin~ineither s~~cceeclcdin persuncling the KIi;fn of
Khiva to sign the trcnty whicll h e had j n q a r c d and
brought with diim: nor ill inducing him to put n stop to the
raid on thc I<ussi;un cnrnvnns.
Russix dctcrmincd at Icngth to put a Iin:rl slop to tllcse
outrngcs. I n ISG~Jslic coniplctcd n strong fort and nnv:d
station nt KI-nsnogoclsli on the Caspian. S h c supplemented
these the ycnr following hy erecting another fort and
anothcr nnvnl station at Tcliikisbr, tlie point where the
Atrelc flows into the se:l. Able now to dcspntch espcditions from n new base resting on tllc Caspian, she prcpnrccl
in 1871 and 1872 to take clccisivc action.
T h e rnmour of thesc prepnrntions rcnchcd tlie Klxin of
Khiva and frightened him not a little. As lie still rcfrlsed,
hornever, t o accept the terms offered by Russia, or to
receivc n Russinn envoy in his capital, dreading them ct dona
fcrsnles, 1:~issia resolvctl to strike the blow s l x had been preparing. I n July 1S72, tlien,she fitted out a n d dcspntched nn
1 nrliazoff. Thnt
c r p ~ d i t i o n~ ~ n d thc
c r commnncl of Gcnern171
officer, setting out from Tchikislar, easily renched Igly, on
the o%l bed of'the Osus, and just within the borders of
the ICarn I<hm dcscrt. At this point began the nntuml
dificulties of his route. T h e Ttrrkomans came lo nugmcnt
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at St. ~~~~~~~~~~~~g and at London; nclive nggrcssion by its
agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions
succccd locally, tlic St. Petersburg Government adopts
them ns n fnil nccovtpli whicl~it did not intcnd, but cnmlot
in honour recede from. If tlic local agents fail thcy arc
disavowed and recalled, and thc 1:qunge prcviortsly hcld
is appealed to as a proof that thc agents hnvc overstepped
tlicir instructions. l'his was cscmplified in thc Trcnty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and in tlic exploits of Simonivitch nncl
Yilctevitch in Persin. Orloff strccceded in extorting thc
Trcaty of Unkiar-Skclessi from thc Turks, and it was rcpresented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances of the tinlc and placc, and not Lhc result of any
previous instwctions; but having been clonc, it could not
be undone. On the other h:und, Sinloniviich and Viktc\.itch failed in getting possession of K e d t in consequcncc
of our vigorous luensures of resistance ; nnd ns they hilcd,
and when they ,had fnilcd, they w r c rlisavowed and rccallccl, and the languagc previously llelcl at Pctersburg
\\.as nppealccl to as a proof of the 'sincerity of the disnvo\wl,
although no Ilumnn being with two idcas in his llcad could
for n moment doubt that tl~eyhad acted under specific
instructions.-July g r, I 853." ( VLit Lord Pnlmcrston's
Lii'c, Vol. II., 2 7 3 , 121110. ed.)
I now return to the datc wlwm I cligrcssed to deal wilh
tlic earlicr dcalings of Russin wit11 Khivn to t l close
~
of
the pcriocl of the two years n.hicli follomed Lord Clarendon's unfortunntc proposition that Afghihistdn should bc
regardcd as'a neutral zonc, and the reception of the reply
of Russia that she looked upon Afghhistin as completely
outside thc sp1lcl.e within dlich Russin might be called to
exer%se her influence. That lull of two years had bccn
spent by Russia in prepnring an expedition n4ich should
clcnl finally, " once and for cver," nrith Khiva. Reports

from their agents at Persia and clsewllerc that: such an
expedition was preparing had, during that period, reached
the British Governmer~t, and that: Government had instrncted its ambassador at St. Petersburg to ascertain the
exact state of the c x e . T h e Russian Chancellor always
denied Lhat any especlition was in preparation, and his
words on this point were so forcible, so explicit, and so
absolute that the Critish Anlbassador could not but accept
thcm. The scales, at last, fell from his eyes. Towards
the close of 1872,Lord A. Loftus infornicd his Governmcnt that he had gained Lhe conviction that such an expedition had bcen decided upon, and would take place as
soon as weathcr and circunlstances would permit. Still
the Government of the Czar and the Russian Anlbnssador
in London continued t o evade and to deny. Forced a t
lnst to admit that there was to be a n expedition, they
pleaclcd pathe~icallythnt it: urns to be on a very snlall sc;~lc,
that it would consist oC but four and a half battalions,
and that it was designed nlcrely to l~unisl?nctsof I~rigandage. Thcn followed the memorable declaration which I
citeci in a preceding paragraph, and which I here
repeat-n declnlation typical of the value which it is
almays neccssnry to place on the words of Russian Czars,
Russian Cliancellors, and Russian a~nbassadors; f i r
froin il bciirg z'hc iderztiort of the C z n ~lo z'nke possession (f
Khivtr, jositinc orders h v c heil iss~ttdto jorc.ve,at i~."
What follonecl ? The echo of the words I have italicised
had scarce died away, wl~en-not n merc " four and n half
battalions," but five columns, numbering upwards of
12,000 men in all, started w d e r the commancl in chief of
General Kaufn~an,severally from Orenburg, from Tchikishlnr, from Alesanclrovskj~, from ICa7,alo, and Crom
Jaznkh, to converge on, and assault, Khiva. Yct, so great
still were the natural difficulties of the route that the bulk

of this army was saved from c l e ~ t r u ~ t li ~ iythe
~ meresl:
accidcnt. 'I'hc Tcl~ikisl~lar
column had to fall back from
Igly-the cxtrcme point rcaclled by hlarliazoff in the previous expedition ; two of the other columns, :\.it11 one of
which was K a u f n ~ a nhi~nself, united, only to find themselves, a few days later, in thc heart of a sandy desert,
\\.ithout supplies, without transport, without water. I n lhis
extremity they were s n \ u l from annihilation by a son of
t h c desert, a ragged Kirghiz n ~ h odisclosed the vicinity of
wells containing abundant supplies of the precious fluid.
T h e difficulties of the two remaining colun~nswere Inore
easily surmountable. Directed by the senior officer,
General Vercvltin, they reached Khiva, and took the city
by assault. il'he natural result follo\ved. Russia imposed
her suzerainty upon the K h i n , and annesecl the whole of
the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Osus !
,.,fThe capture and practical annexation of Khiva sccured
to Russia possession of the central point in the curvcd linc
which threaten& the frontier of India. T h e l d t of that
line was covered:on its front by thc Osus and its confluents,
and was flanked by Samarkhand ; its centrc was at Khiva,
communicating with the Icft by the Osus, and threatening
alike Merv a n d Sarakhs ; the right, based on the Caspim,
would naturally crecp along the northern frontier of Persia,
subdue the 'Turltomans of the desert, then halt at a place
n.ithin striking distance of Merv and Sarakhs ; until, 11aving neutralized or made n vassal of Persia, she shoulcl
pounce upon those salient places, and prepare for the f nnl
spring which should land her in Herht.* $
on I-lcrnt,
* Thesc me not prophecies nfter the even[. In his n.01~1~
pul)l@d in Jnnuary, ISSO; in his specches after his visit to India in
1880-1;and in t& articles enlitled "12ossinn Conquests in the East,"
publislie~lin rhc Ar.tt<y n d A71791A / c , p i n c in 1882,the nrithor did his
utmost to warn his corln!rymen of the incvitnlde issnc.
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But, not even the capt~lreof Ichiva, efCectecl in spite of
the denials and solemn assurnnccs of the Czar and his
ministers, c o d d either rouse the British Govelmnient to a
sense of the actual danger of the position, or wenlren its
faith in the promises of Russian diplomacy. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Granville, not only
declined to esaminc ('too minutely how far these armngernents "--the
annexation of Khiva-" were in strict accordancc with the assurances given in Jnnunry by Count
Schouvaloif,'' but, hopeful still, hc again addressed the
Russian Chancellor on the subject of the two Governments
arriving at a clear and frank understanding regarding thcir
respective positions in Central Asia. There is a sul)limc
irony in thc tone of the reply of Prince Gatschnkoff to
this confiding overture. Having obtained, first,. by hoodwinking thc British Government all that he required, or
mthcr, all that for the moment he was able to obtain, in
Central Asia ; and having in the second plnce obtained the
forgiveness of thc British Government for the violnlion of
his plighted faith-a forgiveness accompanied by the espession of a. hope that no such violation wonld occur in
the fiiture-Princc
Gortschakoff expressed, in reply, his
" entire satisfaction :' with the "just view Lord Granville
had taken ! "
T h e conquest of Khivn left Russia face to face with the
'Turkomans. Thcse hardy sons of the desert, kinsmen of
the Osmdnli who all but conquered Europc-for it wns thc
grandfather of Osil~dnwho, in the reign of Chengiz ICh5n,
emigrated w i t h his tribe of Turkomans to Asin Minor from
Northern KhorAsdn-lived a wild and predatory life on the
dcsert bordering Lhe northern frontier of I<horLsbn.
Herdsmen, they were likewisc slave-clealers,*nor s ~ ~ o uLhe
~ci
fact be nttributecl to tllenl as n crime. T o c?ptureand sell
slaves had been thc custom of the clesert from time im-
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memorial, and the sild, uninstructed Turlco~nanwas in that
respcct not one \\hit behind his m o r e cultivated rival the
KhorAsAni of Persian I(lior,?s;in. ?'he Turkomans had the
reputation of being the most skilrul, the boldest, the most
dashing horsemen of Central Asia. N o r was their martial
record at all a blank. The fathers' fathers of the Turko.
mnns of the present day had responded to the call of
Nadir Shdh and had led the \my for Ahmad Shdh .Durdnl
to India. They had been foremost alike on the Iield of
Panipat and in the sack of Dihli. Sons of fmdoni,
ilnpatient of restraint, they had taken n o root in the land
which they had liclped to conquer, b u t had evcr returned
to the illimitnble spaces of that s a n d y desert, the soil of
which few h t they ever cared to trend !
With men such as these, Russia, 'after hcr conquest of
Khiva (June 1872) had Lo deal. H e r policy, as usual, was
direct. No notions of sentinlent of of mercy w uld allow
it to deviate a skgle hair's breath from its absolutely straight
course. That policy niay be summed up in six words. I t
was simply '' to conquer, that she might use." Realizing
the enormous advantage which might accrue to her in the
years that were to come by the employment as her vanguard
of a whole nation oi "the finest horsemen in Central
Asia" she yet felt the necessity o f first dominating their
spirits, of curbing their fierce love of independence, of, in
a certain sense, breaking their spirits by the display of
reniorseless cruelty ; that nccomplished, the dcserl: warriors
would obey the power which would thus have subcluetl
them, as implicity as their htlicrs' fathers lxtd obeyed the
orders of Nadir ShAh !
F;roralists may lallc of the c i v i l i z i ~ lmission
~
of Russia, of
the a d ~ a n t a ~ e ~ v h imust
c h accrue t o thc world from the
extension of her sway in Central Asia. T h e y forget thc
great truth which every English politician ought to repeat to
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himselr cvery clay attcl all day, the truth that I < ~ ~ s s ihersclf
a
is in all esscntinls an Asintic power, and sl~oulcl I)c tscated
diplon~atic:dlyas onc is accustomcd to treal diplomntically
every avowed Asiatic powcr.
I must ask now thc moralist nnd the diplomat to
accompany me into the great dcscrt after the absolutc sub
mission of Klliv;. had been securcd. There nlas a tribe of
Turkomans, callecl the l i o n ~ i t dTurl~otnans,inhabiting tllc
Hnzdvat district. Thc Yomuds were a Nomad people,
~ v h o s eSOIC \ ~ c a l t hconsisted in Lhc-ir flocks :~ncI herds ;
Lhey hacl no rcady cash. I t was impossil~lefor Lhcm to rclise
money by thc snle ol' their caltle or heir corn, or even
of thc jcwcls and ornmnents of L.heir wives ancl daughters,
for in the desert thcrc wcrc no purchasers. &w General
1Cnufinan had bccn cngagcd during thc campaign in no
actttal bn~tlc. 1Vitho;tt n fight hc could not obtain the
covctcd Cross of St. George. H e lool;ecl, Llleil, to the
dcscrt for victims, and lixcd his eye u p o ~the Yomuds.
Having a s c e t 6 n e d all particulars regarding Lhem, he imposed upon them Lhe payment yitltin tcn days of n line in
moncy which he 1;ncw thcy could not pay. Vainly did
tltey offer their jewcls, Lheir nooks, and Llleir 11cl.cls. T h e
moncy was wanlcd, and they had it not, nor could they
obtain it. Thcn, Lo punish their clefault, I<aufrnan in~mdatccl
their country with his troops, ordcred his gcnerals to destroy
their settlement, and to confiscate their hcrds and their
property. His orders mere obeyed wit11 n refinement of
mercilessness such as has ncvcr bccn surpassccl in the
records of crime.* The reign of terror was innuguratcd !
From that time Lhe warfare of Russia \\fit11 thc dcscrt
tribes \\!as intermitlent-. I t \\.as not, howcvcr, till 1879 that
C

CI

:lught lmt s y m p t h y with Russia :
yet it is from his pages, ant1 horn the conlirmnlory lcttcrs of hIacCahm,
Lhat I h n w drawn ~ h c s cfacts.
X o one will suspect Schuylcr of
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thc colossal Power of thc North judged that the time had
arrived to mnke an attcmpl to establish a permanent settle~ n c n tin Turkomnn territory. T h e point they selcctcd for
this purpose was K i d Arvat, a place above, but slightly to
Lhe east of the higlmt point of the frontier of Pcrsia, a ~ l d
not far south ofthe borders of the liara-ICdm T h c intcntio1.1,
plainly mani'fested, of thus cslablisliing thcmsel~~es
per1liancntly on their highway w s not at all relished by the dcsertborn warriors. T h c chief of tlic tribe of Aka1 Tclclies, Nur
Verdi Khdn, mho till that time had I~eendisposed to reciprocatc t l friendly
~
overtures of the Russians, a t once
took thc alarm. No sooner did tlie leader of the Russian
force, General J.o~unkin,attempted to arrange lor a pel%
n?nncnt occu,palion, thnn Nur Vcrcli assailed him at the hcad
of all the warrior horscmcn of his tribe. No details ofthis, tlic
first struggk for the possession of the dcsert, cver reached
tlie Europe which is outside of Russia. But this, at least,
transpi,red : Lomaltin was cvcntually besicged in his camp,
and was so I~r&xl tlierc thnl lie \ms forced to abandon
his guns and relreat in disorder, pursuccl by crowds of
horsemen to Kmsnovodsk. I-Ie was even bcsieged there for
several \veelcs !
Again c ~ J not
d Russia afford to allow this check to
remain unavenged. In August I S ~ S ,shc despatched a
larger force from Tchiltislilar under the ordcrs of the same
general. This t i m Lolnnlcin rcached IChojri ICnln, a few
miles to t l ~ csouth of I G l Arwt, in safety. But there he
was ns~ailcd by thc same enemies led by the same daring
\\rarrior. I l e and his Russians mere drivcn out of Klioji
Kala a n d were literally chased back to Tchikishlar, from
uilder the vcry guns of wl~ichplace the pursuers carried off
hundreds of hiri camcls !
h third expedition then became necessary in 1879.
General Lazareff, who had greatly clistinguishecl himself in

the campaign in Armenia against Mukhtar Pasha in the
prcvions year, was sclectcd to command it. With Lomaltin
as his sccontl in conimand, Lazareff sct out at the hcacl of
his force-a forcc greatly in excess of that which had started
in 1877-from Tchikishlnr on the 18111 June. His plan nfas
to inflict a selwe clcfeat on, and to dominate the spirit: of
the Turkomnns bcfore alte~nptingto make n. settlement.
Rut at 'l'chdt-i-Atmk, about midway to K i d Arvnt along the
Pcrsian frontier, Lazareffsickenecl and died. Lomnkin, who
succeeclecl him, and n~hoshared his views, pushed on then
to K i d Arvnt, and thencc bcyond R h i , to a point within
six miles of Dengli l'epd, a square built fort occupied by llie
Turkomans with their whole available force. On lhe 9111 of
Scpte~nberLomalcin mnrchcd against that not very formiclable place. After n desperate battlc, ahich lasted all day,
and in wliich up to 5 r.ar. they had all tlic advantage, the
Russians wcre rcpulsed, and fell back, benten, baffled, and
li~imiliated, to thc Caspian ! They were unable even to
reach that bnse beforc Ikcember had wel1t;et in !
Eut beaten: bamecl, nntl liumilitatecl though she had
thrice been on this line, Russia acllierecl to her.piuposc \villi
n steatlfnstness and pcrtinncity charnc~eristicof hcr \ ~ h o l c
policy Russia n e w surl~cndersa firmly-rooted idea. I n
ISSO she made preparations, 011 a still larger scnlc than
before, to renew the attack on thc line between Ak11nl
and Askabncl. ':, , T o cotnmancl the new- expedition she summoned,he ninn wlio enjoyed the highest reputation i : ~
her army, n man who possessed a European reputation for
dash and daring, the lender of her wnr party, the famous
Sliobeleff.
Skobeleff posscsscd advantages which had been denied
to Lomakin. I n the spring then of ISSO, -the T u r l t p n n
chief who had lccl his countrymen to victory after victory,
\rho in the course cf his I~rilliant carccr had defeated threc
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nations, the IChivnns, the Persians, and thc Russians, thc
illustrious Nur Vcrcli K!iAn, had dicd. Hc had lcft no
sacccssor nL all cqual to himself. W i l s t thercfore, in
18S0, the Russians, alike more numerous and niorc
cxpcricnced in Lllc \varfnrc of tlic desert tlia~i in 1S79,
wcrc Iccl by the best gcnernl of whom their country could
boast, the Turkonians had 110 lcader \die inspirccl thcnl
with Lhc conficlcncc \diicli, in 1879, had goric far to cnablc
thcm to repulse their focs.
The plan devised by Skobcleff provcd that hc liad complctely lnnstered all the intricncics of tlic task which had
bcen comn~ittedto his hands. Joincd by n smnll body of
men \vho marclicd from IChiva, to tlic nestcrn border of the
Tekkc oasis, hc marched with a selcct division, of wliich
tliosc mcn fornied n part, from tlic iitlrcl: to the Xkhnl
oasis at G h i , about ISO miles from tlic Caspian and about
So froin thc spot wlicrc tlic TorLo~nanslincl congrcgntcd,
n fort cnllcd GcoB TcpL:, somewhat to the north of thc scene
of the disaster oPthc previous year. I I e thcn procccdcd to
fortify this post, covcring it with intrencl~lncnts,with the
idca of making it thc base for a furthcr advancc. l k r ~ ~ n d e
of it in fact whnt \\lcllington mncle of thc lines of Torrcs
Vcdras. Within tlic lines thus formed Skobclef proceeded to store provisions and supplies, turning a dcnf ear
LO the solicitations of those who pressed him to avengc
without iurthcr d c h y the defeat of his predecessor. Thcsc
supplies camc from ~ l l cVolgn, from tlic Cnucnsus, nnd fronl
Persia, andmercconveyed by camel trninsfro~ulirasnovodsk.
Scvcral months were employcd by Skobclcff in thcsc
necessary preliminaries, A t Icngtli, in January 1881, he
advanced, attackcd the 'children of tlic desert in theb
intrylchmcnts ,at Geok TepC, stormcd their position,
slaughtered thousands o i the defenders, and pursucd t l ~ c
remainder beyond Asknbaci. This ti~iicthe rule of tcrror
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did its work. Tt cowed the survivors into nbsolutc and
coniplck submission.
'l'l~c~ ~ s u politicnl
al
consequelices foll~\\~ccl.
I n thc month
of hTay of t h e snnlc year thc Czar issued nn uknsc by
which Iic dcclnrcd that thc Transcaspinn territory, the
al~odcof the Xkl~alTeltltcs, wns nnnesed to Russia.
Nor w s Russia wp-se scrvccl by hcr ndministmtors than
by her gcncmls. l f n an incredibly sl~ortspace of time,
lines of mils, intended during the Russo-Turkish war for
tlic use of t h e army of the I)nnubc, and which h a d since
Lmn lying idlc in Southern Itussin, \\!crc transported to
the cnstcrn sllorc of t h e Caspian and \\we at once utilized
i? thc newly acquired territories. S o thoroughly in carnest
were the oflicinls, that I~cforetlic conclusion of 1881 the
line hnd bcen completed as far as K i d Arvat, 144 ~niles
from thc Caspian.
I t is a remnrlinblc Lxt, worthy of
appreciation, thnl; a t thnl very n~omenttlic Eritish Indian
Government nrcre selling the rails which had been brought
at considcrnble cxpense to Qi~ettnfor t ~ i ? ~ u r ~ ~ofc ~conse
necting Sibi . r ~ i t that
l ~ important frontier fort, and that fort
~ ~ I<nnd:lllnr
i h
!
I n a Icclurc of rcmnrkablc clcnrncss nncl ability clelivercd
nt t l ~ cRoyal United Scrvicc Illslitulion on the 1Gtl1 Map,
1884, Sir Edward IInmlcy, nftcr describing tlic progress of
Russia in the Transcaspinn regions u p to tllc pcriod of
Skobeleff's succcss a t Geok TepC in 1881, proceeded to
point out how the ltussians, never losing sight of the
definite aim of their policy, had, whilst passing on [lie
railway from the eastcm shores ol' the Caspian t o K i d
A r w t and beyond K i d Arvnt, been at the snnle time
carefd to unitc to thc empire by the same iron band the
Caucnsinn s1101.c~of the same. After pqinting o u t r t h e
advantages of Baku 011the Caucasian shore, as producing a n
ineshaastible quantity o f fuel for railway consumption, and
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inforlning his audience that at the end of 1882 the milway of
the Cnucasus mas continued froni Tiflis to Baku, with a
branch to I h t o u ~ n a, n o r c convenient and healthy port than
Poti, Sir E d n w d thw tlrcw the follo\\.ing conclusions as
t o the advantages to be derived from the new routc thus
constituted :-" From Odessa," he continued, " troops can
l x conveyed across the Blaclc Sea to 13atoum in two days,
from thence by rail to Baku i n tment!4our hours, m o t h e r
twenty-four hours would see them landed at K~nsnovodsk,
transferred in lighters to the sl~allonwater to Micl~aelovsk,
nnd the entrainment of then1 begun, when the journey to
Kizil Arvnt, the present but by no means the fin21 tcrrninus
of the l'ranscnspian line, occupies twelve hours.
" T h e comn~unica~ion
with Odessa, of course, ndmits of
the rcinforccmcn~ of the Caucnsian army to any cstent.
But the Caucnsus itsclf forms nn effectively inclcpenclc~lt
territory for beginning a cn~npnign. I t is no mild, barbarous
region, but a couptry rich, well-watered, nnd now thoroughly
Russian, and its capital, Tiflis, in the advantages of its site
and climate, its public a n d private buildings, nncl its
establishment as the head-quar~ersof an army, mlp stand
comparison with nearly any city in the Czar's dominions.
T h e war strength of the army of the Caucasus is 160,000

'

men.
" T h e cflicacy of the other channcl of communicntion
between Russia and the Caspial~l ~ n salso heen largely
increased of late yenrs. Uesidcs four lines of railway to
points on the Volgn, completc co~nniunicationbetween the
Neva and that river is afforded by the canal system of the
country. And to obviate the interruption occurring in the
winter months, a line of railway is projected fro111 a point
\vherz many lirfes from Russia converge, in Cis-Caucasia,
to Petrorsk on the Caspian, a n d thence along its shore t o
Baku. You nil1 therefore probably agree that there is not
I.:
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at l ~ c s u i tIIIIICII dificulty, and ~ h n tsuch ns tllcre is will
sliortly disnl,penr, either in bringing rescwes and stores, to
any cstc~it, on tlic lines from Nortllcrn Russia, nncl also
from Soutliern Russin, to t l ~ cCaspinn, or in coweying the
nrnly of the Cnw:lsus with its storcs from that scn to t h e
Transcaspinn rnil\my, nncl along t h t line to I C i d Arvnt.
Tllat tcrniinus is 13j miles from Aslinbnd, to \vliich plnce
tllc rnilwny will cloubtlcss be cnrriccl. Asknbad is 186
~liilcsfro111 Snrnklis nnd Enrnkhs is zo? from HerLt, only
:I r c , ~~iiilesniore thnn tlic distance from York to London."
T ninkc no apology for this quotnlion; for the words of
\rhicIl it is coniposed present in [he fhircst 2nd clcn~cst
light to the rcnder thc immense aclvnntages ~ r h i c h
Skol~eleVs victory nt Geok Tep6, nncl the conscquent
nnncsntion of the Tsanscnspinn territory, hns procured for
Russia. 'I'liaL territory is unitcd now by thc speediest of
dl modern modes of con~municationwith St. Petersburg,
wit11 Aloscow, and wilh nll the grcnt arsenals of Russin.
1'11nt coliquest brought not an isolntccl nlrd outlying portion
of Russia-but
the \vliole Russian empire bound into one
solkl mass by thc iron road, as near to Herdt, within n few
milcs as the most ndvancec1 outposts of British Tndin !;s:
2 2 1rc go 011 we shnll see that tllc cvil did not stop thcrc !
Nor wns the power to concentrntc an irresistible force
up011 thc fw.hcst point of its Transcnspian territory the
only nclvnntagc gained for his country by Skobelef! nt Gcok
Tcp6. Leaving alxolutely out of considerntion the prestigc, the moral infl~~cncc-though that is n factor ~ ~ I l i c h
nus st cntcr largely into thc cnlculntion of n statesman \!!hen
Ilc lins to den1 wit11 Enstern peoples-~licre remain two clistinct mntcrinl ndvantagcs, both of which mill affect very
po\vcrf~~lly
any struggle which may occur i n Afgllbni&n o r

on tlie existing British frontier, betwecn Russia a d Great
Britain. These are (I), the enormous influence gained by
thc former over Persia; ( 2 ) the employment as the vanp a r d of her nnnies of thc conquered Turkonians.
IVith rcspcct to tlie first I shall again quotc from the
same cornpetcnt authority, to whose warnings in May of
last year the country turncd a deaf ear. "Nest to her
resources for n campaign," said Sir Eclwnrd I-Iamley on
that occasion, " Russia's relations with Persia arc of prinle
importance." Describing then the various phases of the
attitude of Persia towards Russia between 1876 and 1880,
Sir Edwird thus continued : But, in the following ycar,
aftcr Skobelelf l ~ a dcstablishcd liimsclf at B h i , a remarkable change occurred in the attitudc of Persia. Ostensible
orders to the contrary notwithstanding, he was allonfed to
proci~rcvast supplies of provisions froni I < I ~ o r M n; and
wlicn, after t!~ecapture of Geok Tell$, he marched beyond
Asknbacl in prrrsuit, he was alloncd to violate Persian
tcrrito~ywilhout remonstrance, and lhe Turltonlans who
escaped into what they supposed to bc tlie neutral territory
of Persin were handed over as prisoners to the Russims.
I n fact how can Persia, without the strongest support, resist such a ncighbour ? The Bussian border is co-terminous
with hers from Mount Aralnt to beyond Asknbad. The
fleet on the Caspian and the new milway give Kussin the
means of invading at a hundred points the bordering
territory, furnishing a hundred good rcasons why Persia
could no more oppose thc will of Russia than the mere
linman being of her o w tales could oppose the treniendous spirit \ ~ h orose in clouds from the sea, or descended
on over-shadowing wings from the sky," Information
which %as been received since the Iccture from which this
passage is quotcd nras delivered, and since the Russian
advacces to Merv and Sarakhs, therein foreshadovred, have
('
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become accon~plished facts, goes to prove that at thc
present moment Persia is an inert mass to be inouldcd at
will by hcr powerful neighbour.
The second advantage I have referred to-the incorporation of the Turkoman cavalry in the Russian army has
been also already accomplisl~cd. Thc rule of terror, always
an initial factor with Russin when dealing with Oricntnl
races, did its work, as I have already said, at Geok TcpC
That crushing defeat and the unsparing manner with which
i t was followed, broke the free spirit of the desert-born
warriors. Recognizing in their subduers their masters, they
accepted their fate, a n d thcy are now ready to foragc, to
fight, and to plunder for the successors to the empirc of
Nadir ShAh !
1 return from this digression-a digression necessary to
display the great results obtained by Russin from Skobeleff's
triuunph at Geok Tep$-LO describe thc further progress
made in the Transcaspian line or co~~quest.I left Lhe
Russian army pursuing the Turkomans as far as Asknbacl,
only 385 miles from I3erBt. I propose now to describe
their further progress sincc that date.
The victory of Geok Tep6 had subdued for ever, n vcry
important tribe of thc Turkomnns, the Akhal Tekkes.
But there were other tribcs scarcely less formidable.
These were the Sarilr Turkomans, numbering 65,000 souls,
lying along the Murghrib river between Merv and HerCtt ;
the Tejend Turlroinnns, occupying the country watered by
the river of t h l t name to within thirty miles of Sarakhs;
and the Merv Tekkes or the tribe which pastured its hprds
round about Merv. All these tribes were to be absorbed.
The turn of the Tejend Turkomans came first. Terrified
by the defeat of their brethren at Geok TepC and Its consequences, they offered, almost on the morrow of the victory,
their sitbinission to the conquerors. That submission
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brought into the possession of Russia the Tejend oasis, a
territory, to use the worcls of Lieutenant, now, I bclievc, ,
Colonel, Alikhanoff, \she surveyed it-, "almost larger than
that of Merv," nnd brought her within striking distance-go
milcs-of Sarnkhs, and within 232 of Herit. T h e l'ejend
river which waters that onsis is, in very d x d , the Hcri-rGd
\vhich waters I-Ierdt, for, flowing northwnrds as it approaches
the Persian frontier near ICuhsnn, it takes, jmt bcyond Pul-iI<h5tun, the name of the smalnp in which it finally disappears. I t forms then, if not a water road to Herdt, pet
a road which supplies troops marching along its banks
with one of the two primary necessities for an army.
For a timc after that submission Russia rcmained apparently quiescent. Shc was ouly biding hcr time. l\'hilst
the attenlion of Lhe politicians of England was fised upon
the events passing in Egypt and in the Soudan, they rcad
one m6rning in January, 1884, that Merv had bcen
occupied. Some years before, even staleslncn who believed
in the pronlises of Russia, had declared that her troops
could never be allonwl to occupy Merv. Xrct in 1884,
that occupation was allowed Lo pass ivith but a feeble protest !
T h e full significance of that inlportant acquisition is not
evcn yet properly appreciated by the governing classes and
the people of L-heseislands. I n vain did two Englishmen
and one foreigner attempt to rouse them to a sense of the
danger it involved. One of these, Mr. Charles Marvin,
whose services in' respect of the 1Cusso-Afghan question
have been invaluable, and who, speaking and writing with
absolute knowledge perso~lally acquired, can understand
better than any living man thc feelings of the Cassandra
of th; Hon~cric'legend, published at once a pa~uphlet in
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\vllicli lie dwelt empl~aticnllyupon the opporlunilies which
s u a~ movcnienl:
~ ~
gave t o Russia. " T h c conqucst or
>lcrylJJ\\'rote Mr. h,lmvin, in February, I S S ~ , "is somctiling lllore than the mnesation of a mid-dcscrt oasis. It
Inenns t l ~ ec o ~ n l ~ l e tjunction
e
of tlie military forces of the
Caucasus and 'l'urkestAn. I t mcnns, \\.it11 tlie annesation.
of i\khnl, the nbsorption of roo,ooo of the best Irregular
cnvcllry in the world, at a wcek's ~ n a r c hfrom the city of
I-lcrit. I t means thc meeting, for the first timc, of t11c
C o s s d i and thc Afghrin. I t means thc complctc cnclosurc
or ICl~ivnwithin thc Russian cmpire, and tlic reduction of
11okh:irn from the independent position of n border stale
to tlic tlepcndencc of nn incorporntcd province. I t means
tlie cnclosure of more Lhan zoo,ooo square miles of territory, and the addition to t h e Russian empire of a region
as laryc ns Fmnce. It: means t h e completion of the conquest of the Ccntrnl Asian clcserts, nnd the commencement
of the anncsalion of Lhc grcat ferLilc mcluntnin rcgion of
Persia and i\fghdnistdn. I t means the cleliberatc occupation of a s1rntegic:ll point, fraught with political cntangle111cn1sof s ~ ~ cal wide-spread
i
nature, that, whether Russia
dcsirc it or not, slie will be inevitably led, unless forestalled
or checkccl by England, to Meshed, tu I-Icrit, to Ballch,
nncl lo 1Cib~1l. And slie will not rcmain there. She \\ill
continue her swift advance until slic triumphantly lays
clown her Cossack border alongside the Sepoy line of India."
I t m y be objected by some that these are the opiniolls
of Mr. Marvin, and that they d o not care to listen to Mr.
htarvin, I)ecause, when the Conscl-vati\.es \\ere in ofice h e
was charged with divulging in formntion which c011111romised thc Government. I m y remark, in pass in^ that
that charge in no way affects thc credibilify of n nlan w h o
has heard with his own ears the opinions expressed on t h e
subject by Russian generals and Russian diplomatists, anc1

--

--

who, for thc love of England, has spent his own moncy to
warn England's pcople. Gut let us turn from Ur, Marvin,
from this past-master of thc history of ~ r n i i s c ~ s ~ ~ i a n
aggression, and read what thc greatest strategist of England
has to say upon the subject.
" Co~nmerciallyv i e n d , " said Sir Ecl\vnrd EIa~nleyin the
lecture from which I have already quoted, dcli\~rc,din
May of last year, "Russia has gai~ycd in Rlcrv for thc present mercly a frcsh burthen. The Turlromans, dcbnrrcd
frorn brigandage, and unfit for any sustained comn~ercial
or ag~~iculturnl
entcrpriscs, will bc but an in~poverished
conlmunity, They posscss 110 towns nor iustitutions, nor
territories which csliibit any mark citller of prospcrity or of
the faculty of bcco~ningprosperous. 'Tlic onc :~dvanlnge
of the possession is that the caravan route passing Cok1lira
to Meshed and the interior, and that from India by I-lcrit
to Ccntml Asin, lie through Merv. Eut that it was once a
centre of great grosperity is proved by the fact that the
remains of four grcat cities exist Lhere, the inhabilanls of
the last of which wcrc drivcn out hy the present semibarbarians about a ccntiiry ago. Uncler Russian rulc that
prosperity will revive-the land will once Inore tecm with
the crops to which nothing is wanting but good husbandry.
And, when .once again bcco~ncpopulous and fertile, it will
afford a secondary bisc against the Afghdn frontier. I n
the mean\vhile it closcs thc gap n~orcsnicl,and as soon as
Rr~ssialays down her fronticr linc, Ll~c wholc of that vast
e q ~ i r efrom the Baltic to the Danube, thcnce along the
Black Sea, across the Caucasus to the Caspian, along Llle
Persian frontier to Rlerv and Tulkistin, and so on to
Siberia, will lic in :Lring fencc. 'This is the Power which is
no\\~sscpamtcclfiom a frontier which, presumably, we cannot
allow hcr to overstep, by a borderland which is a, barrier in
no sense, and which I will endeavour briefly to describe."

On the same subject, Sir Charles Macgrcgor wrote in
1875 :-'I There is n o douht in my mind that the real
danger lies in our permitting the Jiussia~lsto concentrate
unopposed a t hlcrv, which is quite within co/Q n% mni/z
distance of Herit ; a n d it is in this fact, and in this alone,
that the value of RIcrv to the Russians lies. Once place
Hcrat beyond the possibility of a cu@ dc maill, and I cannot imagine thc astute statesmen .of Russia persisting in
thc occupation of an isolated spot in the desert, thc maintenance of which must cost n great deal." Thc forecast
has been already proved true !
I t will be observed that Sir Edwnrd Ilamley speaks of
the new fronticr as one " which, presunlably, we ca~mot
allow her (Russia) to overskp." But six months hncl not
elapsed since the delivery of the lecture when Russia did
take another step for~vard--a step, in 1ny opinion, thc most
important of all subsequent to the victory of Geok
TepC. I n the autumn of IasL year Russia advanced
her outposts along the Persian fronticr ffom Askabad to
Snrnkhs !
Russia \vould not have been Russia had she not accompaniecl this most important move on\\wcl by the usual
attempt Lo deccive t h e gulliblc British public, and their
lyorsc than gulliblc representatives in the Housc of Commons. 1 shall show more clearly further on why the I J ~ C
was that there was an old Sarnkhs and a new Saralths, mas
of all plez5 the most disingenuous. Russia gained the
position on the hank of the Tejend most convenient to
her for an operation against Her&, and the value of that
p s i t i o n was, as I shall sho~v,in no way affected by the fact
that she did not occupy t1.e fort as well ! Yet the excuse,
Imle as it was, went down : it was accepted ; and Russia
was allowed to remain at oldSarokhs without even a rcmonslrance !
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T h e enormous importance of thij step has never been
sufficiently appreciated. With all Iiumilily ancl with all
earnestness I \vould beg my counlryn~cn to iurn for a
moment from h e selfish strife of parties, ancl devotc a fc\v
minutcs'consiclerntion to a subjccl \vliich affects, and \,itally
aflcls, tlie future position of the British Empire. TIlc
position occupiccl b ) ~old Sarnkhs ought ncvcr to hnvc been
nllowed to fall into tlic hands of 12ussia. l'hnt she was
nlloned to take it is a proof of tlie statc of vassalage to
which Persia has been reduccd, for nev: and old Sarnkhs
constiluted a frontier post of that country. Lct us, for ii
niomcnt, examine their position.
l;ortul~ntcly, we arc able, o n this subject, to witc "from
the book." I n 1875, o11.e of tlic nblcst ancl most nccomplislied oflicers \vho \\cu. the Ihitisli uniform, the present
Qunrlermastcr-Gc~icrnl of H e r hIajestyJs nmiy in India,
Major-Gencrnl Sir Charles MncGregor, visited Saraltlis.
l'licrc is no unqptninly in Llic opinion he gave regarding
its valuc. " A glancc at lhc map will show," he ~ r o t c ,
" that in thc complication whicl~ nlust arise erc the liussoIndian quesliol~can be d e c ~ n c dscttlcd, ils fulure-'thc
futurc of Sarnkhs '-is likely to be a stirring one. Plnced
a t thc junction of roads from Herrit and Meshed, by the
I-Ieri-rild and Ab-i-Mcshcd valleys rtspcctively, and at tlie
best cntrance to the province of I<lior;is;in from the ~iorlh,
i t cannot fail lo escrcise n very scrious influcncc 011 the
monlentous issue of tllc above question. 'l'liis must
I~appen, ~vliether it fa11 into the hands of thc friends of
England or into those of her foes. \Vl~ctlier 12ussia use
Sarnklis as a base Ibr offensive measures against Herit, or
England use her as a defensive outpost to d d c a t any such
ope;?ations, ha? positicn will be I:card of agai~!. A I ; ~if
111y feeble voice can eKect a wrning, ere it is too lale let it

hcre be raised in these words :-fl Zn@td /l'ocs ?rot r m
Snrnkhs for d ~ f e n c cRussia 71cvXnsc it f o r ofl~.trcc."*
I am no alarmist. 'l'he vords I have quoted are the
words of a very able man who has spent his life on the
Indian frontier, n.110 can speak the language of the
Afghdns arid the I<horisinis, a man \vho Iins ever kept his
eyes and his ears we11 open. Tlic journal of his travels
teems with evidence that even in those days Persia was
being Russianizcd. There is not a soldier living who
knows MacGregor who would not ncccpt as an absolute
truth his nlarning words about Snrakhs, And yet, the
English Government allowcd Russia to take quietly and
without ren~onstrance the plains commanding that most
important place-a place wl~ich is nn eye to see and an
arm to strike. When n faint voice was raised in Parliament upon thc question it was sileilced by the disingenuous
plea, already referred to, that there were two such places
known as Sarakhs, and that the Snrakhs oscupied was not
the fortless but the old town !
Is there a n old town of Sarakhs? There was indeed
in earlier days an old Sarakhs, but there is but one fortified town now. Let the reader follow the description
of Sir Charles MncGregor :-"The
sccne that mct my
eye" he writes,describing his survcy of the country from
the north tower of the only csisting Santkhs, "is easily
described. T o the north stretched one vast plain, which,
except for a few mounds and a ruined mosque marking the
site of one of the forn~erto\vns of Samkhs, nas unbroken
by tree, bush, mound, or undulations as Lnr as the eye
could reach. The 'l'ejend, it is true, winds round to :he
* T h c italics arc Sir Chnrles h1ncGregor1s. Vh$ I' Nnrrntivgof n
Journey :hro~tgIithc Province uf I<llorassnu m d thc N.\V. Frontier of
Afghniiislan in 1875." London : IV, H,Allcn & Co., ~Syc).

north-west, but its bed is low, below the level of the plain,
and so nothing can be sccn of it. I t \vas a strange I'ccling
to look out 011 this wild interminable cxpanse, and think
that for an arc of Soo, there \\?asnot for 300 miles perllnps
one single drop of water, or one human being T o the
north-cast lay the roacl to Nerv stretched out beyond the
dark tamarisk foliage in the bed of ~ h 'l'cjend.
c
To thc
cast all was clear : to thc south-enst wcrc undulating
rounclcd ridges (covcrcd \\.it11 li~tleblack dots which Lhcy
told tne were " pi st:^ " bushes)?* extending to\vnrds tllc
MurgllLb. 'Yo the south was ~ l l cMilzciuran ridgc we had
come through, a n d a little way north of west was n confused mass of rugged ridges, among which I \\Ins inforo~cd
lay the famecl stronghold of the great Nadir."
This plain on the Tejencl, then, is really the position
of Samlths 'r' 'I'hnt position Kussia has taken and ICussin
holds. I t is idle to argue that the position is vducless
becnusc s h e doss not hold also the fort of Snrakhs. T h c
fort of Snrakhs "has n garrison" ( I quotc again from
MacGrcgor) "of one battalion of infantry, numbering
somc scven l l ~ ~ n d r emen,
d
eleven guns, good, I~acl, and
indirferent, a n d n few horsemen ; but thc dimensioils of the
fort are such that it would take ten times this number to
man the \rails, even in the most incflicient manner." I n n
word, the Russians can walk into it \vllenever they may
choose to d o s o !
XlIacGregor gives us, lilccwisc, n plan and description of
the fortress. H e then adds :-" Were the 'l'urkomnn question for ever at rest "--Russia has settlcd it since he penncd
those words-"I
see no reason why Salxkhs should not
becpnlc n place of coilsiclerable importance as n Inrge
m

* Thc Pistncllio nut.

population could easily b e supported Ily agriculture alone,
and its convenient position nfitli reference to B,Ieshed and
HerAt o n [lie south, and Khiva and Bokhira on the north,
mlrks it out a future probable entrepBt of commerce."
I%~rtl~cr
on, he adds : " Commercially, it is adn~irablysituated for drawing to it all :he trade between Turkistanon
t h e north and Khol~nsdn on the south; and it has every
advantage of soil and water and climate that would bc
necessary for these purposes."
On the same subjcct-the position of Snrnld~s--let us
study tlie description of tlic position as given by the
correspondent of the IL/~ts/;l.crfedLoncl'u~j11+70s, in tlic issue
of Lllot paper of the 14th March :"Samkhs, which the Russians were permitted to occupy
soon after their conquest of Mcrv, and from whicli thc
understood line of Afghan boundary was to have been
drawn eastward to the Oxus by thc Joint Commission, consists of olci and new Sarnkl~s, tlirec nlbles and a half
apart, situatcd on oppositc sides of the I-Ieri-rud, the bed
of which, at that particular place, was dry nt tlie scason
when the Critish Commission arrived tlierc. This place
belonged to Persia, L~utold Snrnkhs, on the eastcrll side,
was handed over to thc Kussinns by the Persian Governor.
\\'I~en o w Special Artist visited old Sarnkhs, h e Russian
Governor-General of the 'l'mnscaspian .I'rovinccs, General
lio~nnroff,was there, but only a few Russian troops, who
were Akhal 'I'urkomnns recently enlisted in the Russian
army, l'llc sketch now given shows the remains of tlic
o l d city, wliicll is entirely deserted ; to the east and north
tlierc arc n number of reed hu[s nith n few people living in
them. Old Saralths, as the slcetcll will show, is n ~ e r e pa
square mound, rising high above the present Icvcl of the
dcscrt, and this mound is no doubt nn accunlulation of

rubbish fosmccl by the destruction of houscs and the rcbuilding of them during a long course of time. T h c
ruincd walls of onc building arc all that stands of he old
town ; the rest of tlie space is a mass of bricks and wecds.
T h e walls are of burned brick, but are in a w r y crumbling
state. T h e town itself evidently has not had a n inhabitant
for many years. O n the north and east arc the rcmains of
crumbling mud walls, which luny have Ixen inhahitecl since
the old city was left to clccay. l ' h e old tomb seen to thc
right of this view is cnllecl Uaba Ogle ; but thcrc is n
tradition that it is tlie tomb of Abel, the tomb of Gain
being at new Sarakhs.
' I New Sarakhs, which is still occupied by the Persians, is
on the western 1,anIc of the Heri-rud, 300 yards from thc
river bed. I t is of latc date, and is posscssecl of the usual
iuucl n~alls,with toners. T h e wall cncloscs a spacc of 700
yards diamctcr. T h e governor, Ali Mardan IChnn, who has
to den1 with the whole of the frontier of this part of Persin,
lives in the t o h , and has four or five h ~ ~ n d r etroops.
d
Although the walls cover a goocl amount of ground, thcrc
are very few people in the place.
I n thc sketch, thc
mound of old Sarakhs is just visible in the distance ; in the
foreground is one of the usual towers of refuge, Mr.
Simpson ~ u a d en separate sketch of the Meshed Gate of
new Snrakhs, w l ~ i c l shows
~
the character of the crenelated
walls and the towers. TYhere are only two gates to the
town-this gate, and another towards the north, callecl the
13okhira gate. ,Inside of the Meshed gate is the Arg, or
citadel, where the governor lives, and thc garrison havc
their quarters. A mall separates this from the other part ot
the town. There is a ditch ,perhaps 10 feet or 1 2 feet deep,
and nearly 2 0 fjxt wide, round the walls, with a covered way,
or chcmin cle ironclr, between the wall and the ditch. Tlicre

are six sniall brass guns placed at various points, but l h e
mud walls could offer no defence to a regular attack.
''A curious feature of the river above Samlths is the dam,
or ' bunci,' as it would be lermed in India, at I < i d Koi,
by which LIE water is diver\ed into slreams for artihcial
irrigation. Iiizil-Koi is eight miles higher up the river,
bctwecn Sarakhs ancl Pul-i-Khitun. This dam, which is a
very primitive affair, bcing made of wattles and earth, fills
n water-course, which supplies old Sarakhs; and new
Samkhs ~ w e i v e sits supply of water 'on the other side of
the Hcri-Kud from a point- not far distant. All cultivation
in this region is done by means of irrigation dcrived from
rivcrs and Streams ; and the protection of "water supply"
is an important part of the frontier question. On the ordinary maps it mill be secn Lhat the Heriserai is on the Persian
sick of thc bridge, slnncling o n Lhe r i g h ~bank of the Kershef-Rud. T h e datc of its erection is given as in Timour's
time. Thc view taken by m e is looking south, and the
high I d l s forming the backgi-ound are all an thc Persian
sick. Thc I<ershef-Rud is n small stream which cnters the
Ilcri-Rud o n its left bank only a few yards bclow the
bridge."
Let tlic readcr renlizc lhe conmercial and military
advantages of this position ; f ~ ~ r t h ethat
r , llle fortress resting
on that position I~elongsLo a prince who is virtually a vassal
of Russia ; further still, that the position, capable of a large
development, lies by thc valley of the I-Ieri-rdd, 2 0 2 miles,
by the alternative route along the Murghdb valley, a
somewhat shorter distance, from I-Ierit : ~hal:it is aboul.
Go miles from R'lcrv, and f h i Ihc routes j5.m Ihc flun plnccs
to Hcnff, by thc i%rrrrg/r(lb ?:alley, r o n v c ~ p nf Pm@ic/r:
let him rcalise all this, and then ask witl~surprisewader
what blind infatuntion has the Eritish Government per-

lnittcd the occupation of tllesc t\vo threatening positions,
h.le1.v a n d Si~rakhs,by a colossal po\\w which is advancing
towards Indin, \vithout making n corresponding forward
movement from the I n d u s ?
l ' h c considcration of this infatuation will fornl the su11j e c l of the nest chapter.

TI4E INFATUATIOX OF GREAT BCI'I'AIN.

Tm Ministers of the Crown of Great Britain a ~ i dIreland
are, or are supposed to bc, the eseculors of the will of tlie
people of those islnnds. However culpnbly ignorant and
culpably hcff.icient n ministry may be, i t is unfair then absolutcly to condc~nnthem if the people whom they represent
absolve thcm. If the people of these islancls are misgoverned, if ~ h c ysanction a policy which tends to the loss
of Inclix, they hnvc mainly tl~emsel\~cs
to blnnw. 111describing "tlie infatuation of Great Britain" I shall describe
a coursc of conduct n~hich,tllo~ighinitiated by the minister,
has bccn sanctioned by the people. It isLto the people that
I appeal. I tell the111that that policy which Lhey have
sanctioned is risking thc loss of heir greatest dependency.
I implore then1 not to he I~linclcclby oratorical platitudes,
but to look facts sternly in the face. I make this appeal not
as a party-man, for it \\fill be seen I blnnie both partics, but
a s an Englislmian who loves his country and who feels that
tlie empire \\phich has been created by the vdour, by the
energy, by the skill, and by the devotion of our forefathers
can only be nlnintninecl by the display of the same
qualities by their descendants !
At the close of the third chapter I brought the action
o r the Eritish Government up to the year ISGY,the year in
which, Samnrkliand having been anncxed ancl Bolchdra controlled by Russia, Lord Clarendon made his famous proposition for constituting Afghdnistdn as a neutral zone, ancl

rcccived in rcply Prince Gortschnld~'snssumncc, that his
master, LIieCznr, "Ioolts Ilpon AfghLnistdn ns completely without h c splierc in which 1R11ssiamay be called upon to excrcisc her infiucncc." I :~lclecl,that on tlie Government of
India objec,ting to nn nrmngen.lent which \voulcl removc
i1fgli;inisl:in complc~elyfrom tlie sphere of British influencc,
thc negotiations with Russia were prolonged for two years,
the Russian Government continuing to protcst, by the ~nouth
of its Chnncellor, that L'Russia l1ac1 no inLenlion of going
further s o ~ d i and
, ~ ~that extension of territory was extcnsion of \veakness." I shewed further that.with these honied
terms upon I~erlips Russia was, during those two years,
preparing for the spring upon ICliiva which she made in
1873. I now propose to rcsumc the history of the recent
negotiations of tlie (';overnments of Grcat Britain and
Indin from the period, January ISG~,when Slicr Ali, having
o\;crconie all his rivals, became unqueslioned ruler of
Afglidnistin.
In Llie a u t u ~ i ~ n ' i m ~ i ~ c d i iprecccling
~tel~
his dccisive victory in January 1869 over his relative, Abclul Rahman, thc
vic~oriousAniir, Slier Rli, bclicving his authority to be per
manently established, requcstcd tlie TAieutenant-Governorof
the Punj311, Sir Donald Mncleod, to inrorni the Viceroy~ l i clate J,ord Lawrence-that, in order to concert a good
~ n d c r s ~ a n d i nbetween
g
tlie two Governnicnts it \vould be a
salishrtion Lo himself if the Viceroy would meet him at
I'csl~d\\wr or solne other place on tlic frontier. The Viceroy was willing Lo grant the interview, and would have
armngccl it, but, beforc preliminaries could be se~tlecl,there
occurred that invasion by Abdul Rahman, the repelling
of which demanded all t.hc energies of Sher Ali.
l'wo n~onLl~s
after tlie decisive battle \vhich confirmed
Sher Ali on his throne Lord Lawrence left India. His successor, the Earl of Mayo, possessed the rare and difficult
((
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gift of n thorough knowledge of his felIo\v-mcn. I-Ie
was quick, bcgonrl all men \vhom I 11nve mct, in rcacli~~g
character, This gift, joined to great decision and cncrgy,
\vould have lnndc him under any circumstnnces n stror~g
man. But, added to it, and gilding, as it were, all his
nctions, tI1c1.cwas a singulnr charm of manner, which impressed cve;yone with whom he came in contact, and
which was sure to csercise, and which did exercise, a
remarkable influence over an 0rient.al people.
One of ~ h cfirst acts of the new Viccroy was to esanlinc
thc rclnlions existing bclween Inclin, ancl the ruler of thc
mountainous region on ils north-wcstern border. Renliriing n t once the importance of thc interview ndiich Shcr
Ali liad solicited from his predecessor, Lord Mayo at o11cc
forwarded to him an invitation to meet him at Ambala.
'The invitation was nccepled.
,., Shcr ?Zli came to Amlxila in the spring of 1869. Had
the l~nnclsof Lord Mnyo been free, it is quite possible that
.
an arrangement might have been arrivcd at which \vould
hnvc prcvcntcd the second Afighnn war and hnvc rendered
ilnpossiblc Ki.~ssinnaggression. But Lcrd i\ilayc\'s hands
werc ticd \ w y ~iglitlyindeed. Shortly after his acceptance
of tlie~officeof Viceroy, llie Minister who hnd rcco~iimel~ded
him for that office had bee11displaced ; and there liad come
inlo poner a h'linistry upon whom a phrase invented bj7
I
Lord L.nntrence, the phrase '' masterly inacti\~it)~,";exe~.cised
a f:lscination which its very victims would find it now diflicult to explain. The rcnl meaning of this phmse, as interpreted by 1-he action of those who adopted it, was h a t
Ihssin might do as she pleased in Ccntrnl Asia, provided
sllc did not touch Afg1i:inistdn; whilst British India
should retnain inactive, not eiicunlberi~gherself with an
offcnsivc alliancc with a power bejrond i ~ aclual
s
frontier,
least of all with AfghiuistAn, and taking care to give 119
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pledge to support thc dynasty of tllc actual ruler of that
country.
If \\lc bear in mind this fcttcrecl position of Lord Mnyo,
we shall casily recognize the greahess of the clisnppointmcnt likely to accrue to the Amir Sher Mi. For Sher Ali
had come to Ambdla full of h o p of obtaining the support
\vhich a dependent wler has a right to cspccl: from his
suzerain. Sher Ali had. come to Ambdla h o p e f ~ ~ofl securing an offensive and defensive alliance with the Government of India. H e desired n full assurance of protection
against Russian aggression, Lhe prospects of which, ever
since the fall of Samarlchand, had filled him \rill1 q ) ~ . e h e n sion. R e wished to be assured, in a distinct and absolute
manner, that the British ~voulclrecognize as his successor,
in his own lifetime, the son \vho~nIIC was prcpared to
nominate. Thesc were Lhc cardinal aims which had
l m ~ n p t e d him to solicit an intervie\v from Lord Lairrcnce, and \vhich influencecl him to accept Llle invitation of Lord IvIaFo. H e had come to ilmbila in the full
hope that his wishes with respect to all of Lhem would be
gratified. Even we, who arc I~ehindthc scenes, nnd \\rho
know how conq~letelythe hands of Lord Mayo were Lied,
cannot realize the full inensure of the disappointment in
store for him.
Thc charm of Lord Mayo's manner won indecd the
heart of the man, but thc spirit of his replies wounded to
Lhe quick the soul of the An+.
With respect to Sher Ali's
cle~nandfor a spccific promise of full l~rotcction against
Russian aggression, Lord h h y o could rcply only with
the vague promise hat " he would be strengthened from
~ i ~ ntoc h i e as circunlstances might sccnl to require ;" Lhnt Fis applications for assistance \vould
always bc receivcd " with consideration and respect."
Nor, on the domcstic question, was the answer hc
8 2
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received one whit more satisfactory to the Amir. I l c
was not cvcn solaced \it11 n promise that lme wo~ddbe
supported against any nltcmpt \vllicIm his rivals mighl. ~ n a k e
to unseat him. T h e utmost he could obtain \vas a n
assurance that any attempt on their p a t \\could be regardccl
by the Eritish Government with '' scvcre displeasure ;"
whilst as to the recognition of his favouritc son as his
successor, although, with respect to that, lie made-to
use
I,ord Milyo's esprcssion--" thc most urgent nncl prominent
demancls ;" statcd his carnest wish that the GovernmenL. of
Indin ' l sl~oulclacknowledge not only hiinself, but his lineal
descendants or successors in hlood ;"and added that, if
this wcrc accorded '' there .was nothing he would not d o
to evince his gratitude," he was met, as far as Lord Mnyo
was conccrned, by a reluctant " 71on possumlts !"
Sher Ali returncd to 1iLbul a sincere admirer a n d , personal friend of 1,ord Mayo, but utterly clisqlpointed with
the political results of his journey. % all intents and
purposes he was in x position, with respect to Gritish
support, but littlc bettcr than that which he had occrlpied
when h c accepted the invitalion. I J c ventcd his fcelings in
tlw bitter rcnlark: "Thc English carc only for tllemsclves!"
Yet-and it is a rcmnrltnble resalt of thc glamour esercised I)y those fital \vords '' ~nnsl-erlyinactivity "- evcn the
vague assurances of I ,ord Mayo had excited the alarnm of
the Ministry in England. T h e plmr+x i~sedby the Viceroy
that any application for assistance on the part of tlme Amir,
would b e received "with consideration and respect " was
objcctecl to by thc Minister for India, on the ground that
those words " mny sonmc day b e construed by tlme Amir or
by his successors as meaning more than, with those cxglanatiom "--i.c., the verbal cxplanaliolr; given by Lord
Mayo to the Anmir-" they were intended to convey."
T h e same Minister even wrote a despatch t~ the Viceroy,
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in whicl~,anlongst other matters, he objected to tlic term
" rigli~fulrule " as applied to the rule of Slier Ali over
Alghdnistin !
'Time went on. T h e IZussinn Governnient, after nniusing
for nrorc than two years the Critish Ministry wit11 vague
and spccious proniiscs, struck at and captured I<lii\q in
1873. 'l'lie nc\vs of this cnpturc rcached l<;il~ulin June of
tlie same year. I t lillccl thc mind of the Amir wit11 tcrrol:
T h e c n t a s ~ o p h ewhich he l i d secn looming in the f ~ ~ l r ~ r e
at Amblila had conlc upon him. ICllivn had folloncd
Sanmkhand. 'I'l~eturn of Afgliinistbn \\.auld follonr 1'1111
of tliesc apprelicnsions Ilc strctcl~edout his hands Lo the
Viceroy, tclling him \hat t l ~ evnguc assurances or h m b d l : ~
were insuficient for the prescnt clncrgcucy, and desiring to
kno\s how fnr lic niigllt rely upon l:ri\isli Iiclp I T Iic shoulcl
bc invaclccl.
11 was, suldy, n i,nlu~drequcst, this solicitnlion lrom 111c
commnnclcr of tI;c outcr hul\\~n~.lc
of I-lindusta~lt o tlie ruler
of the coun(ry 1\711icli that bul\\wk covercd. I t was a
rcqncst \vllicli s l i o ~ l dhave rcceivecl n synipntllixing nnd ITassuring reply.
l'hc Viceroy of India \\Ins no longer Lord Mayo. l'lint
nobleman had been nssnssi~latecl in tlic Andmmnns by n
convict scntencccl to penal servit~~cle
for murder, and l i d
been succeeded by Lord N ~ r t l ~ b r ~ onllnnn
i , whose colcl
unr;yinl~athizing manners nnd liarcl ullimnginnti~enalr~rc
were not calculated to concilinte.
Lord Nortlibroo1c did not feel ernpo\verecl to reply to tlic
nicssoge of tlie Amir, I)ut rclerrcd it by telegram to tlie
Ministry at Iiome, tllc snmc Ministry n.11icl1had adopted with
respect to Indin the fatal principle summcd u p in tlie
Lnwrcntian 111otic. 'l'hc reply Iic rewived is north rccording as n specimen of thc "masterly inibecility" which
pervncled British councils in July 1873.
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" C;tbinct thii~ks," so ran thc tclcgra~n, " you should
inform Amir that n.c do not a t all share liis al;lrm, and
consiclcr there is no cause for i t ; but you nxly nssurc
him we shrill maintain our scttled policy in f~tvour
or Afglidnistdn if hc abides your advice in cstcrnnl
ahirs."
'l'lic I<han,ite of Iiliiva anncxed, and no causc for
alarm ! Surcly ihat w s cold conifort for a ruler who, o n
the spct, posscssccl tlie best m a n s for judging ! W e
do not share his alarm." Wc-who Ilnve bccn dripccl I)y
this \.cry act of Russia ; \vho n e w told that thc espcclitiun
n.as a \cry little one, that far from its being ihc intention
of the Cznr to h k c lihiva, positive orders Iind becn sent
to prevent it ; me, who, after the' event, elo not. care to
exnmine I' too minutely how far ihcse nlxtngcmcnts were in
strict a c c o r d a ~ ~with
e the assurances given in Jmiuary ;"
wc, who hnce hcen duped at every turn and who have
been wrong in every forccast-we "do ~ i o at
t all sharc liis
nlnr~u,and co~isiclerthere is no cause f d i t ! " Cold comfort Lliat, I repent, coming fro111 such n qunltcr, for an
ansious nncl nlat.mecl rulvr !
Cold co~ilfosLi n t l c d Shcr Ali found it. Such n mcssage
w s cnlculntccl to confirm lathcr tlim to rclno\,c his fcius,
Rut lic did not evcn then tlespnil: I-Ic would placc bcfore
tlie Governor-General, and, through him, bcfore thc British
Government, Iicts \dlich should speak, and he ~\louldmake
a find appeal to thcir justice and to their interests. I n this
intent, Shcr Ali Lransmittecl frcsh instructions to nn agent
wlio~nhe hnil prcvionsly c1esp:~tclicd to Simla, the summer
residence o f thc Viccroy, n n o l h n a n n,ho enjoycd all his
confidcncc, S:iincl N u r Muha~~imncl
Sh:ih, urging him to
press for certain dcfinite concessions OI.* thc t\vo ~nattcrs
which he himself hncl so strongly ~~rgecl
a t Ambdla, viz.,
the absolutc assurance of suppor against Russia n7hcn h e
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should denland it, and the recognition of his hvouritc son
as his succcssor.
Nur Muhammacl ShAh carried out these instructions to
the letkr. I-Ic had had one interview with Lord Northbrook on the 12th July : a second was accorded to him on
thc 30th. So far as related to the c.nlming of the apprebensions or satisfying the demands of thc Alnir these interviews
c
n w c absolutely unproductivc. 'I'hcir result may l ~ sumnled
up in a letter addressed by orclcr of Lhe Viceroy to Lhe
Amir. In that letter the Anir nf3s informcd that whilst
the Viceroy did not entertain any npprehension of clnngcr
to his Highness's dominions from withoul, yet that " the
the British Government will endeavour from time to time,
by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen
thc Government of your H i g h l ~ c s ~Lo, snnblc you to
csercise with equity ancl justice your rightlhl rule, ancl to
tmnsmil to your clcscenclants all the dignities a n d honours
of which you are thc lawfi~lpossessor." I n LIE same letler
the Avlir zilns ilzhi~jdcdof thc n s s ~ n ~ gt hs n by l h s i [ z ns
20 his co~mfiy
bei/ly quite B ~ J O the
N ~sjhoa within ~ h i ~she
ii
7ems cnlM ?@on fo exwisc her iri@//c~trc. Easing his
dccision on that assurance, Lord Northlxook "postpoaed
to n morc convenient opportunity" the discussion of the
mensurcs to be taken in thc event cE an attack upon
Afglxinistdn !
I n tllc n~indof Shcr Ali this letter was a deathblow to all
his expectations. Lct us for 3. moment rcalize his position.
H e ruled the middlc region between two colossal powers,
lhglancl and Russia. Every reason, gcogmphical position,
pcrsonnl fecling, his knowledge of the pmctical justice of
hcr rulc in India, promptccl him to link his lot with the
former. But Gussia was advancing
giant s~ridcs.
She mas wilhin striking clistnnce of his cnstcm ljordcr at
Samarlihancl; thc cnpturc of Khivn hncl enstucd to her n
\\lit11
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position wliicli musk sooncr or Intcr bring her on to his western frontier; her agents wcrc busy tliroi~glioutCentral Asia
dwelling upon her power ;und boasting of lier intcntiotis ;
he wished to I)e i n a position to be able to clcfy alilre lier
protnises and her threats. In reply to his denland to be
placed in such a position, hc rcceived only general assurances that lie had 11oground for his alarm.
That the Amir was right in construing as evasive tlie
reply of Lord No~thbroolcis proved by tlic lettcr from that
noblemari to tlic Sccrct-nry of Stntc for India espl:~ini~ig
its
nicatiing. 111 Lhat Ictter the Viceroy slated that thc envoy
of the Amir had becn informcd that " if, in thc event (f
O / ~ UI ~ ~ Y ~ . S J ' ; O$/ hI / / 1 7ijiLh(1//L,
fi/,iLi~h~ V J I I C I ~ ~ T~ ~ U iI /Z/ t ' ~ h d ,
njln'ftrikd hy j!ga/in/rbn /o E/%dn sn/is/;rc/mysrtfZciim/, 1%'
II'AS PROBAB.LB /hut lhc Brilish Go7~e7'n~n~'nt
TCIOI//I~'
nJud the Aulir ~ j i a i c hZ assisln~rcci/i ?+/:iqy crn ~ I L Z J ~ ~ L ' I . ;
but that such assist;~ncc\voulcl be conditional on the Amir
following the advice of the British Government, and having
hitiiself abstained from aggession." .
Observe : the above is the TTiccroy's own interpretation
of his om11 reply to the Anlir ! \\':is it a rcply calculated
to reassure? \\hs it a wply wo~~tliycf the occasion,
worthy of a statesillan ? IIcrc mas tlie comnlander of tlic
outlying bulmalk telling tltc Govcrnor of tlie rich city
whicli it covcred that lie dreaded the sudden attack of 3
sul~tlcenemy, and ixgging for n dcfinite nssilrance that lie
would be protected. I n reply the Governor refuscs to
jwonlise him protection : tells him only that if hc were
attncl~ccl negotiation \\~ouldfirst be tried ; that thcn, if
negotiation were to G d , thcrc was-not a certainty let it be
notccl-but nprobnbih%y that lie would bc protected : nncl
that only if lie nere to comply wit11 certaii~conditiot~s
!
Mark these conditions. 'L'Iic first : that he should follow
the advice of tlie British Guvernnicnt : truly a liard con-

dition, for the British Government might have adviscd him
to yield a I'ul-i-Khi~tun or a Panjdch in order to rclnin the
remainder of his dominions. T h e second condition wns
harder still. l L ' r h a tlie slmnlcl himsclf have abstilincd from
aggression." Nothing casicr in \\m-cls, nothing more
diffict~lt,in the presence of Russia, in practice. T h e stmying of a few herdsmen across tlic I~ordermight be tcrmetl
aggression. T h e history of Russia, and her connection with
the states she has swallo\\wl up, is n constant repetition of
the story of the wolf nnd thc lain!) !
Looking back at that unhappy episode, I cannot I~elirve
that the most prominent British actors in it would care
to defend it. 'I'he reply of the Viceroy \\,as ungenerous,
~instntesm~nlike,and un\vorthy. I t 1.)roducccl the only
possible result \vhicli a clear-headed man could Iiave
ilnticilx~lcdfrom it. I t alicnatecl 11ie hniir f m n I~:ngl:intl,
and clisl)osccl him to receive \\,it11 favour Llic a d v i ~ n c c i
of Kussia. His scnsc of t l ~ c un\\,orthy tone of Lord
Nortlil~rool;'s letl%r, mith its iissllrances of probnblc nssistance in case lie sl~ouldbc nttnckctl, found vcnt i l l the
sarcastic reply ~vliicli h e tmnsmittcd : "l'he frirndly
dcclaration of your Excellency," he wrote in November of
thc smile year, " to the effcct that you will maintain to\vnrds
mc the same policy wl~icliwas followed Ijy J.ord Lawrence
and by Lord &layo, lins I~eenthe causc of much grntificntion
to me, My friend ! Undcr tllcse circumslances of the case
it was not necessary to hold all tl;osc conversations with
Saiad Mur Muhammad ShAh ! T h e understanding arrived
at a t Anib~llais quite sufficient " ! From that moment his
confidential correspondence with thc Viceroy ceased. " I
arn dctermincd," he said, " to rcceivc no morc favours from
the British Govc~dtmcnt! "
Russia mea!~while was continuing her mole-like work
in Central Asia. T h c fruit of this ~vorkwas ncxt seen in

February 1S76, \vhen she absorbed the remaining moicly
of Kholiancl, permitting only the principality of Ih-atigiiin
to rctnin a condition of semi-independence.
I n the spring of that gear Lord Lytton succeeded Lord
Northhrook as Viceroy of Indin. T h e ncw Viceroy cnmc
out empo\vcred by his Government to repair, if it were
possible, tlic miscliief which hacl been accomplished, by
offering to the Amir the activc support a n d protection,
inclilcling thc formal rccogni~ionof his dynasty, \vhicIi hc
had previously vainly cle~~~andecl
a t the I~andsof the British
(;o\wnment. Eut before Lord Lytton had been ablc to
open conlmnnicalions with the Amir, ccrhin evcnts had
happenccl \diich had confirmed that potentake in the llostilc
attitude which he had assunlecl after thc mission of Saiad
Nur l \ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ a r nSlidli
r n a cin
l 1873.
There 11x1 been a dispute of long standing between
Afglxirlisthn a n d Persia regarding certain lands in SSisl-An,
tllc south.western province of the former state. I n the
cnil.bot11 powers had agrced to refer tRc matter to Lhe
arbitration of England. Sllortlp bcfore Tmcl Lytton Ianclecl
in India, thc arbitmtors had given a dccision very much in
favour of l'crsia. This result of a .diKerencc in which lie
belicved tli;rt all tlic right \\.as on his side so cnibittelml [he
A~ilirthat, conling as it did after the S i m h conferences, lie
n~tributedit to n sc~L1ccIdesign on the part of Englnnd to
humilintc, to weaken, and to insult him.
l'lic action of h e Government of India in anollicr
nialler oil which lie vns extremely sensitive still further
embittercd the Amir against the Critish. *
7'hc son who had accompnnicd Sher Ali to A ~ n b d l a
,
on whose Leli:~lT I:c had pleaded to Lord
in I S ~ O and
Mayo, \vns his youngest boy, Al~dillaJh+,
born to him by
his favourite wile. Popular sympathy liacl howcver been
excikc1 in AfghLinistbn and in India in favour of an clder son,

.

Yalcilb : t h i n , nt Llic lime govcrnor of I-Tcr:it, and n ~ h o\vns
believed to bc cndowed n-it11 more than orclinnry ability.
This general i~nprcssionas to thc capacity of Yakill~KhLn
kncled, in the belief of h e Amir, to thc d i s p n m p u e n t of
his.favom.itc in public esti~nation. His first act, thereforc,
on his rc2lurn from tlic Ambdln confcrc~ice,had becn to
entice Ynhdb IChdn to I<dl~ul, nncl to thro\v him into a
dungeon. This act was so far rescntecl by h e Government of Indin thnt it ncvcr failed to press upon the Amir
it's opinion of the inj~!sticeand impolicy of his action, a n d
to urge the release of the prisoner. This conshnl: I-emonstrancc, coming after d l thc Amir's requests had bcen
dcnied, had cngcnclered feelings which the dccision rcgarding SSistd~iincreased to positivc linlred.
T h e Amir was umdcr the influcncc of this pnssion when
Lord 1,ytton arrived in Indi:~. O ~ i cof llie first political
acts of the ncw Viceroy wns to despntch a native Aicle-clccamp to K i b u l with a message of rcconcilialion, But
t11c cvil had b&n clone. Sher Ali liacl already tnkcn his
part. There wcrc at thc timc Kussinn agents in Iifibul,
agents who rcadily pron~iscdwhat thc Iinglish had rcfi~sed,
:uld mho llncl therefore cntire possession of his mil~cl. Sher
Ali declincd then, os~entatiously,to reccive the messenger
of the Yiccroy, ancl tlloi~gl~
the conciliatory langl~agc of
Lord T.ytton rendcred it impossible fur him Lo refuse thn
propo:inl that a c,onferencc between two duly-empo\vered
envoyi from the two courts should take place at Pesh;iwar,
he took care Lo furnish his envoy with instructions \ r l ~ i c l ~
sl~ouldrender the negotinlions fruitless.
T h e interview bctwcen the two negotiators took place at
Pesh:i\vnr in the cnrly part of 1877. England was representcd on that. occasion by Sir J.ewis Pellg, a very dis~inguishcdoficer, who, lincl some years before, mnde Lhe
journey, alonc, wearing all the timc
Rritish uniform,

from 'l'el~eran to the Uritisli frontier, crossing n dangerous comer of Afghanistan, and who wns thoroughly
accloainletl with the habits, language, and moclcs of thought
of [lie people. '1'0 that able oflicer it soon became
apparent that, since 1873, Lhe d t s of the negotiators had
been invcrtcd. 111 Lhat year it had been the Rritish Viceroy \die had declined all the propositions of lie Amir :
in 1877, it was the representative of ILibul ~ v h orefused
his assent !o the lerms of nccommodnlion and rcconcilintion set for111hy the reprcscntativc of the Hrilish Governnient. T o S L I C ~;In extcnt did this proceed, so unaccummoclnting-even hostile-did
thc lnngr~ageof the l<.ibul
envoy at Ins1 I.)ecomc, that tlic Viceroy wisely took ndvantagc
of the death of that nobleloan to declare (lie conference
a t an end.
lt'rom lint moment the Governnient of India, acting
upon instructions from England, resolved " t o maintain an
altitr~dc of vigilant reserve until sr~chtime as the Anlir
might bclter realize his own position nncl"inte~.esls." 'rliis
policy wns persevered in for twenty months, During Lhnt
pcriod the aggressive action of Russia continued to dcvelop itself. 'l'licre cannot be a doubl but ~ h n t ,liad Llic
ncgolintions I)el\vecn England and l<ussin in rS78 tcrminatcd in x ruplure betvccn the two powers, IZussin was
prcpiuecl lo follom in the foolsteps of Niclir Sliii11-to
threaten from tlic base of n friendly Afglirinistin llic
empire of Hindustan.
Under these circumstnnces, it
was not. possible, that the nritish Govcrnmcnt sliould
remain quiescent, \vhen-a
breach betnfeen Russia and
England seeming to be a question not of days but of
hours-the Amir receivecl nil11 remarkable ostcntation an
embassy despatcl~eclLO Iiiln by tlic Czar I n
P e t though it was impossible that the British COVCIIIment sl~oulclallow to pass withor~t11olice a n act which

constituted a brcach of thc engagement existing bc~wecn
itself and the Aniir-the engagement niadc between 1)ost
Muhammcd and Mr. John Lawrence in 1854,accepted by
Sher Ali on his zccession, confirmed by him at An~bdlx
in 1870, and never s~ibsequcntlyabrogated-the cngagcment that he would be '( the friend of the friends and
the encmy of the cnemies" of thc Dritish Governmentthc noticc which the Viceroy did take of il was remarkable for ils moderation. Lord Lytton simply requirecl
that tlie Amir, having welcomed an embassy fro111 the
Czar, should receive in his capital an embassy from the
Viceroy of British India. H e informed [-lie Amir at Llle
same time that his refmal would bc consLrued a s an unfriendly, evcn a s a hostile, act.
T h e conduct of Sher Ali on receiving the friendly
lettcr containing this proposal from Lhc Viccroy was more
than discourtco~~s.Not only clid he vouchsafe LO it n o
reply, but lie directed (he officer commanding the arl\~ancecl
posts in the di?cction of the British frontier to refusc
admission to the British envoy and his retinue, and, if
necessary, to repel him by force !
T h e Viceroy, meanwhile, hacl directed the distinguisliecl
ofiicer whom lie had nominated to be cnvoy-General
Sir
Neville Chamberlain-to proceed on his mission. But
when Chamberlain attenlpted to enler the I<haibar pass
h e found its heights occupied by the army of the Amir.
H c was, in fact, ref~lsccladmittance !
l'he position had now become very strained. Lord
Lytton had t o consider that the mountainous region
covering tlie north-\vestern frontier of the empire of \vhich
h e was Viceroy, a region upon the maintenance of which
the predecessorsrof the English, the hfogols, had always.
insisted, which covers all the passes through which invaders of India have passecl a n d niust ~ ~ sand
s , the 110s-
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scssion of which by Russia nwuld Ic:ive India at the
nlcrcy of Russia, was nois held by an Arnir who, spurning his offers, had consented to be the vassal of Russia.
He ]mad to consider that every mow of the Amir, his
hostile attitude, his refusal to receive his envoy, had been
dictated by tlie Russian guests whoni lie was entertaining
a t his capital, and that these might at any moment suggest
action which would for ever paralyze British interests.
,
Ihem was a strong Russian force at SnmnrLhand, and
there were detachments betnlccn thnt city and ICBbul. If
these were to be called up, tlie situation would become
cstremely perilous.
Reluctant, hon.ever, to proceed to estrenmities, Lord
Lytton resolved to afford tlie Anlir one more opportunity
to return to n. better mind. H e wrote tq him, then, to the
effect that n marked insult had been offered to the envoy
\vhom 11c ]mad ordcrcd to procced on a co~nplinlentnry
visit to his capital; that lic trusted the Anlir would, upon
reflection, realize that such action was fiot in accordance
\sit11 friendly relations between two neighbouring nations :
tliat, if deliberately intended, it was a hostile act ; but
that in the hopc tliat it was not deliberately intended
the Viceroy \\us glad to give the Amir the opportunity
of disavowing it, or, if it liad been clone by his exprcss
orders, of now expressing his regret for the sanie. Lord
Lptton adclecl, that unless a satisfactory reply werc rcceived before the zoth November he should bc forced to
regard the insull as clelilxrate and intentional, and tliat
h e should treat the Amir as an enemy.
Tlic date, tlie not11 November, fixed for the rcceipt of
the reply, allowed the Amir six clear days to consider his
posilion. On the 19th lle penned a wply-a reply as
evasive and unsatisfxtoi-y as the coinnmunication he ]mad
received in 1873 from Lord Northbrook, Tliis reply
. . die!
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not howevcr reach the Viceroy Lill many days after the
date he had mcntioned. On that date liostilities had commenced.
Such was tlie origin of the second Afgli;in mar, A hard
and unelastic principle of policy, the principle thoroughly
expressed in tlic words " illastcrIy inactivity" applied to it
by its authors, designed in its origin to deal with a n
Afglxinistdn boundcd on tlic north and north-wcst by wild
and independent tribcs, had been rigorously appliccl to nil
Afghdnistdn natclling with beating Ilcnrt tlie stcady nbsorption of those indcpcnclent tribes by the great Northcrn
P o w r \\~hichsincc 1859 had been no longer held back
b y thc barriers of the Caucasus. I n her fear and her
agony All1:inist~in had nppcalcd to tllc Power of \vhich
she licrself constituted the outer bul\\wlc--shc had q ~ ~ e a l e d
to the British rulers of I-iindustbn. I n her appeal to those
rulers shc pointcd to the fact that onc kingclorn on her
north-eastern border 11x1 bcen virtual!y sn:allowed up ;
that but one mofith had clnpsed since nnothcr Icingclom,
beyond her north-western frontier, had been suddenly a n d
without wartling nnnexed ; that she was n o n threatenrd ;
and she a s l i d alike for synipathy and assistance. Both
werc refused. An empire n~iglltbe lost, but the principle
of a, hdlo\vcd phrase \ms not t o bc infhgccl. 'rhe rulers
of England, but just a\\~tkeniiigto the conviction that, in
t h e inatter of Kl~ivn, they h a d been deliberately triclicd
ancl deccived by liussin, professed thcir willingness to b e
cleceivcd once again, to believe plcclges made only to be
broken, to trust in promises \vhich were violated before the
p p c r had absorbed the ink with which they were written.
They answered then thc entreaties of Afghinistin with a,
complacent asslyaiice that they did not share hcr alarm ;
that, if shc \ \ w e attacked by Russia, and if, then, the
~legotiators of England failed to induce that power t o
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istdn with troops, provided always it were made clear to
thew Illat her rulcr \voulcl follow their advice and that
AfghhistLn " had al~stained fro111 aggccssion " ! Well
might tlie Amir remark " the goat attacks not the panther; "
well might lie declizre his detern~inationto receive no more
favou~.sfroin the English ! Can we wonder that, bnRled in
his hopes, as he knew himself to bc, fooled, as he bclievcd
hi~nsclfto be, he should take a n early opportunity to dcry
his former protector, and throw Ilimsclf into the arms of
England's enemy ? Between two colossal po\vers, onc of
whom was. profuse of promises, tlie othcr cold and unsympathetic, it was surely natural that he should prefcr t11c
former !
The second Afghdn war, then, was the natural outcoine
of the repellant policy of 1873. I t devolved upon Lord
Lyttol~to carry it out. H e had a great opportunity. I n
the Indian army he possessed, in I S ~ San
, unsurpassed
material, and he was giltecl with t l ~ cpow&. of ~nltingaccurate stock of the inen with whom he mas brought into
contact. I t mas Lhe perception of Lord Lytton thnt gavc
t o Sir Frederick Roberts the opportunity which broi~ghl:
him speedily Lo the very foremost rank. Side by sidc with
lioberts were such inen as Cliai-lcs MacCregor, Donald
Stewnrt, James Ilills, not to spealc-for the list is a long
onc-of very many others. T h e Sikh and Glirkah regim c n ~ swere well-drilled and disciplined and eager for a
forwnrd move~nent. The cavalry, the artillery, the commissariat, mere thoroughly organized and ready for the
campaign. \Vhilst Lorcl Lytton, then, had a splendicl opportunity, he possessed ample means for using tlixt opportu~iity, for settling for ever the Russo-&ighan question.
T h a t hc did not settle it is clear. How was it then that
h e failed ?
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T h e fault \\,as not the f ~ i d tof Lord Lgtton. I n ~ h e
part \\hich clevol\~ed~11mihim lie liad done all that was
possible. H c had rhosen Lhc right men and sr~pplied
them with thc bcst mnlcrials. A civilian, even Lliough he
wcrc Viceroy, could d o no more. 'l'he rcsulls justified his
m:icipnlions. 'I'he scco~itlhfglinn war had begun the 20th
of Novcmbcr, I S ~ S . 111 M;ly of the ycar following Yakilb
Iih:in, son and succcssor of Amir Slicr hli, ~ v h oI ~ a ddicd,
cnlercd thc Uri~.ishcamp a supplicant for pcacc !
T h a t event gave the 13ritish Govcrnrnent the long-dcsirecl
opporLunity, J n n speccl~ nladc a t the Lord Mayor's
banquet in Noven~ber 1878, Lord ~caconslicld had dcclaret1 thal the main objcct of Llic arniccl intcrvcntinn i n
Afghdnistin was to obtain ':a scientific frontier.:' Like all
Llic plirnses used I)y that dishguislied stalesman when lie
wished LO empl~asiscn particular linc of action, lhe phrase
c : ~ 1 ~ l Lhe
i 1 public car nncl \\.as repealed nll over the country.
N o t cvcry one, however, aslied himself or cared to ask
others \\.lint it rcal?y meant. T h e phrase was so sonorous
and espressive Lhnt the general lx~blic\v;~sconlent to accept
it without il~quirp.
Therc wcrc, lio\\wer, some \vho examined more closely
its r e d meaning. Alnongst these \\m the gallant soldier
and distinguishecl strategist from whose lecture in 1884. I
havc quolcd i n a p r a i o i ~ s chaptcr, Licuienant-General
Sir Ed\rnrcl T-l'amlcy.
'I'o Sir E d \ \ w d Hamley the phrase could havc but o11e
significance. '1'0 llim n scientific frontier meant a strategicnl
fronticr-a frontier, \vhich, making India safc against cvery
chance of invasion, should allow the races hehind it's line
Was such a
to livc unclislurbed by continun1 scares.
fron~ierpossiblc f ~ Irn d i a ? T o give an answer to that
question I-Iandey applied to the sludy of Lhc subject a
mind singularly clear and well-stored. When h e had
C

thorougllly iltnstcrcd it, Itc, i i ~response to a requcst mndc
t o him Iy thc Council of t l ~ cRoyal Lrnitcd Servicc Institution, dclivcrcd his vicws on thc 13th of December, 1878,
t o n lnrgc and distinguislted audicnce assen~l~lcclin its
thcatrc.
Ncver did Sir 13. Ha1111cy more con1pletcly vindicatc his
title to thc character of slrategis~thnn on this memorable
occasion. He depicted, wit-lt,a master's hand, tlie conditions of the Indian frontier; sho\vcd that the linc of the
Itidus wns no rcal 1)arricr against invasion ; that, if propcr
prcc:m~ions were talicll on the Pcsh:i\\.nr plain, wc nccd
not be apprcl~cnsiveregarding an invasion through tlie
Kli;!ib:lr pass ; that neither the I<hurnm Pass, nor tlie
Gomnl, need inspirc us with scrious alnrm; hut that
bctvcen Randnhnr and tlie I n d u s were plnins of rcmnrkable fertility which could subsist an encmy's army until its
gcncrnl should clioosc the opportune momcnt and thc
cnsicst point whcn a n d wherc to cross thc Indus. I-le
cnmc to the dcfinite conclusion, then, thft n.c should occupy
t h c snlient angle which covered that country and all the
passcs Icnding into Indin behind it. T h a t snlient angle
\\.as rqxcse~itccl by ICandnhar. " I hnve enclca\-onred,"
said Sir Edward, in concluding a lccture which will p r o w
to aker ages that there was a t least one English soldier
\\rho thoronghly undcrstoocl the posilion, ." LO skclclr- a
clcfinitc plan upon which to conccntmtc our rcsourccs, and
b y which to sccure a scientific frontier, a n d a permanent
settlement of this large question. Looking a t the northcrn
half of this pnrt of our tcrritoly, I think we sliould bc
thaitltful for possessing n frontier s o easily rendc:recl impt.cgnablc. Looking at thc southern half, we have n o less
reason t o be thankful for l~nvingacquirpcl, in Quclla, s u c l ~
nlcnns of vigorous and effec~ive~action,
and s11c11nn opportunity of securing new advnntnges of the most importnnt
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nnd clccisive kind. \.\'it11 a garrison strongly postccl in its
lines at lianclal~ar,with all the rolltcs a n d stages by which
our forces might be a s s c ~ ~ ~ l ~on
l e cthat
i point, all so~ircesof
s ~ ~ p p l and
y , all armngcme~?tsfor tsmsport, lnid domn, ns
our trained staff ofticcrs arc ccrtainly capable of laying
t l ~ e mdown, we might vicw calmly m y possible complicalions beforc us, n~hetlicr arising f r o n ~ he angmented military ponlcr of Russia in the East, from thc success of her
intrigues, or from her open hostility. T h e gro~~ncls
of our
assurance would b e manifcst and easily unclr:rstoocl, our
native subjects would soon learn to appreciate them, and
what would be security for us would be tra~~cluillity
for
I'ndia."
Spcaking on the samc subjcct, two ycars Ixtcr, at the
fiojwl &@,r~uj/'ic~d
Society, an o f k c r of Engineers, clisting ~ ~ i s h efor
d his auainnwnts and \dl0 liad visitcd thc
country, thus s u p p o ~ t e dSir E. Hamlcy's view :" k'rom a comnicrcial, political, o r , military point of
~ i c w , "said ~ a p t a ; n I I ~ l d i c l i ,:' Knndalinr is the most iciportant point in Afgllinistin ; gcographicnlly it may bc
said to indicate the ~rcalc point of the Afghdn frmtier.
'I'1icl.e is no Hindu ICusli Ixtwcen ICandnhar and the
north-west, nor is the distribution OF the hill country r o u ~ l d
I<nndalinr of sucli a nnturc, o r such nil ostcnt, as that
which enabled the tribcs of thc north to maltc s o formidable an opposition to us last wintcr.
" T h e bronc1 open plains wliicli s u r r o ~ ~ nKandaliar
d
arc
not well suited to A f g h h tactics. ~Vhatcverdifficulty We
may liave in dcaling with n foe \vIiose strcngth lies chiefly
in his power of scattering, or concentrating, 3s the case
may be, by lnalting use of mountain tracts 2nd ~ ~ n l t n o m n
hill paths, vmishss \dlen h e country b e c o n m flnt and
open. T o hold ICdbul would mean to hold an extensive
line of hills round IGibul. T o hold ICnndaliar means very
G 2
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little more thnn retainins colnnnnd of the wall.; and
citadel. 'I'l~c chicf n.cnlth of i t f ~ l i ; i ~ ~ too
i s ~ his ccrlainly
co~~cenlrnteclin I<nncl.hs.r :uld J~lcriil.. Conlpnrcd to
ICantlull:~, ICibul is but nn arsc~inl,and n convc~lic'nt
slrntcgical point from mhich to govern the turbulent
~norlhcrntribes. I
L
:i s not n cenlre of trade in nny sense,
nor has it the commnncl of such grand trade roulcs as
I<anrlalnnr possesses.
1Jr1t J<an:l:lixlr lies just as ensily
open t o approach iron1 onc sidc as from :t~iothcr."
,
1 his, then, was t l ~ crc:d scicnlilic frnnlicr-- the estcnsion
of tlic Urilisli frunticr to I<anclnhar, tile annexation of thc
u~duI:ntinp Cllnti:lli p1atc:ru 1.1cllincl 'I'nl, nnrl of the l'ishin
v~~llcy. 'I'hc fortifications of I<nndnll:~rto be strengtl~cnccl
and that place united by rail with Cirislnl:, Farah, and
Herfit, which last placc should be plnccd virtually under
British protection.
I Il:~vesnit1 " to l < a ~ ~ l n l" ~Ijut
~ r thc
; occi~pationof that
town should incluclc t h e occupation of the country as h r as
thc Helmund. " \\:hen we spcal;," said Sir E. I-I:~nllcy,
on n su1)sequent occnsio~~" Of occupying 1<:111c1:111nr,it is not ~nerely tlnc city
that is meant. '1'0 lmld 3 city against a Ixsieger bringing modern artillery to bcnr on it, iu to cloon~ it
to ruin, its inhal,il:mts to dcst~.i~ction.Positions I I I L I ~ ~
be held nt a clist;~ncc--in this casc u p to the line of Lllc
1-lel~ni~nd.'l'hcsc positions, in orclcr to draw from them
their full advantage against such forces ns the Russians
cor~ldbring on LIS, shoulcl bc c ~ ~ ~ f ifortified
~ l l y with c~nrtlnworks, and nl ined wit11 nl-tillcry nlorc pn\\,erTi11than could
follow t l ~ cmarch of a n i n ~ d c r . Sir Alicl~aclIiiddulph, in
n valua1)lc rcport made from personal observation during
the Inst Afghan wnl; says, "l'hc position,of Girisl~lcis with
the most modest prccnution i~nassnilaLle-all the pnssages
of the Helnlund can be dcfended Ly suitablc works a t
>
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short noticc.' Tlii.; being tlic first linc, Ile describes a
scconcl s~rongline behind i t-and a third, if necessary, is
to' bc fomd, IIC says, on an arc extending Cronl the edge of
thc desert. ' Irisiclc this arc,' he goes on, ' lies all the proclwtive country, while willioul it Llic country is sterile and
an open glacis.' ' I t s e e m to mc,' he aclcls, ' that even
thotrgh invasion Inxy be remote, the possession of this
point has an importrn~cewhich cannot Ijc mtcd too Iiigllly.'
I t is upon the lielmuncl, tlicn, lhat \re must dircct our
march, iC \ve occupy Kanilaliar. And if we clo not occul)y
it, we can ne\..er I x certain tlint Russia will not anticipate
us on thc IIclnlund."
No\\; \vhcn in May, 18.19,'l'diilb K l h entcred the
British camp at Ganclali~akto accept any tcr~nswhich the
British (;overnmcnt might offer, ihc obtaining of the
slrnlcgical fronlicr ciescriberl by Sir Ed\varcl I-lamley was
casp. \ire hncl hut to ask for it to get it. That w o did
not ohtnin il was,mora thc f:~ultof the Ministry in Downing Slreet than of I.,orcl I:,y~~on.
If Lord l,ytton had proposcd s ~ ~ cal ifrontier the Cnlinct
doi~b~less
would have supported hi~n. Lord Lytton did
not propose il., because, being a civilian, he llad to depend
for his stratcgical plans on the ~iiilitaryadvisers at his
elbow, and amongst those adviscrs t h e was not one \vho
was posscssecl of practical s~mtegicknomledgc.
I do not rcfcr lo men likc Robcrts, M a c C q o r , Stewart,
or Hills. They \\we \\dl1 the aruiy in Lhe ficld. But, at
Simla, Lord Lytton was surrounded by theorists, each of
\vhon~had his favourite plan-plans built not,as\\.asE-lamley's,
upon knowledge and argument, but upon rcasons which the
supporter would have found it difficult to ~llaintnin11cforea
critical assembly of esperls. To put the niattcr tcrscly
and clearly, it was Lord I.!;tton's painft11task to liavc to
select from a aumber of plans, all of them incongruous
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and deiecti\.c, tlic plan \vliicli lie dccmcd the least
liarmf~il.
I t is possi1)le-I d o uot kno\v-but it is possiblc Ile may
l ~ a ~been
l e Ilnmpered by the I-Iome Government. Certainly
it \\.as in the p o \ \ w of the H o m c Government either to
force a plan 11po11 him or reject and alter any wliicli h e
might propose. Whether tliey clid s o or not I cnnnot say.
At any rate they must hear the responsibility.
Now that the Cabinet which rulccl tlic Gritisli empire
I)et\vccn 1874 and 1880 11x1 clear minds rcgnrcling Lhc
'' scientific frontier " wllicli its brilliant chief clesirocl to
sccurc it is impossible to x;scrt. I t is most p:~infulto m c
to be obliged to admit that, not only llad its members n o
clear views, but they had no clefini~ciclens wl~atevcron the
subject. This \\.as patent up to the Inst moment of their
remaining in power. They adopted n right principle a n d
nn intelligent policy only from t l ~ cmoment wl~enthey
acre relegatecl to the cold shade of oppos$ion.
Rcgnrding " the scic~ililicfrontier," the Cabinet of 1873
l ~ a dideas, I have said, neither clear nor clclinite ; and tliey
Ilad, moreover, no conlpctent military adviser to inspire
lliem. Not inclcccl, becnusc l l ~ c r cwcrc not military ndviscrs
at tlicir c l l ~ o \ ~ The
~ . l c c t ~ ~ of
r c Sir Ud\snrcl Hnmley had
been clcli~cred to n very distinguished nnd a very crilicnl
audience, had bccn spol<cn of 011 tlic very evening of its
deli\wy in the House of Commons, had bcen noticed in
the leading nrticlcs of our clnily newspapers, and had
attracted an extraordinmy amoiint of at~ention. Wiscloii~
had cricd aloud in the strccts, But the members of the
Cnbinet had shut their ears I
T h e fact is, lhnt in all matters rclaling to the Afghan
question the Cabinct of 187.4-80 flounclfled from first to
last. Succeeding n Cabinet which had adoptcd and persistcntly acted ~~pcinthc fatal principle cspresscd by the
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words "masterly inactivity," the Cabinet of 1874
rescnnblcd, in its I n d i m policy, a inan who lanew
Lhat if he were to stand still IIC would die, but n h o
\WS afraid to n ~ o v eforward lest he should stumble into
n bog. And that expresses esnctly what this Cabinet did
do. Althougl~Sir E d n m d I-Inmley held up n lnntcrn to
5 1 1 tllcnn
~ ~
thc solid path along which thcy might Lrcnd
with security, ~ h c i rfcarr, whispered that thc light of his
lantern \\.as the light of n \\lill-o'-ll~c-\\~isp
: thcy took Lhen
a step in a n opposite direction, ;md suffered thc calasLrophe
I have mentioned.
F o r thc "scientific frontier" obtained by the Treaty of
Gandnniali was, in w r y dccd, tlie nork of unscien tif c mcn.
I t \\.as a delusion 2nd n snnre. I t gnvc Indin n frontier
n tliousnnrl times mosc unrclinblc than thc frontier which
it hncl abandoned to obtain it. I t gave 11s tlic Klinibar
Pass, when wc werc h r bettcr off in the vallcy of thc 111dus
ready to receive a n cnemy emerging from ~ h n tpass; it
ga\Ie us the K h u h valley, the occupation of which would
liavc isolated a porrion of our army : it's o m solitarjr
mcrit \\'as Llie acquisition of the valley of Pishin.
I t clicl not last long. W e acquircd it aOr-:olutcly, that is,
he treaty which gavc it to 11swas ralificd, thc 30th n'hy ;
the #allant Cavngnari was rnurclc~.ed on thc 4 ~ hSepLember. Threc nlontl~s of existence were anlplc for so
grotesque nn abortion ! It's early dentli, follo\\~cd though
it was by n rcncwal of tlie war, was a blessing for \\hicli
!
tlic authors cf its esistence ought to be for ever thnnlil~~l
T w o d:lys after the murder of Cavngnari, ZCobcrts, the
most brilliant, the most daring, Lhe most accomplished of
gcncmls, comlnenccd the war. O f such a man, of such
men as Hamley, 2s Charles h~IncGregor,and as Hills, it is
inspiring to write. P,ut t l ~ a ttask is n o w rlcnied mc. I
h a w to ilcnl only nith lhc rcsulls of tlic cnr~tpaign. I t is

I~o\\~e\~er,
at least satisfactory to know that such men still
survive for the service of Grcnt Rritnin.
T h e \\?nr thus re-commencccl conlin~lcd lill the cluse
of ISSO. I'nstcrn Afghdnist:in, or ICnl)ulislAn, 1 . d becn
t , Llic I.LIIC over L l ~ tportion
evacunlccl the T I t h A ~ ~ g u sand
of ~ l l c o ~ ~ n l rconrerrecl
y
upon ill~dulRnhm.in, the relative
d ~ o mSlier Ali 11x1 clefcntcd and drivcn into esilc in
Jnnualy, 1869, and who h:ld sincc Lllnl time been living in
Bokhlirn, :L pcnsioncr of Russi:i. I h t in \ \ h t is generally
called \~esLcrn Afgllinisldn, that is, in Llle country about
T<nnclnh~rnncl from ICnndal~nr northwards the war continued some time longcl: Holding, as I do, \\.it11 General
to intcrferc
Ila~nlcy,Lhat therc was no necessity ml~ate\~cr
in cnstcrn hfgh;inisthn; that tlic true in~crcstsof Engln~id
wcrc bound up in the linc from Quclh Lo Knndnlm and
from I<nnd:lhnr to I-l'erht ; th,~l:Lhnl is thc linc \vhich, LO
bar Russian invasion, wc have to occupy nncl s e c ~ ~ r eI,
slinll confine nly commcnts to the nktipn of the Xrilish
Government on that line.
The ~.cnc\valof the war had givcn thc Conservative
C:~binctnnotlicr chance. Aftcr tlic collnpse of the Treaty
of Ganclnmnk, sonic din1 light of thc trutll of Sir Edward
I-Tnn~ley'snrgunicnts woulcl scem to have removed a portion
of the fog which h a d obscured their reason. T h e apprchension stolc upon them that the 1Zandahar linc might, after
all, be the true line. If we wcre to judge only from their
d t c r conduct when in opposition we might even I~elievc
that the npprehension grew into conviction. If that were
so, they were more nlorllly of condemnation than if their
vision hnd remained clouclecl. For this nt least is certain,
they never rose Lo Lhc Ileiglll: of the silunlion. 'l'hey sho\\recl
themselves painfully wanting in accura'k knowledge, in
decision, in that quality which will cover a multitude of
minor sins, in pluck. Having ICandahar in their possession,
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convinced as we must supposc they were convincecl, of its
enormous importance-for, subsequently, they all voted
for Lord Lytton's m o ~ i o n for its retention, in Llie 1-Iouse
of Lorcls, and for Mr. Stanhope's motion in the I-Iousc of
Ccmmons (i'lnrcli, ISSI)-LIIC~ lincl not tlic coumge lo
put their foot down and say " possessing this iml~ortant
plncc, this place s o ncccssa~yto the safety of India. \YC
will Ixep it." No-thcy
adopted one of thosc lialfmeasures which are thc bane of truc statesmanship--such
a half-nicasure as the elclcr Pitt would havc spurned a ~ i d
Palnierslon \voulcl liavc deridecl-they
placed tllcrc in
suprenie authority a cousin of the Ink Aniir, a mnli likewise nnniecl Slier Ali, \vho under tlie nnnie of L ' \\Tali " or
morc properly, " Vali," was c o n d ~ ~ tlie
c t civil adniinistmtion of the districts clepcndent upon Lhe ci~):. l;or nll the
good that this appointment caused, the Govcrnmcn~might
as well have stuck up a lay ligure. 'I'lie people in the
country covered_by Kandahar wcre longing for the British
rule : they came in crowds to tlie political officer in charge
of tlie Chatidli district to implore it. h bold announcenicnt that England lnd nclvanccd her frontier as far as
Kandahnr would have had an imniense influence for good.
'I'he nppointnicnt of the " Vnli " shewed to the popula~ions
Lhnt tlierc was still a chance of their being relegated to
tlic hatccl rulc of ICibul. Nor, whilst Llius productive of
cvil, urns tlie mcnsurc accompanied by any corresponding
aclvnnLage. From first to Inst thc " V:ilin rcniainecl what I
havc said he might as wcll have bcen-a lay figure. On
the first important disturbance, 14th July, 1880,his troops
eclesertcd 2nd h e collapsed, though he did not actually
clisnppenr till thc following Deceml~cr!
T h e collapse3f the " Vali " mas a result second only, in
the beneficial chances nrhich it offered to Great Britain,
to the disappearance of the treaty of Gandnmak. Like
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that fortunate collapse, it gave Englai~danothcr cl~anceto
retricvc her political errors-to
secure a really scientific
frontier.
But, bcfore Llint chance ofrercd, a change had occurred
in the guidance of the political destinies of Great Britain.
'The hllinistry mhich had desired " a scientific frontier" had
gone out, 2nd the advocates of " masterly inactivity " had
conle in. The men who had composed the retiring Cabinet
recovered their senses and thcir courage only with the first
inhaling of thc opposition breeze. It was, incleccl, high
~ i m ethat they sl~ouldrecover both. If it be true, as was
stated in Jan~~arp,
ISSO, and has been repentccl without
contracliction over and over again sincc that date, that in
that mon~lithey were trcating with Persia for the transfer
to that powcr of the important city and district of I-Ierat,
they must Inve been absolutely on the verge of in1Ixcility. \\Thy, it was to prcvcnt the consummation or
such an event that Lord Paln~erston p l p n e d the first
Afghan wnl; and that he inade war on l'crsia in 1856 !
And, in spite of that, a Conscrvativc Ministry aclunlly
d c h t e d mlieLher, to rclicve themselves of rcsponsilrility,
it \\.ere not advisalrlc to d o that which thc grcatest
forcign minister-I
might almost s?.y, the only forcign
miniatcr-of this century 1 1 ~ 1waged LWO wars to prcvent !
Did they ask themselves for a moment what snch a transfer
would mean; that the handing over of Her& to Per:iin
~vould signily the handing ovcr o l I-Iedt to Russia? If,
it1 their forgetfulness or neglect of history, they li;itl
doubted then, can they doubt no\v ? Docs not thc hte cf
old Saralths rend a lesson ? Has the occupation of Pul-iliishti a~iclof the Zulfagnr Pass, and the threat to occupy
Panjdell-places far beyond the frontier acepted by Russia
in 1872 and never till now repudiated-not opened their
cyes? Or,. is it a h c t , Lhat il Russia werc to occupy
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to-morrow the hill \\~hichis said to con~mand Igerit, s
terrified English l\'iinistry, and an ignorant 311d gulliblc
British public would readily s\vallow thc c s c t ~ s cthat there
was n llew H c r i t as \wll as an old Herdt, and that Russia.
had only tnken thc latter?
If t l ~ cConservntivc Cabinct 11x1 transferred IIerdt to
Persia, they would have dcscr\lcd i~npeachmcnt. I3ut thc
conduct of ils nlcmbcrs sincc they hnvc Ixen in opposition
has 1 ~ x 1 7so much morc bold and dccidcd on a11 matters
nKcc~iny ~ h cfrontier policy o € Indin hat I a m nilling to
Iiopc, cvcn to believe, that the idcn, i€ serior~slyd i m s s c d
at all, nas discussed only to be dismissed. But, beforc I
advcrt morc fully LO the true conccp~ion of the national
inlcresls which has guided them in oplmsilion I must nolicc
thc action of h e i r successol.s \vllich causcd it.
T h c Afghan wnr nlns still unfinishccl when the '' mnstcrly
innctivity " party rct~lrncdLo power. T o thcni it hacl Ijcen,
and nrns, gall and n.orm\voocl. Rut the clcfcnt a t Mniwand
and the sul)scqu&t I c q y e r of Kandnhnr by Ayi~l, Klmn
had placctl them in thc, to thcnl, extrcmcly painful 1)osition
of bcing forced Lo continue the war. From this painful
l ~ ~ s i t i oLhcy
n w r c rescucd by Sir I"rederic1.: Roberts, whose
i~~~iiiiiuitliiarch
and s u b s c q ~ c n tZccisive victory will cvcr
rcmnin one of the most chcrishcd records in the military
history of Cleat Britain. l'liis vii:~oryconcl~~clccl
tl!e wnr-.
Still ICanclaliar nlns in our hnnds, and we might cnsilp
h a w made it n condition with thc new h n i r w110n1 we
had placed in authority, that n c slioulcl hold it. l'he
rcndcr laust b c x in mind that thc question c:ul~c u p lor
the lrist timc in the year 1851;-I, at thc time that Skobeleli'
was lmparing Lhe cq~edition which subdued thc Akhal
,
1urkomnns. 'l'lw idcn thcn occul.rcd Lo mc that if Lhosc
splentlid \varriors \\,ci.c subdued, and wc should, i n ~ h c
\.cry same ) cnr, c\.acunti. t l ~ cfwnticr f'ort~.cssn.1lic.h cove-r~cl
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all the western passcs into Hindustan, the ensily inipressed
pcoples of India n.oulcl not fail to imbibe the idea, not
only that England was retiring before Russia, but that,
Trom fear of Russia, shc had left opcn thc o n c gap in
hcr fronticr linc, throogh which lhc invaclcrs of India
from tlic n o r h had always advnncecl. 'To test the correctncss of tlicsc iclcns I visited India, and spent nearly thrcc
winter months ~ C I - efrom
,
Novembcr to the third weelc of
January,. ISSO- I . Thirtylive ycars of previous residence
in all parts of tlic country had made me acquaintecl wit11
most of its rcl~rcsentativcmen, and I llad little clifficul~y
in indr~cingLhcm lo speak frankly wit11 me on the suhject.
I found, amongst all clnsscs, anlong T\~luh;umn~aclans
as
\wll as among Hindus, a rcmnrkablc ayeenlent of opinion.
T h e y all condcmncd the al~nntlonmcnt of Icnndahar as
likcly to cnusc the people of India to lose confidence in
h e staliilily of !?:.itis!: :.!!!c. " NLdir Slldh came by that
rot1 tc " thcy snid, " nntl houg11 I<andnlnrl slopped him frrl.
a year, nothing stopped 11in1n f ~ c rhu hncl tnkcn that plncc.
Russin \rill of caul-sc ronclrlcr tllc 'l'url;on~:~ns. :\nd thcn
I
- I N i li
If ).OII Irave
I ~ s i il l I I I
Kanclahn~~,
you will Imvc opcn n gap I)); \vllicl~Russia will
casily cnter. 'I'hc nntivc princcs, mcn l i l x Scindinli and
)Iolkar, know t l l a ~ns \wll as you do. 'I'hcy bcnr your rulc
I m a u t c if you werc not I ~ c r etllcy woulcl fight amongst
tlici~lsclvcs, and h c y know you c:m dcfcnd tlicrn and
nlnintnin order. I3ut if they once think that a grentcr than
you is coming, and 11icy will think :io if you dclibcrately
Icave the gate open for him to come, lhe hope of gaining
so~nethingout of a general scrimm:ige will pervade [heir
niintls, and \vhcn yo:^ scnd your army to nicct lhrssin o n
h e Inrlus, Lhcy will slril;c for inclcpcndc~-r^ccin your rear."
Such was llic gcnernl opinion cspresxcl to nie by the
Nn;;vcs of Indin, wl~o,in my judgment, were best c a p

ble of gauging thc vie\vs or their countrymen. Shorlly
after my return to England I embodied, at tlic request
of tlic members of the Constitr~ticnal Union, Iny espericnccs in tlic form of 3 I C C ~ U ~w~ l, ~ i ~Ih d ~ l i w r c d in
Pcbruary nr i \ k ~ r c l of
~ rSSr to a Inlge audiencc in 9.
Jamcs's 11:dI. I am b o ~ ~ n to
c l nclcl that the Conscrvntive
pnrtp Il:id long bcforc Ixcomc alivc to the ncccssilp, in the
intcre~Lsof the Il~ilpire,of ~.et:hiing 1~ancInh:~ras thc ncw
fronlicr. J.ortl I.,jtton llncl in tlic mc:in\vliilc rcturnccl
h o ~ n nnd,
~ , 1 cannot doubt, h i esl)rcssccl vcry ficcly his
views on thc subject. 'I'his, at Icast, is certain, that r'tlic
iden of ~ l l crcte~itionof l i n n d : ~ I n rw ~ sadoptcd by the
Conservntive opposition, and nrns ninclc the main themc
of thcir platform speeches during Lhc nuLumn of ISSO,
nncl thc first ten \wcks of ISSI. ;
I t soon transpircil, Iio\vever, that [lic Ministry of
'( ~innst~rly
innclivily " had no idca of retaining the place.
It is curious, looking back from the status of acconiplisl~ed
facts, writing i ~ l = t h cthird week of this 1no11tI1of hfarch,
1885, d l c n l<ussia possesses Snrnkhs nncl h'Icrv, m1cl
hns advanccd to Pul-i-KIiAun and Zulfagnr, witliiu thc
I - h i t territory and witl~in striking distance of h e city
of tlint name-it
is curious, I say, Lo notice Lhc reasons
given by tlic authorities whom they quotecl, upon which
the hlinistry rclied to justify their relrogrndc n~ovenicnt.
'J'hc most \rnlucd of tliesc nuhorilics, Generid Sir Hcnry
Norman, arguing, in n ~ n e m o r a n d ~ udated
l ~ aoth Scptc~iiher, ISSO, against the retention of linndalinr, thus cspresscd
liimsclf : " T h e proBnbi/i/J,
O M /tnci/i,q t o s/rrrg,qlt. JOT
Ifiltf/, or to defend Indin from I<nndnhnr, is so remote
tlint its possibility is liardly worth considering."
IVo~ndcrfill forccnst !, 'rJie time s o rcmoie as to be hardly worth
considering I n s narrowed itself to a term of less tlmn five
years ! Sir Evelyn Baring, another expert of the masterly
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inncti\.ity school, n.ns eq~lnllyscept-icnl. T h e n tllcrc was
the ncn. 'Viceroy, 1,orcl Kipon, \diosc cspcrierlcc of ratlicr
1cs:i than one yenr was s o valuable : and, 1;rst not least,
llicre wns that cmincnt Russomanc-llie S'rinic Minister.
" 1' Iinvc no fcnr mysclf," h:~d said that high authority, o n
Novcmber 27, 1879: 'I of tlie territorial extensions of
Itussin, no fcnr of them \vliatcvcr. I think such fears arc
only old women's fears." Possibly some of tlie constituents
and many of tlie fricnds, perhaps even some of tlic colleagues of Mr. Gladstone, regmd now tliat rcmark as
n libcl upon old wo1:ien !
l'lie queslion was clcbntccl i n tlie I - I o ~ cof Lords, on
the motion of Lold T,ytton, on tlic 5111 i\'larcli, 1881.
Tlicrc the m ~ t i o nfor the rctcrition of S<andnlinr wns
cnrricd by n majority of Sg (165 against 76). I n tlie
I-Iouse of Commons, after n dcbntc of two nights, a similar
~iiotionwas defeatcd (26th March) by n majority of 1 2 0
(336 ngninst 2x6). Of tlie motives \vliich influenced some
at lcnst of the ~iieinbersof that majority 7 have n word or
two to say.
On the evening on \vIiich tl~edivisionwas to lalce place, tlie
2G1hhlarcIi,I linppcncd to b e dining at a Club of which I nm
not a member. Ecforc I snt down, n;y host informcd me
that a fiiend of his, n S.iberal Member of l'arlianient, was
wry ansious to speak to me o n tlic sul>ject which was tlien
engrossing tlie attention of tlie House, and tliat he WOLI~CI
come over, if I did not mind, at 10 o'clock, for that purpose. I at oncc cordially assented. At 10 o'clock tlie
member came over, was introducccl to me, and bcgan
questioning m e about I<andnhnr. After I had answered
all his questions the Membcr thus addresscd m e :" Colone; Mnlleson, I l ~ n d previously road all you had
written ; I have now l~enrcl all you linve to say on the
subject of the nbandonnicnt of I<andnlinr : I linvc no

liesitation in telling you that I agree with )roo to tlic fullest
cstent, al~solutely and entirely: I am satisfied Llinl- if wc
nbn~iilon Kandahar we sliall have to figlit Russia on tlic
irontier for our Indian empire, and it is quite upon Lhe
cards that wc mny b e at the same time struggling wit11 the
nalive princes within its borders. Holding ns I do tliesc
opinions, you will bc surprised to hear that it is my intcntion to-night to vote f x the nbandonmcnt of I<nndalmr ! "
C:onipletely taken aback by this conclusion, s o opposcd to
t l ~ e 1rm"mble of the Member's spcech, I could only
e:uclnim :-'' Good God, Sir, have you got a conscicncc ? "
'I'he Member, in no way abnshed by an csclnmation which
lle probably expected, repliccl at once wit11 :I jaunty nii :" Conscicncc ! Yes I hnvc a conscience, nncl I'll Lcll you
horn ii nloves m e to-night. Shortly after I had taken my
sent for the first time in tlic I-Iousc of Co~umons, n
friend, who 11x1 been many years n melnl~c~.,c a n e up
to mc, ; u ~ dc.ongratulating I T ~ C 011 being thcrc, espressed
a hope that I mmould keep my scat as many y c u s as
h c had kept his : IIC added that I would lteep it, too, if I
mould only adopt the plan whicli he had mar!ccd out for
liiniself: and invariably followed. I aslied my fricncl to tcll
nic his plan. ' Why ' lie replied ' it is simply this. Kcvcr
make a speech, never give a votc, in this House, without
first asking yourscll, on your COIISC~CIICC,'--11liild
you, h e
used tlic worcl' cot;science-'
\vhelhci- that spcech or that
vote will imperil your rclurn a t tlic next clcclion.' Now,"
added the i\.Ienlber, " I Iinvc n very slire\\d idea that if I
were to vole in favour of the retention of I~anc1al~nr
I
should imperil my seat at thc nest election : ll~creforeI nm
going clown to vote against it.. And I can Lcll you," he
added, " tlicre n u a t least fifty, probably seventy or eighty,
men~bers of our party who agree with me as to Lhe
necessity of retaining Kandnhnr, but \v110, actuntccl by Lhe

.
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motives which nctunte Ine, will votc for its abandonmcnt."
Comment on ~liisstory is unnecessnry. I t is onc of the
saddest signs of tlie times that on questions aliecting the
wclfnre of Grent Britain conscience is often clcad !
I<nodahar was abandoned. Tlie very rails which the
encrgy of Sir Riclia~d'l'cmple liad collected ncnr Sili to
con~inuetlie railway from Nari-just
beyond Sil)i-to
Qt~ettnand thence to Kandnhlir wcrc sold as old iron at n
loss, according to tlie I h e Books, of more tlxln hnlf n
million stcrling !
But Tim is rightly cnllecl tlie nvcngcr. Tlie ncws of the
progress made by Kussia along the nortl~crnfrontier of
Pcrsinn Kliorrisin induced even the rel~resentntivesof the
masterly inactivity party LO repair some of thc evil which
liad been effectcd. Quietly and uuostcntntiously ncw rails
were sent to Sibi, and large gangs werc set to labour at the
r ~ l - aI t wns ~molved in fact to carry out the
original plan of continuing the rail\vay tn Qucttn, and, it
is to hc liopccl, LO Kandnhnr. l'ifforts were 11indesimilarly to
induce the Amir, Alxlul Rahman, to believe that the llritislt
werc really his fl-iends. H c was assurcd, in terms far more
posiiive and direct than those \~liicIiwere eniplo~ccltowards Slicr Ali in 1373, that should Russia venturc to
invade his dominions lic \\~oulclrcceive strong and eflicicnt
snplmrt : that England recognized it as a duty clcvolving
L I ~ O I I her to insist Llpon Russia nclliering to her famous
declaration in 18Gg, that " AfgIi,iniskin was complctcly
without the sphere in which that power was callccl upon to
esercise her influence." If England had at thc same time
put her foot down-if she had responded to the move of
Russia upon Snmklis by declaring tliatctlie crossing by
that Power of the frontier line from that place by RobatAbdullah Khan and above Andkhoi to Koja Saleh would

Incan war, we might havc had no such disturbnncc as that
which now exists. But once again was the Cnlinet too
soft. I n reply to thc plea of Russia that no proper frontier
of thc country counpl-ised under the geogrnphical term
Afglirinistin, existed, she agreed last ycnr Lo dcspa~ch n
Co~nmission to nlark out with precision, in conjunction
with n Commission sent from Russia, Lhe line which sllould
tllenccfor\\wd be rccognizcd as the frontier across which
Russia was no1 to advance. The line so mnrkcd was 1.0
bc the dividing line between Trans-Caspian Russia and a n
ilfgliiunistan subsidiscd by England.

I N justicc, Lhere sl1oulcl have been n,? question rcgnrcling Lhc frontier of Afg11;inis~;in. I have already rclntecl
that, when in 1869 Princc Cortschakt~if informed I.orc1
Grnnvillc that his mnslcl; the Czar, regarded Aigl1rinist:in
as cntirely without Lhe spherc in \ ~ h i c hRussia would
be called upon Lo escrcisc her influence, it \\.as furtllcr
agreed that all thc countries in the effective possession
of t h e Amir Sher Ali, a n d which had formerly recognizecl thc sovcreignLy of Dost ~Iuhnmn1nrl, shonld b e
embrnced under that name. Finnlly, after waiting for
n report on the subjccl froin General Kauf~nnnwhich
uever camc, Lord Granville wrote x despatch to Lord
AugustmLoftus, in O c ~ o b e r ,1 8 7 2 , for communicntion to
the Russi:un C;o\amment, in wl~ich Ile stntcd Lhat not
having rcccivccl any 1cLLcr on the sul~jectfro111 Lhnt C o \ w n ment, thc Cabinet h : ~ lclcciclcd to consider the unclcr~ncntioned provinces as constituting the frontier provinces of
tUgI1d.nistdn :-(I) Pladnkhsl~~ln,
with its dependent dislrict
of Vnlihan, from thc Sariliul (IVoocl's 1,alte) on thc enst, to
the junc~ionof the Kotchn rivcr with the 0x11s(or Pciya)
forming the northcnl boundary of this Rfghdn provi~ice
through its cntirc cstect. (a) Afghiin Turlristlin, comprising
the districts of ICuncluz, Khulm, and l~allth,the northern
boundary of whicli would be the line oL thc Oxus from the
junction of the Kotchn river to the port of I<hojn Snleh inclusivc, on the high road from Bokhim to Ballth ; nothing
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to be claimec1)y the A ~ n i on
r thc lclt bank o r thc Osus I~clow
IChoja Snleh. (3) The intcrnnl clis~rictsof i\l;sho, Seripul,
Mni~ncnc!, Shibbcrjnn and Andkhoi, (he l a ~ t c rof \diicli
would be tlic estrcnie' Afghdn fronticr posscssion to the
north-nest, thc desert I)cyond beloligiug to indcpcntlent
tribes of T ~ ~ r k o m n n s .(q) Tlic west err^ h f g l ~ i nfronlicr, n
strniglit linc from I<hojn Snlch on the Osus t . ~Sns~klison
thc l'crsinn frontier. This line passed abovc Andldioi and
Gulu 1:ulu to Robnt-ilbclullali I<li:in on the i\[urgli;ib,
thcncc by Imam Raksh to Llie Tcjend, close to the to\vn,.on
the otlicr side of llinl: river, of Snrnhlis. l<ussi:~:~cccptcd
that lronticr in clespalches dittccl rcspccti\*elyin Dcccmher
of that, 2nd in Janrmy of tlic following, year. l ' m n Llint
dntc to 1884, tlint lronlicr has ncvcr bccr. q ~ ~ c s l i o ~ i1)y
cd
that country. I t Iins nplm.rcd on all tlic Russian I I ~ : I ~ J S .
Kvcn Schuylcr s l ~ e n l ~ofs it as well laio\vn L I I I ~lint needing
fr~rtllerdefinition.
Y o qucslions, I rcpcat, werc rnisccl 1 3 1 Xussin regnrding
this fronticr till 12-34. I t wns only when, in tlmt year, the
ncq~~isilion
of M e r v nncl Snrnklis brought Iicr upnn it tlint,
in order to h w e a pretest for o\~erIeapiugrit, sllc w g p t e d
Llie proposnl refcrred to in thc last chapter, liussia would
not have bccn truc to her immemorial policy if, on nppronching n new borcler, she hnd not nt once raiscd doubts ns Lo
its wlidity. T o solve those doubts, I)oh countries cngagcd
l o send commissioners to LIE clebatcd grouncl.
r
1hough Russia agrccd Lo this nrmngenrei~l~ h c r arc
c ninny
rcasons for believing that she did il- :oluly to gain timc,
a n d vith 3. deterlnination not to act upon it. I f she hail
m y designs upon Eritish Inclin, the clelinen~iono l n Frontier
which shc must respect would interfere very imcli with tlic
use of those insid@~s means \vliich hnd cvcr mnrkcd her
sledthy progress. 'I'lie sencling troop!; across n fronlier
recognized l ~ yhcrself 2nd gunrantccd I)y England to Llic
7
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hmir, \voulcI mean war with England as well as war with the
Amir. She would I)e cffcctually prcvcntcd from justifying
a forward spring Ily the use of such quibbles as she had
cmployed regarding Snrakhs. At thc same lime shc was
not: quite rcady for war. T-Ier'l'mnscaspian railway, pushed
on though it had becn with the z e d of a Power which feels
that it has a mission to fdtil, had not yet reached the
required point. Othcr preparations wcrc likcwise not s o
forvnrd as Lhcy nhight hnve been. Still she could not rcfuse
to promise to co-opcrntc in i~ plan so fair. Wc may fairly
concludc from Ilcr s u l m q ~ ~ e conduct
nt
that she made that
lromise with n sccrct rcsolvc to brcak it.
For, whilst Grcnt Britain, true to Iicr word, despatched,
in the autumn of ISS'~, a n English Commission, headed by
a n oflicer who ltad lilled high positions in India ; while Lhat
oficer and his suitc proceedecl by way of Persia to the
appointccl place of rendezvous, Russia sent no one. For
oncc, too, she had no cxcuscs but the poorest to offer. Such
as she did make reririnded the British p~d)licof the taunting
apologies suggested by the Yrophet Elijah to the prophets
of Baal for h e abscncc of any maniicstation on the part of
t i i i i ('\Vhcre is ( k n c m l Zclcnoy ?" asked the
Eritish public. (' \\'c d o not quite know," answcred Russia ;
" c i h c r h e is tnlking, o r he is pursuing, or hc is on a
journey, o r perndventure he sleepeth and must b e
awakened." At all events he did not come to time.
Whilst the British Commissioner, Sir Petcr Lunlsdcn,
a n d his escort, wcre waiting for his Russian colleague,
Gcneral Zelenoy, the Russian c o ~ n n ~ a n d eat
r s Sarakhs a n d
Mcrv deterluinecl LO solve the question of the boundary
by despatching s ~ n a l lbodies of troops into the territory
clainled and occupicd by the Afghdns., If thc reader will
glance a t any good map of the country immcdintely to
the north-west of the Paropamisan range 11e ~vi,llsec mqrked,

on t l ~ crivcr 1Icri-rilcl, at a point wlicre the Iicshcf-rild joins
thnt river, thc nnmc of l'ul-i.Kh:itun.* 'I'hc 1-Icri-rfid,
wlie~herunder its o \ w name or ns the 'rejend, constit~ites
to L i l t south and to thc north-west as 1 - i ~ ns SnrnIihs 111~
boundary of thc pro\~inccof Henit. l'he principal of the
110sLson its banks ns i t flo\\;s uor~liw;u.cl are Kulisnn,
the Zulfagnr pass, and l'ul-i-J<hi~~~tl.
'l'l~csc posts linve
long Ixcn recognized as belonging to flcrit. Yct, i n a
timc of j~rofouncl pencc, wl~il.it the Uricish Comn~issioner
appointed to nlark out the boundary was \v:~itingfor his
Russi;ul collengue, liussian troops crossed h e line then
recognized ns thc I~oundary and seized n post, Lllirty-two
miles to the south of it ! Not content even with thxt they
proccecled likewise to occupy thc phSS of Zulf:~g:~r,somc
twcuty-eight miles still nearer to Her5t !
'l'llerc was no cscusc for these acts : Pu1-i-1Ch:itun is
nicrelg a good place for a new clcparturc ; it is 11ot w e n n
villngc ; il never belonged to, and 112s noll~ingin common
with, the Turko~nnns,wlietller Sarik or other ; it is simply
an ope11 ground covcred to the casl by high mountaim.
Of the ground in~mcdinlelyto thc wcst of it Sir Chnrles
MacGrcgor, who ~ n a d ethe journey honi Meshed to Snrakhs
in 1875, gives the followi~lgaccount. I should premise
that lllc r o d fnllonrs L.he Keshel-i Iiud as f u 3s Slior--jnh,
just bcyoncl Ak-i-Dmhend, and branches at a riglit angle
not tiwards, just before reaching l'ul-i-I<hdtun :'I--" 011
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S 3 t ~ ~ r ~ lLIIC
f i y 2-ltli of July, wc ~iinrcliecl 1 6 n~ilcsto Alc
1 1 r 1 i I 'l'lie roncl lcads clown the ~ a l l c ynlnlost the
whole way, only occ:nsioi~nlly Icnving it. Lo go over spurs to
t!ie Icft, which hcrc and there impinge o n the rivcr. I t is
quite prxticnble cvery~vhei-efor field artillesy. At the
ci2htli mile nrc passed nncmly built fort cnllccl 'l311glil1ugIio0,
occupicd by thirty w e k h e d creatures, wlio lookcd at LIS
pnssing with ~ h longing
c
of prisoners nrorded n glin~pscof
the outcr world.
'' ;\t (lie hurtcenth mile wc dsscen[icd to Llic 11cd of the
1,ivc.r :1;1il crossed to tlic sight banl; 1y 3 \ u y nnsly, bcthe r o x l \vent over a n
c a l m \-cry ~nuddy, ford. TIICIICC
open phi11 for onc mile, whcn it asccnclcd over a spur by n
steep, but otherwise casy pass, to anothcr littlc opening,
\vhich was ngnin divided fro111 Al: l)usbcnd by nnotlit.1.
si In i lnr l~nss.
" 'l'lic river hcre is confincd b e t w e n hills, s o that the
valley is not inorc than 300 yards ncros$ and I~epondthis
it gmcluallp gcts n a r r o w r and nnrrower, till it Ixcomes n
regulnr ilcfile, and continues thus ti11 it cmergcs fro111 tlic
hills ut l'ul-i-l<li:il~~nwlicrc l l ~ c ground I m x ~ n ~ cniuch
s
111or.copen. All access from Lhc ~ 1 s tis closcd by towcrs
pl:tccd on co~n~unncling
1)ositions owlhanging tlic dcfilc, s o
that the position of Ak l > u ~ + ~ c nbccc~nlcs
d
one of vcsy
cr;nsiclcrnblc! iniportnncc iii co~isidcringLlic clcfcncc of this
110: Jcr, as by it is the only practicnl soad bct\vecn Milzcluran and the southern siclc of tlic ridges which bound
h c All-i-Mcshcd o n the s o ~ ~ t l i . "
Four niilcs beyond hk l)url)end is Sho~jali,where, as
stated, the road I>rnnchcs ~iortli\wrds to Snraltlis. Pul-iKlidtun is alx1~11:eight miles to the east by south from
Shorjnh. 111his book (Journey through?Cliorris:in in 1875)
MacGrcgor gives s!c~tcl~csof N: Uurbcnd nncl of the
gorge of the Ab-i-Meshed nbove Pul-i-ICl~ritun.
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On ~ h esubject o r Uic suclclcn sweep of Russia ul)on
that post, Professor IraolbL:ry thus witcs (March 1885)"':"'l'o this hcl: I reckon," lhnt is, to the fact h a t I<ussia has
3 settled design to nnncs Herit,
before dl, that Inwlcss
and unjust aggression of Kussin o n the north-castern fronliers of Persia, an :~pproprintionof n lnrgc tract o l C O U I I ~ I ~
Lo Lhe occupnlion o l which tile Go\-ernment of the Shih
has not given its consent, and he anncsntion of whicl~lias
bccn only made wit11 the obvious purpose to approach L l i ~
district of I l c r i t ancl to s\voop clown upon this i~nport:~nt
placc in orclcr to scizc the Kcy of India, and s o bcconic
thc i~ndispu~ablc
~nasterof the country lying between the
Pnropamisus and I-hc Osus. I fully admit, as I stated in
n1y pr.cvious pnpcr on tllc I<nsso-hfglxin Boundary Com~nission,that thc country c s ~ c n d i ~ iI>ctwccn
g
the ~niddle
course of the lieri-rdd and Llic hlurgli;ib, respectively, [Ilc
Iinslik (r,,dr/ts K h ~ ~ ~ h l i ~river
d l . ~hns
) forn~ed,i n thc
course of thc present ccntury, n debatable ground I x t r \ ~ c i ~
~\fgh:iuistin and Persia, b u ~since Lhe lnst-namccl co:~~;try
was LIII:IIJIC to clear this Iiigh\vny of t!ic 'I'urkoman Alnliinns
( I m y s ) on h e i r inroads into thc eastern part of Khosds:in
2nd Scistan, the (JL' f k t o possession niust bc, and call be,
only accorded lo the Af,ll,ins, as LO tlic P o w r a l ~ l eto put
:I check on Lhc devastating incourse of the recklcss frccLootcrs of the north. If Kussin. had the sinccrc inlention
not to lneddlc wit11 Herit, as hcr statesnicn nsscrl, Llie
encroachment upon Sarnlths, whetlicr tllc new or Lhc old
one, which is nl~nost the sanle, \\.oulrI h a w been quite
sr~perfluous,and she could have cnsily avoided to rouse thc
just suspicion of I<~lglnncl. Cut \vc sce tlint quite the contrary has llnppanctl. Encouraged by the vague tl~rcats
c o ~ n i ~ fi-om
i g the anofiicial quruters of I'.ondon ;uiJ Cal-
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cutla, li~issialiurricdly rcll down still rirthcr to the soi~tli,
a n d laid hand upon Tul-i-Kllntdn (the Lady's Eridgc), at
t h e wry moment when the Ihglisli l!ou~~dary
Commission,
hcaddl by Sir l'ctcr L,umstlcn, nrrivcd at the spol. l'hc
object in view was to p r o w to the English that the place
whcrc ( h c Keslief-rlid joins tlic Hcri-rild is Russian territory, and cannot bc nlacle h e object of furLhcr discussion.
I'lut we bcg leave to ask what a r c tlic reasons which have
necessitated this step ? l'lierc are 110 'I'urkonin~lss~lbjt!c.l
t o liussin in this o ~ ~ t l y i ndistrict,
g
there is no intcrcst t o
defend, and thc whole movement is nothing else but a
badly-co~icealcclntlcmpl agaiust I-leriit."
. 'I'he Zulhgar l'usa is c w n stronger for aygressi\.e pur
~ O S C X 1 slxdl spcak at greater length of this further on.
\\'riting on ~ l i csul~jectfrom Bdln i ~ r l l rorty-six
,
miles below Panjdch, tlie correspondent of thc 7iims
(March I 2 , I 885) writes ns follo\vs :--"You will scc from
llie map that both tlic roads to I-leril run through 13ndgIiis,"
the districts to thc north and north-west oFthe city of I-Icrit,
wllicli co~iipriscsthe vnllcys of tlie Hcri-riltl, Kushk, and
Murgli:il~. T h a t is \\thy it is so v:ilual.)lc to 11s and to
Russia. If Russin Ilnd no clcsigns on Ilcnil s!ic would
not care ~ v h c t l ~ chcr
r frontier \ \ w c at: Sarnklis or I'ul-iKhlirun, or at Yohtnn or Pnnjtlell. But of c w r s e slic
cares. liussin has stntcsmcn, and each natur;llly aspircs to
b e tlie Joshua who mill t c r ~ n i ~ i a tthese
e
weary nnntlerings
and lend her armies into tllc l'roliiised Land. Once ~ h c r c ,
their troubles are at an end. Evcrythi~igis therc t.) I)c
round, lor llie \*alley of Hcrdt flows with milk and honcy."
'J'lie writer closes a very interesting letter with tile follm~ing
pregnant sentence:-"
The /wo tholtsnttcl miks 70c h77v
wtnt-rllrtt bc/werri t h Cns-intt (711d the 17n'tls hnw rrs?./ni/tll,
c ( ~ ~ z i i1w
1sl/ k t f i d k is /he got-den of Asia, and /hot ottly
i / t hlrii~-h'et.dt m d Bndghis w e but oases-are ./c.m/e;r.
r711d

.
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h d d fhc ~ I /( Lw d I W ~ /he e . w - / i o ~ l . A k l ale C H I ~I I I I ~ W
hi id 7~1h-y//Iei.t!h n 7 1~~ L ' Nso ~tini/yi//.i'ils,jl/~s
rf I/i/id~t.<k/i/."
On thc salnc point n wcll-informcd writer in thc same
p a l m tthus rccently cspressed himsclf :" A t the time oT ~ h eRrlssian war \villi Khiv:l, Sllcr Ali
rcprcscntcd to thc Viceroy his :~pprehcnsion of Lhe conscqllences Lhnt \\voulcl cnsuc if tllc 'I'n~.I;o~iinnso r Ncrv
werc drivcn by 12ussinn inv:uion into his prc.vince of
E:ltlghis. 'I'hc fact Lhnt no European travcllcr pa:;sccl
t h r o ~ ~ gthis
l ~ rcgion aftcr Vnmbdry in he early dirys of
Sher Ali's nulhority Lo Lcll us what thc esnct condition of
Panjclch was, is not an nrgrlnwnt invalidating the iV'gl~in
claims over tllc l)lace, cspccially a s those claims arc supporlccl by Lllc ~ w e i p t so r trilmtc fronl the surrou:lding
tribes contai~leclin the rcgistcrs of the I1cr:it Adminis~rnlion. If thc presence of [lie Amis's troops :11ic1 officinls
were l o ljc nl;tde the only tcst of his right to rnle therc are
many olher plnccs Imides those which Russin I n s scized
t h t i \ b d ~ r r a h n < ~ \n~ o u l d11nw to sr~r~wxlcr.I t is, of
course, intelligible that Russia should seck lo make Llle
Amir's burden i n governing his st:~leas heavy as possil~lc,
but it is difficult to understand ho\v this argu~ncntcan be
inclolwd by any i ~ n p : ~ r ~ iwitncss.
nl
T h e Amir llolds
ZJanjdeh, partly because it has always Ixen dcpcndcnt on
IIcr:it, and partly bccnusc he found it marked on the Innp
~vcllnvithin the fronlicr drawn by the English Intclligcncc
1)cpartnient. But liis chief rmson ol' all is that the 110ssession of 1';mjdeh is ncccsswy to the prescrwlion o l his
llolcl on the road running north\vards from Hcrdt through
th(: province of Afglxin 'l'urkislnn to Maimen6 and Unlkh.
ltussia \ \ ~ u l dgive hiul that road and no more. I t is
absolutely essentkl to its security that the A ~ n e c rshould
retain thccontrol of the region on its western Rank, which
includes Panjdeh and the I<ushk valley. On he question

. of l-'nnjcIcli, as o n that of %ulf;lgnr and the l<olx~tl'nss,
there is n o room for discussion or difference of opinion.
T h o s e places form an integral p r t - o f Llle ~ \ n l i r ' s
dominions, and apart from their own inherent value h e y
nrc most important as cons~ilutingthc nntural out-works of
I-Icrit, T h e Russian troops hnvc not yet nssnilctl cithcr
l'anjdeh or I ~ h o m b o u but
, they are encamped close to Lhc
former place 2nd at Zulfngnr. W e hnve rrequently pointccl
o u t LIE risk thus crcnkxl of n hostile collision, and wc can
only repeat, that nn attack on eitl~erof tlicse places coi~ld
only be regnrdcd a s an act of u n p r o ~ o k c daggression upon
t h e Aniir which wc slioulcl bc bound to pron11)LIy resent
by forcc o f a r m .
"'Shosc persolls who estcnu:rtc thc latest phase of
I<ussinn aggression ignore d l the circumstnnces which induced the English Government Lo join with llussin. in a n
attenlpt to delimit the Afghdn frontier. 'I'hey purposely
o \ ~ r l o o kthe fact that the delimitntion of tlic Amir's
Ixmnd:~ry on Lhc nort!~west was tnlxn i ~ cuecause
p
Russia,
only t\\,clvc months ago, seized Merv in supreme inclirfcrm c e to her rcpented cleclamlions lo us Lhnt SIIC had not
thcleast intention of npprop;.inling Lhc 'l'clike strongholtl.
We hnvc no \\rish to cml~illerLhe prcscnt controversy by
dwclling ilpon past brcachcs of faith, bnt t l ~ csuclclcn and
secret occupntion of Mcrv wa!; a n act that sho\\rccI how
illusory Russian plcdgcs arc. Yet now tlint Russia, f x
from sln~idingstill, hns \vithin the last ycnr pi~slicdher out~ O S ~ 50
S I miles south of Merv, and to places within
Afgliinisdn, we are again nskcd t o confidc to her honour
wllen she repudiates all intention of heating I-lerdt ns shc
has treated thc othcr plnces on the Mul-glxib nncl I-lcrirucl. I\'hen Rwsinn troops cnl-ercd i\fcrv it was at once
pointed O L I in
~ thesc colunlns ~ h n tthe time hnd come for n
dclinile and dccisivc policy with rcgnrd to the Kussi;un

,

advance Lonwcls Indin. TVz only ncquicscctl in the scimrc
of Merv on thc csprcss u ~ ~ d e r s l a ~ l d ithat
n g the frontier of
Afghinistbn should be clearly markecl out, and ~ h n t h e
lcast infraction of this line nould be rcgnrded by l h ~ l a n d
ns n cnms h d i . That course wns adopted I))? our C o v e m
ment, and to all appearance that of the Czar also coincided
in its justicc and agreed to par~icipntc i n giving it ~alidity.
'I'o the policy of maintaining the integrity of AfgI1dnist:in
this country was commitled, not only by n sensc of ils own
interests, but also by the definite nssumnccs givcn to the
Aniir from lime to time, and particularly in I S S ~ . It is
one from \\~hich the Govclnment have as yet sho\\~nno
sign of departing, and, indeccl, thc least symptom of wavering \voulcl bc a t ~ c n d e d\\'it11 fatnl rcsults to lheir own esistence. They 1i:ivc from evcry point of view a position
\vhich is practically unnssnilnble, so fxr as ~ h mnltcr
c
is one
of negotiation. T h c eschangc of opinions which took
place in 1872-3 bct\~centhe two Govcrnnlcnts on the subjcct of the ~ f & &frontier has I m n descril)cd ns no longer
binding on Xussia; but the Russian Ambassador at: the
Court of St. Jnmcs's mas instlucted in thc spring of 1 8 8 2
to slalc that the St. Petcrsburg Porcign Office still'recognized ~ h c\ditlily of the arrnngemcnt then concluclcd.
This statcmcnt acquired more csplicit value from being
follo\\~eclup by thc dcclnmtion of Kassin's readiness to
clclinlit thc A f g l ~ i ~frontier
i
from the Osus t o Snmlihs.
I-low, it ma): be askccl, can Russia carry out her own proposition by throwing a loose linc round the Salar and Sari!<
clistricts, and incorpornting all thc region 111) to thc I'nropnnlisus? 'Thc Russian acts now are in flat contradiction
of everything stated by 31. de Gicrs up to the period of
the h4erv occupxdon, and thcre is evcry reason to say that
thosc expressions wcrc repcatecl still more e~ophatically
aftcr that event 11x1 takcn placc.
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L C \\Thilc 111c English
Go\.crnmcnt are ticd down to n
policy of maintaining the integrity of Afghinistin 11y their
formal representations to Russia and by their solemn
plcclgcs to the. A~neer, the Russian Govcrnmcnt cqunlly
bound themselves 1.0 co-operate in the task of dclirniting
' thc Afghan frontier from Khojah Snleh to Samlihs.' I n
measuring thc cxtent of the unfriendly nction to \vhich
Kussia Ins resorted within the last t\\,o or three months it
is ncccswry to rcmember that the Fronlicr Con~mission
was clcviscd as a means of showing Russia's good faill~,nncl
of ~woving[hat tllc Czar's conquest of M e n did not constilute n mcnncc to England, ns many persons ~.epresented
that it would. Nor can we lose sight of the fact that long
bcfore General Lun~sdcn left London the scopc of his
lahours llnd been clcfinccl by he higlmt Russian as well as
Iinglish authorities. I l c was ,to complete what had been
left unlinisl~ccl in 1873, ancl to givc the hmecr's territory,
which was adnlittcd to bc ' outside the sphere of Russin's
inllucncc,' a recognized boundary from therOxus Lo Saraklls.
I t is as impossible to reconcile Russia's recent action with
the original understanding regarding thc labours of this
Coinmissiun, ns it is to discover in thc occupntion of
Z~~lfagw
and Pul-i-Khisti thc cvidencc that I l ~ cRussian
Govc~.n~ncnthas no sinister designs upon Herit ancl other
places nenrer India. Instend of cordially co.operating
\vith us, as originally arranged, the Russian Government
have delaycd their Commission until thcir troops 11ad
occupied thc most important ;)ositions within thc debatable
ground, and then they have brought for\varcl thc cth~logmphical principle, whicl~should have been ventilated at n
much earlier stage of the question if it \\!as to be employed
at all. Altllough thcy \vent so far as tenominate n chiei
Conlmissioner in the person of General Zelenoy last Septembel; they have allowed him to remain ever since on his

private estzte near Tiflis ; and \vhen the scason approached
for beginning nrork on thc spot, instead of hastening the
lllovelnents of their representatives they sent an agent, &I.
Lcssar, to London to make demands which arc simply preposterous and to which no Governmcnt could vcnture to
yicld. I n short, they have strivcn tl~roughoutto lioocl\\~ink
our Ministers and to mislead English opinion ; but they have
already imposcd more than enough on our credulity. Not
only have they con~mitteda flagrant breach of diplomatic
etiquetle, but they have really invaded i1fghinist:in. Unless t h y rctire from the positions, which they should nevcr
have cntcrecl, there is little chance of averting n hostile
collision, for the English Government can never concur i n
the \.iolent seizure of districts'to which Russia lins not the
shadow of n claim, and some of which :Ire vitally nccessary to the preservntion of the Amir's authority in his
kingdom."
1)eTerring to another chapter the consideration of thc
several routes fwm the important ccntrc of Her6t to Lhe
places on its frontier-for the districts in disputc must be
rcpardcd as outlying districts of the HerLt province-I propose to treat now of those districts only, to seize which,
Russia, in a time of profound tranquillity, and at the
moment she had herself selected for amicable clelineation,
has violated the rights of nations and threatencd the peacc
of the world.
T h e outlying districts comprise the territory comprehended between the line already nlarked from Sarakhs to
Khoja Saleh, and an imaginary line below it, stretching
from a point below thc Zulfagar pass, sixty miles below
Sarakhs, on the one side, between Panjdeh and Meruchak
on the Murgl~tib~
to n point just above Andlrhoi, and
thence by the existing line to Khoja Saleh. This line
would bring liussia within easy striking distance of I-krit !

If the render will consult Coloncl Stc\vartls mnp lie will
see that tlie firs1 linc, from Snmklis to Rhoja Saleh, cuts off
the cclgc of h e Iha-I<ilm descrt some distancc abovc Gu1Rulu nncl n sninll portion of tlie sanie desert in the vicinity
of Saralihs. With thesc esccplions the district consists of
valley, plain, and mountain, capnble of being developed
into a n extraordinary state of fertility. T o thc west, from
Snmkhs down to ICuhsnn, up Ll~eHeri-r~tdor Tejend, tlie
country has never been occupiecl by the T ~ r l i ~ l ~but
~al~,
that migratory tribes of h a t racc have seltlecl for a timc
in other parts 11ns bccn a colisccluencc of tlic gcncrally
disturbed slate of thc counlry. 'I'u~kornnnswcrc c~icnnqxd
for instniicc, at I'nnjdch, when Caplain Abbott visited
that place in 1S4.o. Cut the Turkomnns \vho hnvc occupied
parts of those districts hsvc becn cver ready to sulmit to
thc prince ruling at I-Ierdt whenever 1ic might s!iow any
disposition to enforce his power. They sublnitted to Slier
Ali, and, as Lhc render will see from n lettcr quoted in the
ncst chapter, no one has madc n grcatm iniprcssion on
tlie several tribes within his territories tlinn the prescnt
Afghdn ruler. If, then, t l ~ cRussians sliould Rase Lheir
clnims lo tllc positions they dem:md on the I-Ieri-rild
('l'cjencl) and the Murgliib, and the country above tlic
imaginnry linc I have referred to, on the ground that,
having occupied Snmklis nncl conquered Merv they arc
tlic inheritors of tlie territories occupied by the Snrilc
'l'urlromnns, those claims fall at once to the ground, for,
whilst lhe positions on the Hcri-rlid (Tejend) never were
occupied by the Turkomnns ; whilst at the sevcrnl points
bclow Snmlchs villngcs were not built because of tlie dread of
the Turkomnns felt by the people ;tlie tribes of that race
\~Iio'pitcliedtheir tents in thc~vnlleyof the,h$urghib, at RobatAbdullah IChdn, and bclow it, have, since 1863, and even
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prceiously, paid tribute to tllc rcprescntativc of tlie h n i r
who was ruling a t Ilerlit !
Cut Russia wants that broad strip of land, first, because,
sitllntc for thc most part I)elow thc clescrt, it lmtnkes the
general fertility of tlie H e r i t province, and niay tlicrcfore
I)c occupied as n bnsc for opc~.ntions against the mlleys of
IG~shIdi and TCaln-i-nau. \\That those \mlleys are, n.hnt
the country linows undcr tlie gcncric tcrni Hdrat " is, 1\41
be explained in the nest chnptcr. Itussin \ ~ m i t sthnt skip,
secondly, because tlic possession of it will bring licr within
ensy striking distance of tlic city of I-1cr:i.t; slic wanls it,
thirdly, bccmse, by taking it, she will absolukly neutralize
Persin, by tlirusting n wcdgc bctween ,the l'ersimi town,
Meslicd, and her frontier.
Now, if me allow Russia to occupy these districts, or any
portion of Lliem, \\T virtunlly ninlre her a prescnt oC I-Icrdt ;
and I raise again lily warning voice to dcclare, that if
Russin oncc be nllomed to occupy I-Ierdt, the conquest of
India by hcr wiU be ;L merc q~lcstionof time. Even at
Snrakhs, she was within a 0 2 miles oC the city of that name,
whilst the English outposts arc 5 14 lililes clistnnl from it, and
145 miles even fi-on1 Kandnhar. Since, tlien,sIie liasillegallp,
nyninst the law of nations, puslied licr troops across the
linc, \\;hicIi, sincc 1872-3, lias bcen recognized as Llie frontier
linc of westcrii ffgliinistdn, and has o c c ~ ~ p i ethe
d pass of
Zulfagar oil the Heri-rild, and the posts of NiI<alshcini,
i l k Robat, and 1'111-i-Khisti, it is the duty of the Government of Englnnd to insist that slic ~vithdrn\\~
~ v i t l ~ o udelay.
t
T h e insistance might b c made now with erect, for the
Tmnscaspinn line of rnilwny is not yet ready, and Russia is
not, therefore, prcpared for a niortal slruggle.
Of tlie Russian claini to Panjdell, n foreigner well competent to judge, frofcssor Vamubbry, of the University of
Buda-Pestli, writes as follow. Continuing 1-lie remarks

which I have nlrencly extracted, about Pul-i-I<liitun, he
adds :
li Of
a si~nilnrnature is tlie aggression planned, but
hitherto frustrated, against Panjdeh (five villages), o n thc
right bank of the Murglxib, thcrc where tlie clrcnry sands of
Llic Ram-1i;um steppe ends and thc cultivable country of
thc outskirts of tlie Paropamisus begins. I n former times
Panjdch ~vasa nlost flourishing place in the district of Herit,
and under the reign of Sultan I-Iusein blirza Bailtarn, when
Llie capihl on thc I-leri-rild was tlic cultural centre of tlie
I k i t e r n hlol~n~nrncclnn
world, the environs of Panjdch and
hCal.ucIink (IAtlc Mer\:) were tlie favowitc summcr abode
of the rich a n d l k u r i o u s \vorlcl of I-lcrit. I n tlic subscquent periods w c only occnsionally lnect with the name of
Panjdeh in the historical works referring to this part of
Khorasrin, but we can safely assume that the ultinlate
clcstruction and desolation of the place dates only from the
time when the Sarik 'l'urkoma~~s,
vanquished by thc Tekke
'I'urkomans, had to retire towards thc 11-untains, particularly to tlie regiou of Upper i\.lu~.ghib,which was reckoned
from in~nieniorial h n c s as belonging to Hcrdt, and, since
this place was talicn by ~ l i cArgkins, as an integml part of
Afglidnistdn.
" T h e Russian claim on tllis place is, therefore, from every
point of view, unfounded and unjust. By their assertion
that the Sariks havevoluntarily ncknowledgcd the supreniacy
of the Czar, they might claim h e country on both banks
of the Murglxib from Yolatan (rechits YLII-o-tin=passage)
to Sari Yar and Ak Tcpc', b u t not. tlie country near and
a r o ~ ~ nPanjdeh,
d
the Afghin property of which hacl been
ascertained by the Russian tr:rvcller, Dr. Regel, in July
1884, nrho found there an Afg1i:in garrison of a very unfriendly behavio~~r,
in consequence of which hc was obliged
to change his route a n d to return, viit Merv, to the Oxus.
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Panjdch, which the Russi;un iravcller erroneously cailsP%irdr;
is, tlmcl'orr, i n thc unquestionable possession of Afgh;inistin, and thc rcccnt nltcmpt of General Alikhanoff to overrun this plncc and lay hold on it in the name of the
Emperor of I<ussia cannot bc otherwise styled than an
irruption into a foreign country, nay, into the clominionsof a
prince subsiclizcd by 1S1~glaiic1,
consequcnily into 1.h~icrritory of a fricncl and ally of Great Britain."'.
Subsequently, thc 15th March, the same high aulhority
wrote a letter to thc Tiiitcs ( 2 1st March), \~hichvirtunllg
disposes of the assertion mnde by Russian par~isansthat
l'anjdch hnd ncver previously bwn occupied by the
Afghans, and was only recently taken 1)osscssion of on the
instigation of Sir Petcr I,umsdcn. 'I'l~c letter runs as follows :" I n your article entitled ' 'l'hc question at issuc betwen
England and Russia,' ~~iiblisl~ccl
in the (Zi/ms of the 13th
instant, I read that the assertion ol several leading German
papers concerning the quite reccnt Afghin occupaiion of
Panjdeh can be easily rclated by the fact that Abcli~rrahman had already ordered his troops to take possession of
Panjdeh t~vclvc~nontlisago. I n order to provc this fact
your contributor proceeds to quote the events of I S S ~ ,
when the ruler of ICibul got an English map sho\ving the
frontiers of his couiitry to\vards the north-west, :incl it wns
in conscqilcnce of this cartograpl~iccommunicaiion that l ~ c
found it practicable to put a garrison in tllc above-111~11tionecl place on the WIurglnil~.
" As Continental critics m y be rather sceptical as to
English maps and English oflicial communications, I 1)cg
leave to call your allention to a Gcrman scientilic p p c r
writtcn by a I<us$mn ol'ficcr, in which it is clcarlp s~atcd

,

tlnl Pnnjdcli \vns ulrc:~cly in ~ h ~msscssiun
c
o r lllc h f g l ~ d n s
in June, I S Q , and that it \\-as not a t all the instigation of
thc English, under Sir Pctcr I,uinsdcn, n~hiclipromptcd the
AfgIiAns to occupy I'ilnjdch and to pro\.oIic he quarrel
betwecn England a n d Russia in Central Asia, as Rrlssian,
Gcrman, and also French pnpcrs choose to imnginc nnd to
rcprescnt.
"'l'hc p p c r named i s n o ~ h i n ~ ~ ethan
l s c the highly respcctable geogrnphical pcriodicnl knovn as ' Dr. A. Peter~nann's Alitthcilungenl1 \ a l u n ~ e31, 1885, N o I., in \vhich
there is a noticc by Dr. Regel, the csplorcr of l>ar\vaz,
Roshau, kc., concerning his journey from 'I'chihnrdjui
in
ncrosr; h'lerv to I'nncli ( h n j c l e h ) and back, cxcc~~tccl
June, 1SS4, and wherc \BC rcad, p. 24-' ills wir a m
viertcn Tngc (i.~., thc 9th of June, 1884) nu[ I'iindi
(L'nntljch) losgehen wolltcn, brachkn die Leutc nus
Uulihn (YuliiLcn) die Nnchricht crstcrc Ortschaft (viz.,
Pnnjdch) sci cben crst von 4,000 bis 5,000 ACghAnen
bcsctzt wordcn.'* 'L'hese are other sin$& stntcmcnts concerning t l ~ cprcscncr of the AfgMns in Ynnjdch in the
month of June, I S S ~ nncl
,
11s this Gcr~nrui-l<r~ssi:un
oflicer
will not: bc suspcctcd of l)rcvnlcnl English sympathics, and
as hc hncl written his paper long before thc outbrcnk of
thc prcscnt quarrel, I vcnture to say tile qucstion of English
instigation may be easily clismissed, as thc tcsti~r~ony
of Lhe
traveller named will sufice t o rcfute any contrary statcment."
It is ~ 1 ~ 3 tlicn,
1;
hat ngainst right, in the face of right, in
dcfinucc of hcr rcl~catedprotcsta~ions, Russia has crosscd
the borclcr 1i11c\vliich slic ngrced to i n 1 S i 5 3 , n.hich is
* " \\'lien un Ihc fonilh tiny (Jumc g, rSS4)#i'c were d m 1 1 to proceed Lo l'ondi (L'nnjdch), t11c people fro111 Yulilan (Yoliitcn)broucllt
ns the news that thnl ~ ~ l n c(viz.
c I'nnjtlch) had bcon 1 ~ just
t occupiccl
by from I'om. to I;vo I l ~ o t ~ n ~~iif di ~ l l n n s . "

recognized as t l ~ cbordcr line in all the Russian niaps of
any aullmrity. She has co~un~ittecl
this infraction of public
law at thc wry time she had IlcrselC sc1cc:ed for a ncw
and pcacerul demarcation of the fronticr line, wheli she
l i n c \ ~LII:I~ a laryc English army and n contingent of Indim
troops wcrc in thc Soudnn, that tlic minds or the English
~ninisters\ \ w e occupied by grave E ~ ~ r o p e acomplications,
n
and that Ilnglaud \\.as iess prepared for a grcat war than
shc had been for thirty years. She co~n~riitted
this infraction of public In\\-, inorco\w, at- a period when the cou~lsels
of England wcre g ~ ~ i d cbyd a ministry \vhom she had often
deceivccl, and hacl founcl no dificulty in deceiving ngnin :
a ininistry \vhich shc had seen yielding to bold deeds in
the l'mnsvanl, to pressurc from France, to scjnlctl~ingw r y
like mcnnce from Germruny : n ininistry \~liichhad shown
a strong inclination to undergo any humiliation rather than
engage the country in \vai., even in rightfill war. Pceling,
then, as shc l ~ n da right to feel, that the game of bluster
and swggcr wts n safe gamc to play undcr the circumstances, she had played it boldly and unscrupulously.
Pursuing the policy so aptly described by Lord l'almcrston
in his letter to Lord Clnrendon, quoted in a. previous page,
she spoke i n honied phrases at St. Petersbiurg, \vl~ilst,
rcndg to disavow them if they should fail or to reward them
if ::ley should swceecl, shc instructed her agcnts on LIE
frontier to strike the Llow which might secure for her n ncw
and vcry real basc against India.
Ho\\J have the Miniskrs of England repliccl to this
auclacious attenipt ? \Vc all know !low Mr. Pitt would
have answered it, ho\v Mr. Canning woulcl have answered
it, ho\v Lord P a l p x s t o n would have answcred it. We
know how America, how Germany, how even Francc,
would have met such an insult. IVithin four-and-twenty
hours ordcrs would have been transmitted from St. PetersI 2
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bi~rgto thc konticr for ~Iicwi~hdra\valof the Russinn troops
across thc I~orclcr. I f tlic oulragc had been ~ n c twith
firmness and resolution, prompt alonement would have
becn made. 13ut, 111) to the prescnt momcnt, our Ministers
Iinvc c1ispl:iyccl nei~lierfirmness nor resolution. l'nr from
grasping tlic rcnl significance of Russia's forwnrcl movc,
they hnvc begun by mnlcing a concession which is a virtunl
yielding of liussia's clemancls. Bussin had no c:~scwherewith to support licr impudcnt advance. Our Ministers h a w
provided hcr wit11 one. Lct us imagine, if me can, a French
nrlny crossing the Gcrmnn frontier, \\hich was finnlly scttlcd
nbout lie same time ns the Afgliiin fronlicr, and seizing
l\iIelz ! Is i t possil)le to imagine [lie German Chancellor
allowing thc inmcling army to reniain in that fortress unlil
it should bc dccicled by negotiation to whom thc line of
llic Rhinc properly belongcd : then lo listen Lo Prince
Rismnrk, \\hen incerrogakd in Parliament, as lie made a
slntemcnt like thc following ?
.'' Upon that con>munica:ion "-a demancl by Prince
I3ismark for tlic witliclra\\~al of the Frencl~troops-" a
cor~.espondenceensucd, and tlie l~rcnclideclined lo nritliclrnw their troops. They gave ccrtain esplnnntion5 about
them ; and h e y founded thcir ansnrcr upon the belief they
enterhind that the territory is theirs, tllnt they claim it as
n matlerof right. Well, sir, that being the state of the
case-we of course had adclressecl a requisition to them in
the bclief that it was German territory-as tlie French
nintle n serious claim lo be the rightful possessors of thc
territory, w could do nolliing i n the matter consistently,
I Lhink, either with prudencc or with any honourable regard
to the interests of peace, except to prosecute measures for
bringing about a proper investigation .2hd decision of the
clainl that had been preferred. That being so, uncloubkdly,
1 will not say actually, there has been a withdrawal of the
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requisition, but substantially it conies to the same thing.
Tlie npplication that was ~nnclehas lapsed I'ro~ntlic circumstnnccs of thc casc."
And yct, n~ul(r/is~ n m h i h s this
,
was tlic precisc csplanation, Llicsc I V C ~ C tllc $ s ~ s s ~ I J ~7 ~(~~1 . h 7 ,\~Iiicli tllc l'rinic
iV1inistcr of Ihglnnd ~ n n d c when inlcrrognted by Mr.
Edwarcl Stnnliope as to Lhe action Ilc hncl taken with
respect to the invasion of a frontier, which is, to all intents
and ~iwposcs,the fronlicr of Hritisli Indin !
. I t is to n certain cstent n sntishctory sign of tlic
tinies thnt his reply of Mr. Glndstonc lins n\\dicr~cd the
scorn and contempt of the men of all pxlics. 'l'hu 7';m~
of tlic following morning csl~ressecl the gcncrnl ol~inion
when it l n ~ i i e ~ ~ t~e hd n tLhc l'rime hlinister should hnvc
shown " s o little of the spirit of n ninn \vho nicnns Lo
vindicate the rights of Lhis counlry." . . . u
nvoicl w:~r
by siniplc :~ba~idonmentof clainis which hnve not bcen
investigntecl by competent authority, nnd to permit Kussin
to retain posilicx \\.hich slic has scized in defiance of her
own admission of thcir doubtful o\vnc1~sIiip,is Lo proclni~ii
ourselves impotcnt in presencc of audacious aggression,
and to deprive ourselves of the confidcnce which alone can
Icad to firm and fruitful alliance with Afghbnistin."
I t is in vain, I fear, notwithstanding Lliis expression, and
similar csprcssions, of opinion from all parts of the country,
to hopc that tlic Ministry nil1 bc inspirccl with tlic moral
courage \vhich can nip nn evil in the bud. T o o oftcn havc
they turncd lhcir clieelrs to the smitcr. I \voulcl, ho\vever,
ask them to rcmcn~bertlist in his instance it is not n cluestion of ni,inor import:unce--it is an Empire which is nt stnkc !
The rulers of England ;u.e the trustees Tor the people o f
1Snglancl. I bes~ccli,I iml~loretlie~li,not to ~ieglect~ l i i s
opporlunily of shutting the door lo the invader. I,el ~ l i e ~ n
" be just 2nd fear not."
I f mistakes have becn made by

both pnrtics in the past, let both unite in thc sncrcd duty
of firmly securing the nol~lcst clependcncy of England.
For it is that dependency, it is India, which is cndangercd
1,y this advnncc. If 111y fceblc voice cannot penetrate within
tile porlnls of Downing Strcct, il h e y r e f ~ ~ stoc Ileal. me,
let them listen to thc voicc of one to n l i o n ~for many yews
thcy cntrustecl ~ l i c Government of Indin, and to uhose
advice thcy arc bound to pay nttcntlon. " My own ricw,"
w o t e the l h l i e of Argyll, in n lettcr dated the 18th
March of tlic currcnt year, to tlic .Sf. j n n r ~ s ' s Gnzs//c :L'h[y own view ]ins al\\.a~'sbeen [lint the conc~ucst I.)y
Russia of Lhc Tckl;c l'urkomnns and of all tlic khanates of
Ccntrnl Asin has Jcen inevilable. I h a \ t hcld, furthcl-,
that n o civilization and n o conmerce could bc cs~ablislied
in hose rcgions until that conqucsl had been nccomplishcd;
and that on this ground, as well as on several other grounds,
it was at oncc useless and i~ndignilicclon our part to I x
perl:c(ually renlonstrating against ' advances ' ~vhichwe
could not prcvc~ita n d which, in the intcrasts of hunianity,
,
we ought not to rcgrct.
" E u t nonc of thesc considernlions apply to any advanccs
by Russia icross the I~orclcrsof A~Ixinist:i~i.Wc must
insist on [lie indcpcnclcncc and ilitcgrity of that country
Iwing rcspcc~ecl; and in s o 1.1s ns tlic l\f~Ji,in kingclonl
m ~ s of
t ncccssity I)c unclcr any predominant influence, we
must in& that this preclominancc sliall b e ours. I trust
all pmties a r c ngreecl in this doclrine and in this policy,
and in desiring t h t our Govcrnmcnl shnll carry it into
cffect with firn~ncss."
Finally, I would invite their nttcntion lo thc remarlis,
published in the Ti//lcs of the s m c dale, 19th March,
written by the great soldier whose warnings rcgarcling the
occurrcncc of certain evcnts in Cen:ral Asia unlcsv we
sliould take ccrlain precnutions, linvc, unfortnnately, alnnys
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been ncglcctecl and alwnys justified. " A wry rcnl danger
has come," wrote Sir Edmnrcl Ramlep, "\vithout o w seeking, LO meet us o n thc Afghin frontier, I t is impossible to
conccnl from ourselves the design with which Russia is
pushing on. Our manner of meeting her is among the
marvels of the most ~inaccounLablcperiod of our history.
We t r a ~ her
t ns one of two cstnldislicd coterminous Powers
whosc respective limits require clcfinition. T h e facts a r e
dropped out of sight that a fen' years ngo she was a thousand
miles from the Afghrin frontier, that shc groui~ds1icr brand
IICW title to contest its territory with us on her conquest of
ccrtain predatory tribes on whosc outskirts other predatory
tribes \vnnder, and thnt on tllc strength of this estrnordinary claim she suddcnly puts forth the irupudent formula,
' \VIintcver territory you cnnnot saiisfxtorily p r o w your
right to is nine,' wliich thenceforth 1,econlcs the l~nsisof
negotiation. What can such n prctcnsion put in action
inean but to defy us to wnr, with the alternative of ruinous
submission ? And, in f x t , for weelrs past, the daily
?' an
qucstion has been, ' Is there to bc war with RLISS~:~
event only staved off tlnis far by the hu~niliatingnlternntive. LiIie the tcrrilied prcy of brigands we hnrc cast
ourselves 71crrfre It fc~-rr: I h t even submission the most
abject cnnnot avail. T h e attitude we hnvc chosen is not
csnctly thc best for Itccping tllc throat from thc Icnife. And
what effect \rill it hnvc on our woulcl-bc allies, the Afglirins,
the poverty of nhosc dialect docs not pcrhnps cnnble
them to cliscriminntc niccly betnccn a11 agreement and nn
nrrongement ! What erect, too, in I n d i a ? I f I do not
spcalc of the effect in this country it is bcc:uise \re arc, for
the tilnc, wrnpt i!l an opiun~drcnm, in which facts count
for nolliing, dclusi,ons for much.
1y: ~o1111:lonc o ~ ~ s e n t the
,
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advance is Lo bc found in our embarrassments in Egypt.
That being ~ h czrsc,
c
wl~al:could Russia desire .better if
she herself tiad the ordering of orrr policy, than that we
should cnst fresh armies and ncw licnps of trcasurc into the
Soudnri ? Cnn she be supposed to look on \ v i ~ l iother feelings tlmn dclight \vhile Uritish ships are Inncling railway
11lant by the hundrcd mile at Su:lkirn? H a d the same
energy becn clisplnyecl on the Indus wc should now hnsc
11;1cl a nilway to Qucttn, perhaps to l<.inclaliir, wit11 Len
Iho~rs:~nclRrilish Lroops at thc end of it.
"\\;hat n sound judgment woi~lclscem to counsel, thcn,
is an immediate rrconsitlcration of our position. Nobody
will maintain L ~ : . L n.e cnn carry on two wars, cithcr of which
\ v o ~ l d suficienlly tax onr resources. I\'e must clioosc
Ijetween the will.o'-~lle-\~ispand thc mortal emergency.
Happily, troops nnd mntcrinl nt Sounkim are already so far
on thc dil.cct way to Kurrachee. A n d for the force onthe
Nilc, i l it can continuc its retreat to I.o\\ler Egypt (and the
douht speaks nl~tchfor the perverse inge~ldity\rhich created
it), 1st it abandon its delightful ant1 salubrious sulnmer
r111artcl-salld d c s c c ~ ~the
I ri\-cr ; thus, so many nien will bc
siwxl townrtls the saving of thc Empire. Ancl let us
simr~ltnneously takc nll nccclft~l stcps ftir placing nn
effcclivc army i n the field and putting his ltingdom in a
c o n d i t i o ~of
~ clcfcnce. I( a t 111c same Linle, that lost art,
diplomacy, sl~oulcl chancc to revive among us, it will find
ample occupation in endcasouring Lo persi~ndethe Afghins
to invitc us to n military occupation of their country, in
procuring friends among lhc European I1o\vers, nntl in
persuading Lhe unspcakablc T u r k to form with us that
ng-ccment (or nrrangcnlcnt) necessary to cnnble us to
I
opcmte cfkctivcly in the Black Sca."
These w e pregnant words. Of this, at least, Englishmen
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niay bc sure, that it is only by concentrating all thc energies
of Great Britain o n the maintenance of the esisting fronticr
of Afghinistdn that HcrAt can be saved. If wc allow
I-Icrril to fall, India is doomcd. That thc reader may
understand this clearly I procced to ans\vcr thc q u e ~ y
which I can imagine forming in his mind, " Whnt arc
those plnces which thus scem to conslit~~le
thc outlying
redoubt of Indin? "

CHAPTER VIII.
THE

OUTLYING;

RKnOUUT O F INDIA.

TIIEcity of I-Icrdt stands in tlie fertile valley of the
I-Ieri-rtid z,G50 feet above tlic level of thc sca. The
Ilcri-rlid rises in the mountains of I-Iazireh, not h r from
thc villagc of Robnt Tarwan. 'Under the name of Jangal-ib
it flow in n, south-westerly direction to a point bclow
Daolatzhr, a village on the direct road between Ilerdt and
Eaminn. At this point it is joined by another bmncli, tlie
Sir Tingilbb, which rises likewise in the Haziireh range,
though at a point somewhat more to the south-east than
t 1 Jangnl-rib.
~
From tlic point of junction the united
strcams take thc namc of I-Ieri-rdd and [allow an alniost
direct westerly course south of [lie Paropnmisnn rnngc.
Sonic fifty rides beyond I-Ierdt, which lies near its nortlicrn
bank, tlie r'iesi-roc1 tnltes a turn to thc north-west and then
to t l ~ cnorth receiving many streams in its course and
passes Romnnk, Kulisan, ICasan, 1311-i-l<hitunand Sn~lilis.
Between the two last named places it loses the name of
Heri-rud and takes that of Tejend. 'IJncler this name it
flows north-west~~arcl
till it' is lost in the sand and swa~ilps
of the great Turkomnn desert.
At the point nlrcady indicatccl wlierc tlic combined
w\-ntcrs of tlie Sir TingilAb nncl tllc Jnngnl-Al) form tlie
IZesi-rild, the rivcr trnvcrses a broxl valley which it adorns
and fertilises. All along this clinnncls from the river
spread o w r its Ixoad surfncc, converking Cdcscrts into cornfieltls, and mnste lands into gardens of fruit, Tllc supply

from its swiftly rnnning wnlers ncvcr hils. I t was equal to
the demand cvcn in the days wl~enHerlit was LIE most
fnmous city of Ccntrnl Asia, passcssing thc most influential
court and constitutir~gthe most splendid conmiercial mart
in the 13astcrn \vorld. Though the clianncls have been in
ninny instnnccs destroyed the supply is Inore ~ h a nequal to
the demand even now.
Ju this vnllcy the city of H c h t is tlie principal city.
According to thc graphic account of Conolly, who visitcd
It in 1830, it is situated " at four miles clistant f7om hills
on tlic n o r ~ h ,and t \ \ ~ lluilcs
\ ~ fiom those which run south
of it, The sljnce bctn~eenthe hills is one beautiful extent
of littlc iortificd vill;nges, gardcns, vineynrcls and cornficl~l~,
and his rich sccw is briglilencd by many smal1 streams of
shining water, \\d>icln cut the plnin in all dircclions. A
d a ~ nis thrown across thc Heri-rilcl, and its wntcrs, being
turnccl into many cal~als,arc so co~ductcdover Ihc vnlc
of 1-ler,it that cwry part oC it is watered. Variclics of thc
iuost delicious fruit arc gro\vn in tlic valley, and they are
sold cheapcr cvcn than at i\'Iesliccl ; the neccssnries of life
arc ~ l c , n ~ i fand
u l cheap, and tlic brcnd and water of I-Ierdt
arc prowrbial for lhcir cxcellencc. I really ncvcr, in
England even, tnsted 1110rc delicioiis watcr than that of
tlie I-Ieri-rild : it is ' as clear as tears,' and the nntivcs say,
only cqunllcd by tlnc ntntcrs of I<asIimir, which inaltc tliose
who clrink Llie~nI~eautifnl."
The origin of ~ l i ccity can be traced far inlo ~untiqui~y.
'1'0 thc ancicn~.s the provincc of which it \\.as and is
~ h ccnpitnl wns known ns Aria and Ariann. Tlic city is
mcntioncd I y h e cnrlicst \vritcrs. Arrian writes of it as
Artnkoann or :\rlakann, thc royal city of the inhabihnts of
Ark. JI: ofLcn scrvcd as thc l.esiclencc of tlic grcaLcst
conq~~crors
of ~ h ckst.
f
T r d i ~ i o nIxings to it Ncl)ttcl~ndnezznr and Sc~nirnmis. T h c l'crsinn 1iistori;uns assert, with
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rcnlarltablc unanimity that Alesander the Great pave it thc
nnme under n.liich Arrinn writes of it. There can be n o
doubt but that tlic cily was the gate lhrough which Lhc son
of Philip of .Maccclon passed t o tlie conquest of Indin.
I t was lomnrcls thc close of the tcnth century thnt the
vallcy of lhe Heri-rlid obtained the importnncc which it
exercised during many centuries which follo\vcd. An
oasis betwecn Llie Turkoman clcserts and the rocks and
mountains of Afgliinist:in, Lhc cenlrc wliesc convcrgecl
the roads fiom 13okhdra, fionl Pcrsin, a d from 1ndi.1, it
l~ecanle,nt that period n commercial ccnlrc which even thc
contesls Ixtwccn tlic Irdnian and thc 'l'urmiinn did not
clislorb. I n tlic year 1219 t h c city of 13er:it posscssecl
I 2,000 retail shops ; 6,000 pul)lic bn[hs, cnravnnsarics, and
water-nlills; 350 scl~oolsand monastic institulions ; 144,000
occupicd houses; and the city was visitccl yearly by caravans
from all par'Ls of Asia.
l'hc invasions of Chcngiz I<li;~n,1219-22, and of 'I'nimtit
in r j S r , inflicted upon I-Tcrit enormous-clmiage. I t was
through her gates that lie Intter narch he cl to he conqncst
or India. Gut tllc rebound \\;as n~agicid. Undcr tlic rule
of Shih Rokh, fourth son of Taimul; &r$t soon vindicated
hcr claim to tlic [ i l k of Queen of thc citics of the East.
'I'hc country beyond the Osus boasted of many famous
cities. 'There was Bolchlira, a n d thei-c was a city then more
inll~rentinlstill, the famous Snmarkhand. Uut Shih-Roltli
recognizcd in the province of I3er;it a military position
whence h e could hold fast the co~mtrics beyond the O s w ,
\vhilst lteepilig in n fir111grip the cuuntrics Lo the cnsl., to
t h e west, and t o the south. Under his rule Herdl became
the capital of Lhc whole of Central Asia.
The rencwccl prosperily of the chy and llrovince,
beginning \\;it11 tlie rule of the son of l'nimur, 139G-7,
lasted with but little interruption, to the period of its con-
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q ~ s hy
t Persia in 1510. With that conqucst thc glory of
tlie city depnrtcd. l'he rno~~nrchs
of Persia ncglectccl
Herit 1.0 pntronizc n city of thcir own, the holy city of
wslle c ~ .
From the dntc of its capturc by Persia, Llic province of
H e ~ i becamc
t
the bnttlc licld bctween the Uzl~elisand the
Illnians. ' l h city suffered 'miny sicgcs. Finally it fcll
to the latter, and thence to thc ycar 1 7 1 5 it shnrcd thc
forlunes of Lhc Persian monnrclly, ~ieglected nnd nll bul
forsalccn, from tllal molilen t, ~lntilthe death of Niclir S11:ih.
It fell then into thc hands of thc AfghAns, and i n thcir
llands it has sincc rcmaincd.
The limits of thc provincc of Hcrit hnvc varied with h e
times. Eut regarding that province asconstiti~ting\\~cstern
Afgll5nist;in it Inny hc said to bc 1)ordcrecl on the north
by thc linc from Snrakhs to lihoja Saleh, on the west I J the
~
Hcri-rlid, to the so~~th-\vest
I)y thc I k s i a n descrt as far ns
SGistn~;, lo the south by tlic 1Ieri-riicl ; to the cast I,y
thc inoi1ntainoi16 ranges separating it from Andkhoi,
MaimcnC and Shibbcrgan.
It's value to India resls on two facts:-the one palent to
the eye, that ns long as the province of I-IcrAt is held by
an ally or dependan1 of the ruler of India, Indin is unnssailable : thc other that I-Ier;it constitutes n ncw and perfect
base for a hostile army.
On the first point I would remark that I-Ierdt is called
thc gate of Indin because through it, and through it alonc,
can the valleys be entered which lead to the most valuable
of all the divisions of Asia. Those vnlleys, running nearly
north and south, are protected to the east by ranges practicully innccessible, to thc west by sterile deserls. No invading
army would attcinpt to traverse tlie great salt desert, and tlie
desert imnlediately to tlie south of it, the Dnsht-i-Naobad,
whilst n British army slloulcl hold Herit. I n thc eloquent
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lccturc, already nllucled to, on thc subjcct of tlic ftonlicr of
I n c h , delivered by Sir E. H a ~ n l c y in I S ~ S ,that nlnstcr
of the strategic art laid clown the bloacl principle that if
England were to hold tlic wcskrn linc of communication
with India, that by I-Icrat a n d l<nndnhar, shc ncecl not
troublc herself vcry 11111~11about thc castern or ICibul line.
On thc samc occasion, the emincnt soldier-politician \\rho
has made the question of the frontier policy of Inclin tlic
study of his life, declared, in reply to n question put to
him, that rather than allow the occupation of 1Hcr:it I>y
Russia, hc \vould vcnturr: the wholc might of Dritisli Inclin.
Sir Hcnry Rawlinson saw clcarly that the posscssion of
I-Ierdt by Russia meant the possession not only of a
strategic bnsc whence Russia could invade India, but the
possession of n country wlierc shc could remain quiescent
unlil the opportune moment for making the Gtal spring
shoulcl arrivc.
T h e mention of this consideration !ends me to [lie
secollcl point of my argulnent-to tlic assertion Lhnt thc
povincc of I-Icrit \voulcl form n scctirc and perfect base
for .an army of invasion. I have spoken of the \voncle~ful
fertility of tlic valley of the EIeri-r~icl. Ancicnt rcmains .
prove that the valley of the Murgliih has been and can b e
rendered again not less productive, l'hc vallcys ot
IUidshk and Kala-i-Nau, t h c country about Panjdch,
belong to tlie same category. .Abbott, Conolly, Vamb&ry, ,
found everywhere trnccs of large occupation. T h e province produces in abundance tlie willow and the poplcr,
trees which maltc the bcst charcoal. I t possesses mines of
lead, of iron, and of sulphur. T h e surface of many parts
of thc country is laden with saltpetre. I t s fields produce
in abundance corn a n d wine and oil. ~ h c aen army in the
province 'i\~hich,callcd by its inhabitants Badghis, niay be
conqxehended under the generic term Herzit, and nothing
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neccl be brought to it from Europe. 'I'he valley which
was the granary nncl the province vl~ichwas the garden of
ay,
Central Asin, can equip it, provide it with its ~mlh-i~?,
even with men and horses. On the city which gives its
name to the valley, moreover, convergc all the great roads,
but one, leading on Indin. Occupiecl by liussia, it \vould
beconle " an eye LO see nncl nn arm to strikc."
Tl~cseare not 111y mords done, they ace not my thoughts
alone. They are the words ancl the thoughts of every
Englishman of ordinary intelligence who has studied lhe
subject. They \;we Lhe words and thoughts of the cverto-be-lamented Barlle Frerc : they are the words and
thoughts of Hnmley, of J<n\\~linson,of Napier of Magdaln,
of Roberts, or b4acGrcgor. \\'hat says the latter, n most
accomplisl~ccl and instructed oflicer, on the subjcct? I
cannot quote from the ablc mernornndum which I
received in conhclence, but, forhmntely, Lherc is an
appendix tu his book on 1Chor:isin which contains his
views, writtcn so* far back as rS75, on thc subject I a n
now discussing.
" I t is not, honever, suficient," wrote Colorlel MacGrcgor, '(to show the importance of Ivterv. I will go
f ~ ~ r t l ~and
c r , try and sho\v ~ ~ Ilerlit
h y is important, because
of course if Hcr:~t were not important, and tllcre was
nothing beyond Mcrv but dcscrt down to the scn, I need
not have troubled myself to pen these remarks. Merv has
almost no morc value, npnrt fro111 Henit, than the head of
a sap 113s apart from a fortrcss selected for attack. I therefore \ \ ~ I I particular attention to be give11 to the nest step
by which I hope to prove lily case.
"E1er:it has been tcrmed thc Key or India, not lightly as
n Inere figure of stcech, but b y every officer who has had
an opportunity of seeing its valley. I t is so, becausc it is
the neal-est and best point at which an invader could con-
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centrale mid prepnre for tlie invasion of that country ;
aclvankiges which it gains from ils beautiful vallcy, ~ l i c
fcrlilily of which is unri~xlled in Asia ; from its slrn~cgical
posilion, which gives il tllc command oT all ~ l i cimportant
roads to India ; from the grcat strcng~liof its foriress, it
being, in fact, the slrongcst place from the Caspian to tlic
Indus ; from its admirable climate, and from tlic prestige
it- enjoys throughout Asia.
" T h c fertility of its valley, nncl its capability of maintaining large forccs, is provcd by Lhc fact that it has bcen
besiegcd oftencr Lhan any cily in Asia, ancl has always
af~ordcd supplies Tor tlie armics of both besiegers and
besieged. And it rnrlsl bc remembered tlie first have
sonletimcs rcached as many as 80,000 men, and have
scldom fallen below 30,000, while both have always been
composed of nnclisciplineil men who deslroyed nearly as
much as they consunled. Moreover, I have seen it with
m y own cycs, and I have no hesitation in saying that it is
capable of inaintnining a very largc army.l L I t will not be necessary to clescribe the defences of
Herdt, but only to remark that Sir H. Rawlinson's description is in no way csaggernted when hc says, ' I t is sur~ o u n d e dby works of Llie most colossal character, which,
with h e adaplalions and improvemen~soT modern science,
might be renclcrcd almost iniprcgnable.'
" A glance at the map, will convince any soldier o f . its
importance strt~tegically.i No less ~ h a nfive dislinct routes
lend lo Herlit from the west, viz : I. from ASII~LIKby
Shahrood, Toorsliez, IChaf; 2. from Guz by 130stam,
Subewar, Toorbut, Haiduree, ancl Shuhr-i-Now ; 3. from
Astrabad by Findurisk, Jnlijurm, Jowen, Nisliapoor,
Furreeninn, Shuhr-i-Now ; 4, by thc Xhorgaun, Rabat
Islik, Boojnoorcl, I<oocliaun, LO Mushudcl, and J u n ; 5.
from the mouL11 of the A t l r ~ ~ kby
, that river tlirougli ~ l i c
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same points. From the north two routes lcnd direct o n t o
it from hlerv, and n third arrives from Icirki by Maimend.
Hcrdt conlmnnds all these routes, as \ \ d l as the routes to
the south horn l'crsin, viz. from 'I'iln by ICIiaf, from
Ghain, Sulm\.nr, from Bisjund to F ~ ~ r r n l iHerdt
,
and
Lash. h[orcover lllc routes lending out of Herit, or over
which an army stntionccl Ilcre may bc said Lo have the
c o m n a n d are, I. the route En Rib111 by lktuiian ; 2 . Llle
route to thc same plece by rjehsootl ; 3. Lhe same from
I\[crv by ISala Murgl~ab; 4. the route by Balkh to l<dbul ;
5 :~nd6. two routgs to ICandaliar ; 7, thc roule to Ghuzni through the H q z ~ a h coiu~lry; 8. tlic roulcs fronl
Persin \vl.~ich lead through Sulizwnr, F ~ ~ r r a l i1,ash
,
or
Siistan, and \vliich all converge on Kani1;lhm.. :"
'' Besides all Lhese p o s i t i i ~and patent advantages which
this place possesses, Russia in I-Icrat would have nn unassnilnble position, from nl~icll lo 1hre:lten us in India, so
a s LO force us to kccp largc forces al\wys ready to meet
the menace, \vhik shc \vould be able to cast abroad
L1~roughout India, that ' seething, festering mass o f d i s
nffection,' the sccds of a rebellion that \vould still further
cripple us, she \\rould altogether alienate from us Lhe \ ~ h o l c
of tlic Afglidns, nnci tlic Persian Kliorisinis, and w o ~ ~ l d
practically control for her own purposes nearly all tlleir
military resources."
111 thcsc remarks thc whole case is contained.
The
conclusions, ~ ~ n h r t u ~ i a t earc
l y , irrefutable.
'I'he principles which apply t o the whole province appIy
equally to that northern portion of ndlich is containecl
betwcen the line of 1872 and the new Iine which the
Russians are hying to enforce. ?'he concession of that
line n~ould bring the Rus~iaiioutposts to nithi11 a very
short distance of I-Ierat-not much greater than the distance
liz securely on
between D w e r n ~ i d 1,ondon. Slle \vo~~lcl
I<
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L W O rivcrs, each possessing n full strexu and an unsurpassed
power of fertilizing-each, as I shall show in Ll~e nest
clinpter, opening out a route casy to be tmvcrscd. I n
desiring to acquire these districts liussin can havc hut
onc object, nncl that object the one which has been
the end and aim of her Transcaspinn struggles. T o
allow her to retain the Zulfagnr Pass, Pul-i-1Ch;itirn ancl
I'ul-i-Kishti, with the country to the north of lllcse places,
wonld be as crinlinal and as fatal to h e nation allowing
it, as if the commander of a f 0 r t l . e ~were
~
to pcrmit a
hostile army to encmnp on ~ h glacis.
c
. The conquest of
Merv ancl the occupation of Samkhs brought Russia near
cnough to Herit-but liltlc longcr than the distance which
separates the British outposts from ICandahnl; If wc would
preserve H e r d from hcr clutches, if we would nlaintain
India, we are hound to insist that the horder line from
Sarakhs to 1Choj;i Snleh shall be scrupulously respected.

CHAPTER VIII.

I PROPOSE no\v to describe the routes, and with the ro:ltes
the nature of the country, from Herit along the Hcri-rdd
to Snrdths ;from the same place bji the I ~ l ~ u s hriver
l c to its
junction with the Murghzib ; and from Henit, also, by Lhe
ICaln-i-nail valley to the Musghib. I n carrying out this pl;ul
I shall make frec cstrncts from L l x journals of older
tlnvcllers, men such as James Ahl~ott,Vambdry, Mnrsh
ancl MacGrcgor, and contrast their esperiences will1 Lhose
of he compnnions of Sir Peter Lumsclen ~ 1 1 0haw written
on the subjcct t c thc London papers.
I take f rst Lhe routc from IlcrLt to Sarakhs along the
Hcri-rlid valley, bnsccl upon the esperienccs of Captain
Marsh, who traversed the country in 1872, and of Sir C.
MacGregor who visitcd i L the following year :
Riding westwnrcl thc first stage lands. the traveller at
Shakhwan n large group of ~hreevillqes and a fort, l'hc
distancc by the direct road is twenty-four miles, but to
avoid the wet cultivation near the river i L is often necessary
to nldic n dt?to;r of eight miles, crossing h e Julglln or
])lain of Hcrnt " a sandy loam \vhich bears goocl crops by
irrigation."
The second journcy is thirty-two miles to Sabash " a
little, mean, dirty, fort, bnrely habital~le." The first: part
of the road talics the traveller along n networlc of canals
as far as a riiinecl carnvansnrai ; thence, along high grounds
I< 2

at some distance from h e rivcr to the fort of Rozanak,
about four miles from thc tonm of Ghorian to the south o f
it, and from Rozannk across a vast gravel plain with distant hills on both sides to Sabash.
From Sabasll to Kuhsan the distance is but twelve miles
across the s:iune gmvcl plain. Kulisan is no\v in ruins,
but in Sir Charles l\.lacgregorJs opinion it could easily be
i~nproved"so as to ~ n a k eit worthy of the frontier fort of a
warlike nation." T h e same autliorily speaks with enthusiasm
he writes, "into a
of the fertility of its soil. " Cond~~cted,"
most delighthd garden, I bivouackecl under the shade o f
some fine plane trees, by a tank o f clelicious clear water.
After a good bath in the Ialtc~,it was a great luxury to lie
back in one's bed, and devour, for nothing, bunch after
bunch of glorious grapes, that at home would have ruined
me." H e makes special mention of the splenclid gardens
and vineyards in thc vicinity of the town, as wcll as of its
\viridn~ills,wIiicI1 like\vise are to bc founcl in great abundance about liozannk. Regarding its posieion AiacGregor
writes : T h e position of Kuhsnn is one of considerable
importance as being the first village in :he valley of the
I-Ieri-rdcl which would be reached by forces coming from
the west, and the point on nhich the roads from l'arbut,
hIeshed, and Sarakhs join. It is therefore a place nthere
thcrc shoi~ldbe a fort of considerable strength, because an
invndcr could not venture to pass it n~ithouttaking it, and if
it we're able to offer a respectable resistance, it would necessitate his being detained long enough anlong the barren tracts
to the nest."
The fourth clay's journey is to Chasn~a-Saoz,a distance
of twenty-fonr miles. T h e road, which is good, traverses
a plain on the left bank of the Heri-rdd. Supplies of all
sorts are here abundant. This journey terminates in a
pass, \vhicli, judging from the equal distance, sixty miles
('

from S ~ r ; ~ l can
h , be no other [Inn the Zulfagar Pass,
recerirly seized by the Russians.
T h e fifih chy takes the traveller to Pul-i-IChdtun, twentyeight miles. ' r h e r o d crosses the- Kotal Istn-ICllanchil
pass, and then traverses hills, crossing to the right bank not
far f i ~ mI'ul-i-l<l~:itun. TI-lough not good, it is practicnble
for g ~ ~ n Not
s . far iron [hese hills, the most northern branch
of the Heri-rud takes the nanle of the T'ejend. Thcre is
no villngc at Pul-i-Rhdt~~n,
but forage is abundant. 'l'hc
bridge \vhich gives its name to the locality is an old bridg?
of stone.
From Pu1.i-Kliitun to Saralths, the distance is ~llirty-two
n d e s , the road lwei all the way, over n plain on th-. left
bnnk of the river. At sixteen miles the Si)rt of Knln
1lnolatil)hd is passed ; eight milcs beyond, t ' ~ : l t ol N;~oznbad.
Contrasting with this account is the grnphic descl.iptian
of the salne road, t:lkcn [he reverse way, from Sirakhs
down the valley," ns rccounkd by Mr. Simpson, the specinl
artist to the J/l/tshnlcd Lnirdt/:l AZzils, pul~lishccl by that
paper, in its issue of the ~ 1 s March
t
of the current year:
" T h e march from Pul-i-Khdtun to ICojeh Saham-ed-din,
and thence to Goolnr, on our way to ICuIisan, was n w r y
interesting one. T h e interest of it lies in its strategic
featuses in relation to a force moving from Sarakhs on the
line of the Heri-rilcl to\vnrds I-Terit, From Sarnkhs to Pul-iI<hituo the ground is open .; o n the left or Persinn side it
may be called a plain the \vhole way ; but on the right bank
a gentle rise begins at ICazil Koi, about eight miles south
of Sarakhs. 'l'his rise assumes the c h a r ~ c t e rof n plateau
or of undulating clo\vns, all the way south to l-'ul-i~l<h,it~~n.
Nowhere in thaP space is there any strong posilion of
defence. At I'ul-i-I<h.ltun the whole character of the
ground changes, t l ~ ebed of the river beconxc rocky, and
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pcrllaps nbout a qunrler of a mile distant a gorge presents
ilself. Here the slrnta stand nearly peqxnclicular, and the
road leaves thc rivcr to pass over the spurs of the higher
hills on the south. This gorge, with one or two s~nall
heights, :und the spurs jusl mentioned, could bc easily mnde
very formidable, if not impregnable ; even as they arc, a
very s ~ n a liorce
l
could stop a very Iargc one. Souh is thc
position at Pul-i-I<hitun itself ; and it forms the key of t l ~ e
whole strategic probleln. I t is tlic Ell)urz Range wl~icli
bends eastn.:~rd,or south.enstward, to bc Inorc corrccl, : ~ t
one of i ~ sridges, ~hc.ridge clips down to the I-Iel.i-rhd,
disappears, and crops up again on the east side of Lhe
bridge, from which it slondy rises to\vards the Zulfagar Pnss.
It is n common fenturc of the hills in this rcgion to bc
steep and rocky, nlnlost precipitous, on the south and
south-west ; while on the north the slope is easy. The
ridge extending south-cast from Pul-i-Khdtun is of this
character. For a few miles it i~ no great height, and there
are one or two places \vherc it might be $ssed by troops.
'I'l~ebest place would be whnt is known ns tl~cGermab
I'ass, nbout nine miles from Pul-i-I<h:itun ; this line takes
thc ' chord ' of Lhc cur\re ~vhich[he river ~uakcs west\vard
to Pul-i-l<lxilun. When thc rjvcr is low, this pass is taken
by travellers from its being the shortest linc to Saralchs.
A forcc coming south could turn the position nt Pul-iI<hitun by this pass, but if the def'ending force was large
enough to extend along the whole grom~d to the Germdb
Pass, it would hnvc n strong position. The Germbb Pass,
it will be understood, must form part of the whole position
to be includccl as belonging to l'ul-i-ICbitun. South-emt
of the GermAl) Pass, thc r i d ~ ebeco~nesso elevated and
stecp in park that no force would try 'to? surn~ot~nt
them.
r ; southern
The nest pass is that known as the Z ~ ~ l f a g a its
entrance must be about thirty miles from Pul-i-Khitun, and
'

the distance from leaving thc river to the point wlierc it is
again touchecl by anyone coming through must be still
greater; and I understand that no m t c r is found in tlie
pass itself. This will indicate one difficulty in marching
troops by this linc, on account of tlie want of water; and
if there wcrc a force dcfc~idingthe s o u ~ hend of the pass,
thc difliculty might Ix i~icrc:~setl.'I'hc Zulhgar Pass is a
very striking onc, fron~t l ~ c~ x x d l e lridges of lcvcl strata in
tlie hills on each sidc, n.hicli rise to n grcat Iicigl~t.
" liojeh Snhani-cd-din is n saint's tomb, but our camp
was a t a spring of watcr about a mile hom it. Our next
march, to Coolar, was a very short onc; being only eight
miles. The deserted character of this part, since leaving
Pul-i-Kl~Ltun,is even greater than anything we have yet
passed. 'I'hc ground has been cultiv;~tcdat some fosrner
date ; and \\T Iiaw seen spots on which towns have stood :
now there is not an inhabited house all the way to Kulisan.
At Goolar we were in a piecc of open country, with plains
and heights, h u t o f a small elevation, in comparison with
the hills around.
L ' Our ~ ~ i a r cfrom
l l Goolar was at f rst for about seven or
eight miles soutli, still on the west side of the Heri-rilcl,
which we had not seen since the march horn l'ul-i-Khritun
-on tliat march w e crossed it and re-crossed it again. Right
across our line on leaving Goolar was the Kuh-i-Jam range;
and o u ~
linc soutli, over the lo\\w ground, I~rought-11s to
this range, which we began to ascend in n valley. O n our
left were four mnrltcd hills known as thc Clialzar Do\vli-' Chakar ' meaning four. Between two of these the Hesirlid passes oot fro111 the Iiuli-i-Jam into tlie open conntry
bct\\.een that and the high ranges at Zulfagnr. The gorges
of tlie river whe~r:it passes the Kuh-i-Jam are inlpassable
for travellers ; hence tlic necessity for going ovcr .the hills.
Our route lay op the valley in a south-wcstcrly clircction.
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Troops could march by this load, Lut nothing on wheels
could pass. \Ire stoppcd for thc night at an open bit of
g o u n d , \\,here there was a stream of good water, with trees.
O n the top of a hill are 'some bits of the walls of a fort,
Stoi, but t h e Persians call it Istoi, and this givcs the
llame to the Pass. \Ye were said to be about 4,000 feet above
this place, and it was very cold. There were
the sen
clouds a n d a few drops of rain or sleet."
T h e party had four days' marches yet to perform to reach
Kul~sa~~.
'I'hc distance from I-Ierht to Sarakhs by h i s road is only
t\\,o hundred and two miles. If the British Government
alld the Rritish people are insane enough to allow Russia
to shorten that distance by sixty miles-and
that is the
distancc between Snrakhs and the Zulfagar pass-to occupy
a place which is valuable only for its position, for it does
not even posscss a Ilut--\\~ ought not to be surprised if we
arc soon called upon to yield I-Ierdt liltewis'c !
I turn now to Pnnjdeh-or group o; five villages-a
long \my within the Afghin frontier proper. A glancc at
the following itinerary between H e l i t and klerv along the
valley of the bIurgh:ib, on \vI(:lich Panjdeh lics on the
direcl line, will sho\v more clearly than any special description the enormous importance of Lhe position. I quole
1n3inly from Captain Abbott's journal.
From Herit, due north, to Parwina, is eleven milcs. 'l'lle
road lies b e t \ ~ c e nclose l(:lills,of no considerable height, and
ascends the entire way. Around h i s village are hills and
plateaus producing \vo~~~uwood,
\vhicl~is browsed Ly ;he wild
antelope. l'hcre are many wells and a little coltivation.
l:rom l'nrwinn the road leads across the mountain ridge
of l i a i ~ i l ,north-easlward by north to IC!(:l~~sIlk,
a two days'
j o u s ~ ~ e y .Captain James Abbott, who n ~ a d eit in the )rear
1840, turned the dilticult passes of t l ~ chighest ridge and
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slept in a hollow where wns a little water. From this he
proceeded llic nest day "by a very distressing crosscounlry path, over steep liills covered with grass, to [he
rivulet Iihilsl~k,whence we ascended to the capital of that
name. T h e \ d l e y here is pictl~resqireand interesting."
T h e place, styled somcwhat magniloquently as
the
cnpital," is a small fort round which are mud houses and
nlud kibitltas or cabins. . l'he valley of I<lilishk is tlie
a tribe of Turkish
dwelling-place of the Jn~~~sliidis,
origin, disting~~ishedfor heir. loyalty and their gallantry.
'The present condition of the place and tlie people is thus
described by the T i m s correspondent in UAld Mulgllib,
from whom I 11nvealready quotccl :I' On Deccniber 211d we entcrcd by narrow cleliles the
wllcy in which tlie Jamshidi or Jenisliicl seltlement trt'
Iilidslik is situatccl. I t is about f o u r t c c ~milcs
~
long and of
a n n\wagz width of three-fourths of a n ~ i l e ;h e hills are
of low, rounclccl clay, bnre of trees, tlwir sides clotted wit11
~ i l l a g c sof d o ~ d c d rnld cabins. The irrigation from llic
river is profirsc, nnd h e r e is ~ n u c l lcultivation on tllc tcq)
and sides of the hills, where rain crops are grown. T h e
grain rniscd is only suflicient for thc wants of thc people,
and cscc1)t in opium there is no esport trade.
Every
Jamshidi h i l y has its own home-bred horses, smnll wiry
animals lit for any nniount of \vorlt. Tlic Janishidis themselves arc n quiet, trnctablc people, estreinely friendly and
well disposed Lo us. They were the lirst nomad tribe we
saw at home, for though tliey have their niud cabins they
only live in thew during the winte~; and at other seasons
tliey prefer their kibitkns, which they nre always prepared to
take up and walk. Perhaps I ought to explain what a
kibi~lia-thc ho;~ie of Lhe no~nncl,and a T-erycomfortable
home, loo-is like. IGbillia is tlie Russian and Ev tlie
Turkoman name.
It is n dome-slinped frnnlc\vork of

lattice-work covered with layers of felt, the nnniber of layers
being in proportion to the severity of thc wcather. T h e
walls for about Git. of their heigh~are vertical and L11e.u
the dome rises, its highest point being from aft, to ~ g f t .
A felt cap fits on a hole in the ccntre of tlie roof which
lets in the light-for
the kibitlcn has no windows-when
it
is fine, and lets oul the smoke when you light a fire on the
ground i~nderncath. The floor is generally spread with
carpets of choicc pxttern, rich colours, and velvet softness,
worked by thc fair (?) lingers of tlie clnoghters of thc
kibitka; o n the wnlls, too, hang camcl bags, al~out6ft. by
4ft,, of the same rich carpet worlc. The great advantagc
of n Itil~itka is thaL i n n few hours you can strike, pack 1111
ancl load it on n camel and be of[ Lct Paterfamilias
imagine the convenience of being able to put his c01nfor~able house in the train 2nd take it off to the seaside, and
then he will understand that nomad life Iias its advantages. Hon.ever, if on' rcading this description he wishes
to send for a kibitkn from l'urkistan, he ~ n ~ i not
s t order a
kibitka of such and such a size, but a Icibitltnwhich is n load
for one, t\vo, or morc can~els,ns the case may be."
After dwelling upon the past recent history of this
interesting tribc, and stating that, in thc struggle I)et.ween
Aylib IChdn and Abdul liahman the Jnnishidis, having
transferred their allegiance to thc Latter, had quilted Khilshk
to take r c f ~ g ein a less ncccssible valley, and Ilad only
returned \vhcn the cause of A y ~ i bKhdn was irretrievrrldy
ruined, the writer thus continues :" However, the prcsent. bmir has moved 1,000ia,milies
back to Bdld MurghBb, an inlportnnt strategic position
which he wisely desired to colonize. Indeed, it was t i ~ n c
that something o f the sort were done, Ar, owing to overpopulation and over-irrigation thc I<li~islik valley had
become very unhealthy, and h e people were dying off fast

from a sort of enteric fcvcr which has been rife there the
last few years. A n h u l l a KhAn is the Governor of 13811
Murgl~db and Panjdeh.
Therc are still about 4,000
families in Khdshk-every
four families are supposed to
fnrnish one horseman in ordinary times-and I was mucI1
struck by the painful contrast between their physiquc and
that of Jamshidis living elsewhere. T h e Jnmsl~idis claim
. to be descended from a Iiaianinn Chief, who obtained
from Shdh Abbns the comn~andof a military colony composed of horsemen belonging to different tribes of Hcriit,
and 1.0 this colony he gave the name Jamshidi, from Jamshid, the apocryphal progenitor of the Paishdadian and
therefore Knianian family. Shdh Abbns gnvc a district in
Bndghis to the Colony, and round the Persian stem thus
planted there gradually clustered all the waifs and strays of
Heriit, till the Jamshidis mustered some 60,ooo families.
During N:idir Shdll's reign, however, they were reduced to
I 2,000, and they now number only nl~out(5,000 familicsnamely, 4,000 ir? I<hlishk, 1,000 in RAIL Murglxib, and
1,000 in Iiurukh at the foot of thc Kaitli ~nountains,four
miles from Herit. T h e Jamshiclis resembIe the Turkomans in dress and manners, but they are appnrently a
quiet, peaceable people. An English officer might safely
live ninong them without any guard, and if they have only
respite from raids and gar they will doubtless spread over ~11d
multiply in the inore healthy but deserted lands of Badghis.
T h e y are hardy, clever horsemen, and every household
])reeds its own horses.. When wc were i n IChdshk the
weekly fair was held ; it was nttendccl by lmny Turkomans fron~Panjdeh and by some l~iruzkuhis,but by very
fcw Hazarehs, with whom the Jamshidis are not on very
friendly terms. 'T%e Turkomnns brought salt, rice, soap,
carpets, horses, shcep, and found for sale in the bazaar
ploughshares (of cast iron) and hatchets from Mitinien6 ;
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Russian and French loaf sugar, Austrian matches, also
Bryant mid May's, Meshed and Bokhira silk and cotton
goods. T h e greater part of the lattcr was Russian, not
English-let Mnncliestcr draw its own conclusion."
From this valley tlie traveller bent on reaching Mzrv can
either folloe tlie rivulet of Khilshk by I<husI~akSian, Cliahill
Docktar, Knla 'I'apa, Chamnn-i-Baid, Kila-i-hlaur, I'al-i,
Kishti to Panjdch ; o r he can proceed by thc more direct
road to l<;ila-i-Nau, thence to Pul-i-'I'abnn on the Murghdb,
nncl follonr that river also t o Panjdcli. Cap~ain Abhott
followed tlic first route, \vliicli he thus describes :-" \Vc'
pnssed clo\vn the \.allel- of the I<hilslik ri\wlet averaging
about half n' mile iu width, a n d bounded on either side by
sloping, grassy downs, sprinkled wit11 Rocks of sheep nnc?
goats. Under tlic lo\v, sunny clilfs and hills the Jamshidis
had pitched their I h c k tents in considerable numbcrs; and
in the fields of the vnlley hundreds of m3res and colts
\ w e grazing, T h e sccnc was exlreniely pleasing. 'l'lic
wlley is highly suscepti1)lc of culture, &id has once bcen
well tilled." Captain Abbot: enc:~mped that evening at n
point on thc river between 1'~isIint Sin!] and liriln 'l'npa.
The next day Iir niarcliccl along a siniilar counlry to the
latter place; beyond that, the day follow in^, to within two
niiles of Clinman-i-Baicl. Beyond K i l n Tapa he met Inrgc
flucks of slieep.
'l'he slleplierds," lie writes '' come w e n
from -Merv to this plcasnnt valley bringing water and all
other necessaries o n asses." 'I'lie day after, as h e mnrclied
to IWa-i.hlal~r, scenes almost si~nilnr met his gaze.
" Large Roclrs of whitc sheep still sprinkled the hills o n
either side, b u t those hills merc growing niore arid and
sandy as we advanced." Again, " We met not less tlian
six o r seven caravans of grain from h,Ielq/.l1
A few miles beyond Kala-i-Maur is Pdl-i-Gisliti+: a spot
" BInrkctl in Colonel Stcnrart's mnp simply Ly the word " Britlge."
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\vl~ichRussia has actually seized. It is oilly eight. miles
from Panjdeh. Hcrc Abbott halted, and of it he wrote as
follo\vs : " Here the vallcy is about three-quarters of a ride
in breadth. On the east bank are sloping sand hills, about
Goo feet higher than the valley. On the west is the desert,
a high sandy plain ovcr-run with lo\\, bushes and canlel
thorn and estending to the mountain barrier of Persia."
At Panjdeh to nhich he then proceeded, Abbott received the
liospitnlity of the Turko~nans\vho were then its occupants.
He speaks of the desert as having been once populous and
cultivated.
Not less interesting to us at the present ~nonientis the
alternative route by IClila-Nau and Moghor, to. l'ul-i-Taban
on the Murghdb, and thence by way of Bila MurghLI~and
hInruclialc to Pnnjdeh. Fortunately we are able, owing to
the escellent correspondents of the London papers to see
the country as it is at the present moment.
ICBla-Nau is n valley which constit~~tes,
so to speak, the
capital of the 1-krkt HIU~I'UIIS.It bears n strong rescn~blance to the I<dshk valley already described, cxcept
that it is smallcr, more healthy, and more fertile. " The
people," writes the IYt~tcscorrespondent, " are a branch of
the SIiinh Ilaztirehs of Haztireh Jat, between R e r i t and
IC~IJLII,
but, 11;~vingbecome Sunis they havc 11ow no conliexion with Lhen~." 'I'hey are n very fine set of men, with
pleasant frank faces, and with little trace of their Mongol
origin. The influence of the present Amir ovcr them is
all-pwa~nount:-" I'very year," to quote from the salnc
interesting source, '' an increasing number of the Hazarehs
still remaining in Persia join their brethren in the
Kala-i-Nau valley, where there is plenty of room for them
and many others ,The I-IazB.rehs were at one time very
troublesome to their neighbours, but they are now well in
hand, and to quote the words of a native writer, ' Before

Abdurrahman K h i n becanle Amir the I-Iazireh Chief could
murder his political opponents, but now he cannot.' I
must say that I moulcl not like to be in Mahomed Khan's
way, had h e n chance of removing me. H e is a shrewd,
self-contained, clctermincd little man, with a quick eye,
which is always intensely fixed on his own interests. The
Hazirehs are very prosperous, not to say rich ; their land
is exceedingly fertile,-they
have not much more to
do than to sprinkle seed on the hill tops and wait for the
friendly rain; and then, a5 they say, rcap a hunclreclfold.
Their chief wealth, however, is in cattlc. ; ol shcep they
hnvc enormous flocks. T h e Hazhrchs of IWa-Nau :1fford
another proof that the Amir's authority is absolutc and
~~nqi~estioned,"
I don't think I can d o better than allow the writer to
continue the journey to BilA Murghlib 2nd to give his
account of thal place in his own graphic stylc :
" From ICBla-i-Nau we might have takcn the same road as
Grodekoff and VambCry, who travellccl frmn Bdla i~1urghhb
l ~ yTnlkguzar and tllc Darband pass, but it was not
adapted to camel cnrriage, and accordingly we turncd the
mountains by following a stream which ran in a northwesterly direction through a succession of uncultivated
valleys of great fertility, but at present only used by the
nomad Ghilzais and Turkomans as grazing ground for
their flocks. I t was a long timc since we had been i n
contact with Afgh&ns, and the discourteous manner-I
daresay they could not help it-of these Ghilzais contrasted
very unfavourably with the genial friendly attitudc of thc
Char Aimaks and Hazirehs. About 30 miles from Ab-iICamri, the stream we were following was turned in a
norLherly direction to the Khdshk riverby a high hill which
stood in our direct path, while we wvl~eeledto the south-west
into the 'rorshek valley. Five rides brought us to our camp-

.

ing-ground by the sidc of a s t r e a ~ nof vcry indifferent water.
Close a t hand too, \\?asa hot sulphcr spring, \vhich in ancient
days was apparently conducted into a hugc bath, canopied
by a brick dome said to hnve been erected by Shbh Rokh.
On Lhe I zth of Deccmbcr we reached B i l a Murgliib, and
as we neared the place fro111 the sonth-cast, the guns of
the fort fircd n snlutc of scventccn guns in honour Sir Peter
h m s c l e n , who simullancously cntcrccl the valley from the
opposite side. T h c rivcr \\.as about 60 yards broad at the
ford by which we crossed it, a n d not less than 3 Teet deep.
T h c current was very rapid, a n d though the ford had been
sltilfully slakccl, thc laden camels had considerable difficulty
in crossing it, a n d some \vould assuredly hnve been
lost had it not bccn Tor thc rcady help given by the
Jamshidi horscnlcn, who wlien a c a ~ n e lslipped or drir~ecl
d o \ w the current, s\varmed round him like flies, \vhippecI
off his load and drugged him into salety.
Li\\Tearc greatly plcased b y our winter quarters, a n d
everybody is \velA a n d in good spirils. Our camp is surrounded o n t h l w sides by the river in a vallcy about seven
milcs long and one or two miles Imacl, which runs from
south-wcst Lo norlh-east, and-is enclosed bclween two ranges
of rounded clay hills. A1 Lhc s o ~ ~ t l i e rcstrcmity
n
there is
a dceply i~idCnted gorge in thc grand mountains of he
'I'irbund-i-l'urkisl:i~i (which runs west to cast) through which
lie I~lurghbbtcars its way. A t the norllieyn cnd of LIie
valley the hills gradually conlrnct inlo n narrow defile Tor a
fcw miles, when they again opcn oul into the valley
of Knrnolkhana. Twice again d o the hills ~ I I L I S contract
and expand into Lhe v d c y s of h4cr~1cliakand Panjdeh
rcspectivcly. Pnnjdch, I sl~oultl add, is a b o t ~ t forty-six
inilcs from hcre. ,I havc alrcatly cxplainecl that tile iilnir
1ir.s colonized 13ila Murghrib Trom among t h e Jamshidis,
Firuzkuhis a n d Haziras. This was a \vise slep, for Bdla
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Murghib is n. very important position strategically, situated
as it is on the high road from the capital of AfghBn
l urltistin, and: perhaps, when thc R u s s i ~ ~ nflotilla of
steamers is ready to navigate the Osus, from ICerki Lo
I e r 13ut il: is not the sort of place thnt ,z timid h g l i s l ~
spinster lady \\~ouldselect as a residence, surroundcd as it
is, or to spcnk more accurntcly, as it was, by marnuding
Turkomnns, unruly ilimaks, and the t u r b ~ i l a ~Uzbegs
~t
of
kIaimen6. But now thc l'urkolnans m e tamed, the Char
Aimalts peaceful, and hhimend has been subdncd. Hdln
hlurglxib is consequently n safe habitation. 'I'he colonics
estnblished h c r e seem contented and prosperous. On the
left or opposite bank to us there nre thc Firuzkuhi and
Hazireh colonies, nnd on this bank the Jamshicli colony.
The happy family is il\vcd into harmony by Lhe fort with
an Afghin garrison, nncl every clay when n.e attempt lo go
out for a ride the flooded fields and numcruus \v&r.cuts
remind us that the work of reclamation is being rapidly
pushed on. I cannot say there is pretty pcencry, thuugli,
no doubt, it isgrand scenery, but there is the same w n t
of trees \\~Iiichhas charac~erized nearly every. district \ve
havc mnrched through."
T h e routc referred to by the correspondent as having
bccn follomcd by Grodekoff and Vnmbe'ry, and which is
the shortest and no st direct route, is thus described by
the latter :-ILIt is reckoned n rout days jow.ncy for horscs
from Ikih h.hrghdb to Herdt. Camels q u i r e double L1:e
time, for the country is mount-aillous. . . . 'l'nw liigl~
mounl~inouspeaks visiblc to thc south dr U d a hlurghrib,
\\we pointed out to us, and we were told that it n.oulc1 take 11s
two days tu reach thcm. They both bear the name
Durbend (pass), and are far loftier, narrpver, ancl easier of
defence than the pass on the right bnnk of the Murghib,
leading to h11aiimene'. In proportion as one acl\rnnces
P 7
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natilrc nssunics 'n wiltlcr n n d more romantic nlyxlrrnlce.
Thc clcvnted ansscs of rock \vIiicll fort11 tlic first Dcrhend,
are cro\vnccl with tlic r ~ ~ i nofs a n ancient forl, the subject
of the most varying f:hles. Further on, ac tlw sccond
Derbencl, on t l ~ cbank of tlie Murgl~ib, there are tllc remains of nn old cnstlc. I t was tlic sunlnier residence of
the rcno\vnctl Sultan I - l u s h hlirm, I)y \vliosc order a stone
bridge-l~ul-i-Tabn~i-\\~ns constructed, of which traces
are still tlistinguislinble. 111 the tinlc of this, the niost
civilizccl sovereign of Central Asia, thc whole o f the neighl)ourl~oodwas in a flourishing state, and Inany pleasurchouses are said to 11;ir.e esisted along thc course of the
Murghab.
Beyond the second l m s we quittcd tlie Alurglidb.
T h e route t ~ ~ r n e to
d tlic right, in n westerly direction,
townrds n plntcnu closely adjoining n part of the desert
peopled .by the Sdor. Were begins the lofty mountain,
Telkliguear, \\,hich it takes three hours to pass over.
" Towarcls micihiglit we halted at n place called Moglior,
\vlience, ncst n~orning,we reached tlic ruios of thc former
town and fortress, 1Ma-Nin1, iio\v sunounclecl by n few
tents of Lhe Hnzirel~."
Of l3;ili Murglidb Vanlbery thus wrote; " this part of the
valley of the Mv~urghAbbears the nnliie of B91a Murghril) ;"
( t o m the fortress of that name) "it extcncls from the
frontiers of the lofty mountainous chain of the Hazirehs
as far as hiaruchak, where dwell the Salor Turkonians : it is
saicl of old to havc been a possession of the Jnnisliidis, and
that they were for n time dispossessed mid afterwards returned. T o the south-west of the fortress the valley becomes so narrow that it merits mther the name of a defile.
Through the midse the M.urgliAb rolls foaming away with
the noise of thunder,-it is not until it has passed Panjdeh,
where the river becomes deeper and more sedate that the
L

valley sl)rcntls itself out nncl ncqr~ircs n I)rcndth of one or
two miles."
lkild hlurghib is 46 n d e s south-cast of I'nnjddi, ,
h.lnrr~cl~nk,nlso on the Murghil), being about hnlfkay
bctnvccn the two.
Tlw following nolcs, by Captain Artlinr I;. Ihrow,
Aide-de-camp on the staff of Sir l'ctcr Jmnsden, as to the
military value of Pul-i-Klxitun, ~ \ ~ c published
rc
.in the Mttst i v k d Loiin'oit fViws of the I .$I i\Iarcll last :" Proni Saraklls as far a s l'ul-i-Khitr~n, mosement on
eithcr bnnk prcsents no difficulties. To Daulatihid,
t\\dvc miles south of Saraklls, both banks are l e \ d ; from
tliat to l'ul-i-l<h:itun, the right 1)ank dominates, and all
movements on tlic right bank are under cover, and fi~lly
concealed from observation from ~ l i cleft bank ; whilc, on
the other hand, no niilitary movement whatevcr coulcl
possibly be carried on upon tlic Icft bank, within, at least,
sis' miles of tlie river, without h ~ l lcognizance of the right
bank. The river itself, by reason of its ^depth n.nd width,
is nowhere a nlilit~lyobstacle. At I'u1.i-lChitun, the road
passes through a narrow gorge; it is a mere track with
stcep graclicnts, and thencc, as far ns Gool:tr, \roulcl present
great difticulties to the advance of cvcn n srnnll flying
colun~nwith the lightest guns. Witl~out\reeks of labour,
it could not be relied upon as n main line of communication practicable for heavy artillery with its ammunition
column, with the ambulcnce and the heavy-\seeled transporl: and impediments of R large army. T h e river is, on
thc east side, shut out froni Badghis by a steppe, ndlich
drops precipitously into it, thc cliffs averaging from rsolt.
to 2ooft. in height. 1'i! this curtain there are two gaps, by
which access to t l ~ criver is obtained,~alled respectively
tlie Ger~nbband Zulfagar Passes. From Goolal; our route
lay to the west of the rher, which passes, it is stlid, tl~rough

an i~npractical)lcgorge ; scvcral o ~ h c rroutcs arc, ho\w\e~-,

availnblc-one by way of %os:~l,nd,\rllcre watcr is fou~lcl;
and tl~crcis snid Lo Itc \.cry liltlc nnlurnl ol)staclc tu all
advance I~eyondCoolnr 1)y tllosc routes. Enough has lwcn
said Iicrc Lo sho\v that tllc possession of l'ul-i-lih:itun, by
any Powcr which nntic:ipalcs nd\;nncing on I-Icrit in the
fulure, is a clcsidcxtunl of considemble valuc ; for access
to the Pass would nalurally rcsult i n the immediate construction of a good road, along n strcnm of escellent
watcr. A t tlic snnie timc, it must not b c overloolml tlmt
the imj)cnetral)lc nalurc of thc cliffs o n Lhc cast hnnli
oS the river, render lhc I ~ S Cof his ronte, as a main line at
advance, open to Lllc vcry serious mililary objection that
no IaLernl c o ~ n m u n i c a ~ i ncould
n
exist: wit11 parallcl lints of
advancc on tlint siclc ; a n d that, in any conil)incd rno1.emen[., the force sing this road might bc met nncl clcfcatecl,
at its csit, by n superior force of the cncniy, wliilc thc
other columns wcrc I)cing clclained by inferior forces, o c m pyiny strong dcieasiw positions. T h e occupation of 1'11l-iKI14tun by a \veal; Powcr, opposed to the aclvance of an
army on 1-lcrcit, a n d by one to wliicl), owing to distance
from its base, pancity of troops, or \ v ~ n or
t money, the con.
version of Yul-i-l<h;itiun into a dcfcnsive posilion is a n
impossihili~)~,
wor~ldat any rate result in the road remaining in its prcscnt condition ; and would thereby deny its
usc 1.0 an enemy, at: least for some considerable timc after
the declaration of liostilitics."
T h e city of ICuhsan is thus described in Lhe same: paper,
of Lhe same dale :" Kuhsan, sis~y-eightmilcs from the city of Hcr:lt, o n the
fron~ier of the Persian Tcrritory of IChor:lsdn, stands on
the Heri-rud wlierr Lhat river bends from a wcskrly t o
n northerly direction.
T h e Heri-rud, a beautiful rivcr
fertilising and enriching the vallcys of norlh-western
L 2
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AfgliBnistPn, rises in thc highlands of I-Iazlreh, and flows
from east to west between the broad inor~ntain mnge
which the Greeks named the Paropamisus, now called the
Safed Koh or " White Mountain," and the Siah Koh, to the
city of Herdt, a n d thence to Ghorian, where it turns
north-wcst to Kuhsan. This district, copiously irrigated
by artificial canals, was once populous ancl wealthy ; it is
one of tlie most ancient seats of civilization.
I n the
i\Iicltlle Ages, during a t least four centuries, HcrAt was one
of tlie finest cities, and its prorincc one of thc most productive, in Central Asin. From Kullsnrl LO S a w l ~ h s , by
the road following lhc ~ O I I I X o r tllc I-Tcri-rucl, t h e clistnnce is eighty-four ~nilcs. 'J'l~isis the road on \vhic.l1 the
Russinns hnve recently ndvnncccl more than half way,
seizing Pul-i-Khdtun, nearly forty miles from Sxrakiis, and
recently the Zulfagnr Pass, thirty miles higher u p the
river, where an opening through the \wll of clifls on the
eastern bank gives access to the interior of Bndghis, and
through Ak Robat to the ICh~ishkvnllcy :?cl the Murghbb."
l'anjdch, and thc road thcncc to i\Iaruchak--the plncc
nbovc Bdla 1\Iurghil)--arc thus clcscribcd by Mr. Silnpson,
special artist to thc same papcr. 1I the r e a c h will recolIwt, the Russians claim to draw the new frontier line just
above Maruchak (Little hIerv) :
" W e stnppcd a d a y at Ak T'apa, and then mover1 on to
l'anjdeh. About six miles to the south nearly the whole
dislance is covered with Sarok villages, formed of Itibitkas.
T h c Snl.01~'l'urkomans have conle south from tlic i\lerv
district, and have become ATghLn subjects. T h e MurgMb,
as \\.ell ns the Khdshk vallcy, was without inhabitnnts, ancl
its fields \yere lying waste. Some years ago the Saroks
nrrivecl, and thcy have restored the ?lace to life ngnin.
Some of their chiefs came along the IChrishl; valley, a n d
met Sir Pctcr Immclen on tlie third march from Ak T d p a ;
cro\rds of thc Sarilts t~lrnedout to see our arrival, and he
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outskirts of the camp were generally fringed wit11 tl~om,eager
to look at tlie Feringliis, and watch whnt they \ \ w e doing.
There was a good clcal of trade going on in Llic pu;.cliase
of carpets, and other articles, by our people. A considerable quantity of Indian rupces and l'ersian crhis was left
among theln, so KC may supposc that they will rctah n
ple:isanl recollcciion of us. At Panjdch we remaincd Lwo
days; o ~ i cof Lhesc dxys was princip.dly occupictl by n
visit from [lie Governor of Herst, \\h
hncl fo1lo:xccl us 111) ;
and Sir Peter Lumsden paid a visil Lo Yali~il~isl~
IClhi,
lie chief of the Jamsliiclis.
'"l'licre are the ruins, liltlc more ~ h a n~lwunds,of a n old
fort, and tlie evident rcm:~ins of n town around i t ; these
also are nothing Inore than mounds, on tlic west side of
tlie river. A n u n called it " Kona Penclie," by which 11e
meant old Panjdeh. If tlicre is a new Panjdeli, we did not
see i ~ unless
,
it be tliu kibitkn \dlxges of tlie S;~rilts,and [hey
cxtend for over trrc~ily niilcs along both bn~ilis of the
Nurgliib. Wc ~ r scnrccly
c
psepal.ed for such n Iugc
sized rivcr as we round here. It is as wide ns Regent
SLreet, of considcrublo depth, with a large volun~c of
bluish-grey water flowing steadily put. \J1lien to\rns of
iniportance, equal to tliosc we linvc t r x e d tlie remains of,
conic inlo csistence again on its banks, " penny bo.115"
will bc shooting d o n g from pier to l~ier. Fords arc wry
S w , and the one \IT crosscd at h.I:~rucl~ak
had at least four
fcct of water in ils dcepest part. I heard sollie one estimate tlie breath of the wlley at l'unjdeh as about four or
fwe miles ; n.lietlier this is exact or not, Lliere is a large
width of ground, which llad been cultivaiccl \rhen the
valley wns pros[~crousand full of inhabitnnts. 'l'he ~nounds
were the remain6 of' largc to\\ws, and they are a sure
evidence of tlie popdntion that once esisilcd and found
subsistence on the banks fertilized by the \voters of tlie
Murgliib.

I

" 'l'lie m:~rcll to I:u~id i-N:dr-i was alolig Lhc wcstcrn side
of . t h e wllcy ; ~ L I O L I Llinlf way, Llic sandy Iiills on this side
project considerably into tlic plain, narrowing it w r y iin~ch.
Our r o d nsccndccl the liciglits, but al,out n mile or so to
tlie soutl~wc descended again, and found tlie valley nearly
as wide as nl: 1':~njdcli. Our c:lnip wns pi~cliedon a piece
"f level ground close to the hills. T h e lhr~icl-i-Nndri\\;IS
not far lioin us, but it turned out lo Ibc the tlld I)u~icI,
\\.l~iclilintl I)cc~i made on a I x c l of he ~-ivcr,which the
w t c r of tllc Alurghib h:icl Sursalccn, a i d a 1 1 2 ~I)i~nd, o r
dam, Iiighcr ul), wns n i e ~ ~ t i o n eas
d Iinving I u n ~nnclc.
?'he J3und.i-Nnclri canal, ;I. I;-lrgc I\-atercourse for irrigation,
I l o w d past close Lo us; it \\.as fillcd \\ith n beautiful clcnr
siream. .'l'liis is l l ~ ccannl wliose watcr h:id hccn Icd, a t
somc former period, across thc l'ul-i-Kliisti.
" Our nest march \\.as also on ~ l i cwestcrn side of tlic
valley, d o n g tlie I m c or the hills ; and agail~wc left the
lcvcl soil, to pass through a l ~ o l l o \nlnong
\~
Lhcm, which extcndccl for somc milcs. On conling 001: again on the
vallcy, we passed a Turltoman villngc, which I unclcrstood .
\\as the last of tlic~nto\vilrds Llic SOLILII.
WC struclr across
the vnllcy Lo lhc rivc.1; where llicre arc lhe piers only of n
brick bridge standing, A t h i s place there is n ford, which
\vc crossed. Sir I?etcr 1,umsden placed n nuniber of l'urlcouinns across the rivcr, along Lhc whole line of the ford,
thus carrying out tlie military rnle, wl~ich was very necessary, ns the lord was far Srom being a slraigh t line, ancl the
current \\.as 8h011g. Ey this liicans all got ovcr in pcrfcct
safety ; evcn mild IIindils, o n w r y s~nnllbaggage-animals,
\vho smolw and slecp instend of looking out where they
are going, crossed scatheless. Our camp was formed close
to [lie ford, and for tlic lirst t i m on thekight bank of lie
31~1rgli;ib.
" Mnruchak is on thc same side ; it is some distance from
the rivcr, nild lillle ovcr a milc Srolii t11c fbrcl. \\'c wcre
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rather surprisccl a t the estent of its walls, which moulcl
imply that tlic place liad becn inlinbitecl at a Inter pcriod
than the othcr ruined towns wc hacl sccn. Our party found
pheasants vcry plentirkl at'Mnr~~cIiak,
and there was somc
good shooting there. From Mnruchnk to I<nraul I<haneli,
mhich WE the ground of our nest march, has not get been
repcopled, and tlie \vhole space is at prescnt in tlie condition of a vast g a m preserve. T h e birds flew 1111in great
numbers, and when thc sportsnien cahie in, covering tlie
ground with long rows of dcacl pheasants, tlie only complaint heard referred to the deficiency of cartridges.
" After passing i\,IarucIiak, the hills change in their fornl ;
below that place they arc undulating and rounded, l ~ u tthe
curves have a vcry long rnclir~s. Above &laruchak they
form smdl rounded knobs, with steep sides, all thc way up
to B d a Murghdb, to the soul11 of which the geology
entirely cllanges. Thc march from hIaruchalr to ICaraonl
I<hnnch was on the right bank of the river. Towards the
end of the m a r h , we struck to the left, through a gorge
formed by the steep sidcs of thesc mnmclon hills, and came
out a91in about a mile farther on. Kamoul 1Chaneh is the
site of nn old town ; judging by the mooncls, it liad not
been of grent size. Ilcrc n valley comes i n from the left,
and, had tllc first idea of wintcr qnartcrs beyond the A h g h i b been carriccl out, we were to linvc ~noved in that
directio~i; But a change had been maclc, and Riln hiurg h i b had bcen dctem~incdupon, so from ICarnul I<hnnch
\ve marched, still on thc right Ixtnli of h e river, nncl came
on herc, arriving on Ucc. I?."
'I'he abovc cstracts, made from Inany independent sourccs,
will 1101: fail, I believe, to convey to tlie reader a tolerable
idcn of tlie nntire of the country of H e d t , and of the
inlmcnse importnncc to England of the conlinucd possessidn by AQhLnistin of the border line concccled to it in
1S72--~11c straight linc bctnreen Saraklis and ICl~ojnSalch.

As I write, his morning of tlic ~ 5 t hof hiarch, the air is
f r ~ l of
l rumour.; regarding a Russian advance e n I-IerBt. I f
t]ley sllould prove true, jt will clevolvc upon Peter Limsden
to play in 1 8 8 j the part \vhich Eldrec! Pottirrger played in
1 8 ~ 8 to
; aid in the defence of tlie Pcar-1 of I<hordsrin,
until n I-3ritish army can reach that city fro~ii Lhe Pibhin
valley. I n this vicw of the possibililies it is incumbent to
glance, not only a t the respective forces of thc two n a t i o x ,
I ~ u nt
t he distilnces which cach must traverse bcforc ilie
battle ground can be reached.
On the subject of thc nrmanmnts of Russia thc llaily
NEWS
nppearsto he singulnrly well-informed. I n the issue
of that IJnper of the 19th hIarch appeared a statement. of
t h c numlxrs, composition, and distribution of tlie Russian
forces in Central Asia, so important 3s to draw to it the
attention of c w r y !)olitician and every soldier. Inquiries I
made in other quarters likely to bc well-infortnbd, linve
satistied tne that the statement is in all csscntinl points
correct. I1 is as follo\vs :.T h e army of the Caucasus has not reccntly csecuted any
movcmcnt indicntivc of diememb-rment, and is still in that.
part of the country with the follo\ving exceptions :
C

I.

Eattalions of light infantry formed in ISSO, and since
that time qunrtcred In the 'Tmns-Caspian prolinces :

No. I , at ICrassnovodslr,
No. 2, at Geok Tepd.
Nos. 3, 5, 6 , at Asknbnd.
No. 4, at Tschikisjlar.
2 . Cossacks.
Two regimenls and two squadrons of KOLIbane Cossacks.
3. First Battalion of Railway Rescrre.

JXFAN'~.K\'. FIRST BI~IG:\DE.
Transferred to Taschkend, their habitual
quarters, in the circumscrip~ion of Sir
10th :,
12th ,,
Uarin.

srcl
6th
6th

,,

7 tll
4th

,.

:,

,,
18th ,,
2nd

,,

1 ,
..

'I'rnnsfcrred from Snniorkhnntl to Sara\whan.

.'Tmnsferrecl from I<al.tibourgnn to Snrnvschnn

) Transferred

i

to
( ~ ~ ~ a n g a n
Anclischan
Ferghana
Kokancl
,

170~
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BRIGADE.

fronl Mnrgliellane to Ferghana.
20th ,,
'I'lie 5th, r3tl1, and 17th Battalions do not form p.ut of
the above-named brigades. 'I'lie 5th Ins been transferred

from I'etro Alcsandrovski to the Amou Daria ; the 13th
from 3hrghcllanc to Ferghann. The 17th rcmains at
hlerv.
Four battalions of light infantry arc in garrison at
'I'aschkend.
FJEJJIARTILLERY.
1 s t Rsttcry at Samarkhand 8 heavy pieces.
zncl ,, at Taschkcnd 8 nine-pounders.
,, at Andiskhan 8 light pieccs.
3rd
4th
,, at San~arklland8 light pieces.
,, at TL~schkencl 8 four-pounders.
5th
6th
,,
*Iex- 8 moun~ainguns, j-pounders,
anclrovs~;i
7th
,, a~ Samarkhand 8 mountain guns, 2 i.
Besides these, th'ere is a battery mounted with six nlounlain guns (three pounders) in garrison at Rlarghellane.

I

F o ~ r n ~ ARTILLERY.
ss
3 Companies at Perovski, Tnschkend, and San~arkhand.

-

ENGINEERS.
Half a Battalion of Sappers at, Taschkend.
I Detachment of Artisans

]

IRRISCULAR
TROOPS.
OF ORENDURGM
COSSACKS.
REC;IAIENTS
No. 4. Squdrons I, 2, and 4, at Alexandrovski; 3, at
Koungrad.
No. 5. Squadrons I, 2, and 3, at Taschkcnd ; 4, in For1
No. I.
No. 6. Squadrons I, z, 3, and 4, at bh.ghcllane.
One battery of Mounted Cossacks is at Tnschkend.
C

No.

2.

R ~ c r n r E N ~Or
s OUI<~\I.
COSSACI~S.
Squadrons I, 2, 3, and 4, at Samnrkhancl.

'

1nt'mitry.--1:rigndc

of the Linc of Wcskcrn Sibcria.

srcl Batt., iransfenrd from Ujarkcnt
JJ
IJ
Kaurakol
1)
Kopal
,To Sdrnc'r6lschinsk.
6111 ,,
7 111 ,,
I,
Verni
Verni
.
SLII ,,
,,
1st
,,
9I
Omsk lo f\kmollinsk.
2nd ,,
17
(hrrison to S6niipnlatinsk.
411
J,
11
l'o~,LSaisanski to Sc'mipa1;~~insk.
At Tobolsk, Tonlsk, Omsk, and S6niipalatinsk there are
also four bntlnlions of reserve with [lie cadres for five
companies cucli.
13esicles thcsc tlierc w e n t Omsk ano~licrscpar;ite detachmcnt and a mililary prison co~~ipluip.I n several otlier
towns and fork of \Vcslern Siberia tlicrc are nltogcther 44
scparatc detachments.

I

1 ~ 1,I, s A~ I ~ . I . I L . L ~ I ~ ~ .
I3attcr.p a t ~ h n ...
i S light picccs.
J)jnrkcncl 8 light pieces.
z~lcl :,
,,
l<nurnkol 8 mountain guns (3-pounclcrs).
3rd
,,
Saisnnslci 8 pieccs of small calibrc and z
4th
mounti~inguns (3-pounc1e1.s).
ISL

Onc company nl Vcrni.

Onc co~npnnyof Sappcrs a1 Omsk,

I < R G I ~ I ~ T01:S S I I N K I A N
COSSACIG.
No.

I.

Squadron
schat,

2

I,

at Ochoni~clii,8 nt I<itldjn, 5 nl Iiold4, and G in For[ Nn. 4.

No.

Squ:drons 2 , 3 , and 6 a t Lepsinsk, I a1 Bachti, 4
near the river Chorgos, 5 a t Djarkent.
No. 3. Squadrons I a n d 3 a t Saisnnski, 2 and 5 a t ICotonKarasai, 4. at Kokpekti, 6 a t Tschagan-Obinski.
2.

As to Lhe composition and mcnns of transport of their
army, wc are not \vithout accuratc informntion. ' h - o clays
aiter thc st:~tcmentI h a w extracted from the Daily f\rc7t1s,
\\.as publisl~cd, there appeared in thc 2iiict.s n w r y intcresting paper " O n the Army of the Cnucasus." Intcresting as this paper is-and the reader is now again afforded
the opportunity of re-perusing it-there are some points in
it which seem t o invite special remark.
"Thc operations of the l<ussian forces in Turltornania,
of whicl~ the latest feature has hecn the seizurc of placcs
within the accepted boundary o r Afghinistb:~, h a w attracted
greater attention to the arnly of Lhe Caucasus, \vhich supplies the garrison of the Czar's recenlly-acquircd possessions east of the Caspian. A gl.cat d 4 113s IXCII said
about the formidalrlc p o w r of this pol.lion of thc Russian
forces, a n d some military authorities have gonc so far as to
assume that half its strength \ ~ o u l d be avnilable for n
campaign against Henit, and that, without considering the
armies of Turkistan a n d Orenburg a t all, Russia could
despatch from thc Caspian, within a reasonable 1)criocl of
time, an army of nearly roo,ooo men. l ' h c bcsl way to
ascertain how far thcse opinions may he dcenlcd rensocable is lo consider the actual co~npositionand organization
of the army which has ils base and h c a c l c ~ ~ ~ a r tat
e r Tiflis.
s
" T h e arlny of the Caucasus has been roughly computrcl
a t 200,000 men, but in order to arrive a t that total, all its

0

details must b e included, reservc, irregulars, and Cossacks.
T h e regulnr army of the Caucasus numbcrs jo,ooo men,
but its resenre of another 50,000 \\.ould raise it to I 2 0 , 0 0 0
strong. Besides this force of the line there are 30,000
Georgian and I~neritianirregulars of horse and foot. !rhe
Cossacks estnl~lishedin the settlernents nor111 of tllc Callcnsian range, represent another section of the armecl forces
of the Til-lis (+overnorship, and Lhcy arc espcctccl to supply
n q u o h of 50,ooo men. 'I'hesc sepnralc tolals nmltc up
the grand result of zoo,ooo mcn, and this force may be
properly compnvccl and contrnstecl with thc Anglo-Indian
:lrrny or a l ~ o uLhe
~ same nomi~inlstrength. I t resc~nbles
that force in another respect which is too often obscured.
11 vcry large proportion of tlie army of tlie Cauc:lsus is
non-R~~ssian.T h e Cossnclcs, Circassians, Georgians, and
others fonn the ~najorityof the troops whom Prince Doncloukoff-ISorsakoff could array in time of war. T h e
70,000 men \ ~ h oare permanently engaged in garrison duty
south of the C3ucasus are clistributccl bekween Ratoum,
'I'illis, I h r s , a n d other fortified places on the Turkish and
Pcrsian frontiers. They have also to furnish thc troops
employed in the Askabad district, and these numbcr about
15.000 men, of wl10111 9,000 are in positions east of Bami.
I t is q+te certain that any estrn work thrown upon this
porlion of the Russian army \vould ilnmedi.ately necessitate
the calling out of the reserves, who are really nolhing more
or less than military colonis[s who receive a grant of land
and arc allo\vcd LO Innrry a f ~ e rserving f ~ v eyears with thc
colours. l'hc calling out of' the reserves, and the increase
of the Cossack regiments by the corps clra\\w from the
steppe, would b e tlic preliminnries to placing the army
of the Caucasus-on n war footing ; but even then there
\vould be plenty of work on its hands. I t is \vithin the
range of possibility that the Russians could increase

(;cncral Tionm.ofrs army to 50,000 mcn il' ~ h c ywcrc
Icfl :~ntlisturlmI in A r ~ n c n i : ~m c l on tlic I:l;~cl< Sva.
I < I I tlint
~
task cooltl only Ix csccr~tcdat tlic cost of n pent
cfforl., :md nftcr Lhc preparation of many ~nonlhs. I n 18Sr,
wlicn 1.L11ssi:~
thrc\v I~crsclfinto Llic wo~.lc of repairing tlic
rlcfc:~t of Gcolc 'rep6 and CI-ushing the Turkomans, she
succeeded in placing 25,000 troops on the castern shores
of the Caspian, but the preparalions Look nearly t \ \ d u e
months. H e r permanentgarrison i n the Asltabacl province
is no\v, as alrcady stated, ~j.,ooo men, and she lm a railway f r o n ~near ICrasnovodsk to 1:arni. 'I'hcre is notliing
incredible in tlic sr~pposition that under these i n i p ~ m c d
conditions shc could in Llic cor~rscof the summcr ~ h c c
50,ooo iuen o n the northern borders of Persia.
'I T h e composi~ionof cvcn thc regular regiments ol' the
army of the Caucnsus is I~etcrogencous. Russians form a
irlajority, but there are nllmerous rlr~r~cninns,
Polcs, Jcws,
7'artnrs, and Russo-Germnns. Circassians are also largely
to be met with, ~)articulnrlyin the cavalry.. But even the
regular troops a r e sul~jected to a \.cry light clisciplinc, and
if there is anything in our a n d German ideas as to military
efticiency t h e can bc little bcttcr than militia. A rcccnt
military traveller, \vho knows the Caucasus and h r m e n i ; ~
well, a n d who does not conceal his iclcntity under the
pseudonym of "Wanclerel;" !>as given in his interesting
" Notes on the Catrcnsus " the following description of thc
military routine of the regular army :" T h e y have very few par:tdes and absolutely no pipcclay; 2 company or two is pnraclecl daily during tlic
summer months for riflc practice undcr the ncljutnnt and
musketry instructor, a n d the corps is assembled once n
month for muster. T h e rest of the time the men d o much
a s they choose, and usually either worlc a t tmdcs, selling
t h e product of thcir industry at a sorl: of market which is
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held every Sunday in the bazaar of the town, or hire Lheinselves out at so ~nuchper diem to privatc individuals as
I~orters,labourers, &c."
"This sort of life is very clin'erent from the sustnincd
military exercise to \vhich our troops in Inclin arc nccustomed, ancl, altl~ougl~
the conclusion may be unsound, it
will be generally considered that these soldiers \\~oulclstand
but a poor chance against our highly-trained Europcan and
Indian regiments, The Cossaclts are excellent for all the
purposes of irregular warfare, but they nevcr have been
trusted by any Russian General against a disciplined army
in the open field, ancl of the 50,000 men who111 Russia
nlght place east of the Caspian onc-half would bc Cossncks,
as they are the most easy to mobilizc and send on foreign
service. The Cossack cavalry have attached to them a
certain number of six-gun batteries of horsc artillery, and
these move about with them in the field. The regular
artillery of the Caucasus numbers forty-three bntteries of
cight guns each, . o r 314 guns i n all, ancl wllcrens thc horse
artillery consists of sis-pounders the field artillery is composed of ICrupp's nine-pounder stcel breech-loading guns.
T h e artillery is unquestionably the most efficient part of'
Lhe arlny. The officers are well trained, and the men are
specinlly picked for the service. The guns are admirably
horsed and equipped. There are also a fen; batteries for
mountain operations. IYith regard to the Georgian and
other irregulars, it is declared that they are not inferior
to the Rl~ssianregulars; but it is highly improbable that
they would be employed outside the Caucasus. It is, of
course, impossible to gauge with any degree of mxracy
the comparative efficiency of two armies \shich are organized on two different systems and which have never met
in war ; but while admitting. t!le merit of the Russian
soldier, who is stated, n!itho~it any excessive exaggeration,
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- .to be " capable of going anywhere on blacl; bread nlltl
wntcr," it does seem as if the superiority in military
efliciency and military resources rested n$h the :\ngloIndian army ~ x t h e rthan will1 that of the Caucasus.
' I We llave some practical experience of what the arllly
of the Caucasus can d o in actual warfare. I n 1877, on
the outbrcal; of the 'rurkish mar, it could only place
50,ooo men on thc frontier, although prepalntions for wal.
were begun in 1876. This force proved inacleq~~nle
to
cope with the Turks under Mulchtar Pasha, and the
Russians were, as n mntter or hct, repulsed all along the
line in their lirst attempl to invncle Armcnia, At one
period of the campaign, had llle 'Turks l m h e d their
advantage with greater vigour, or perhaps il \vould be
more correct to say llad they been better provided with the
sinews of \var, they could hardly have failed to achieve a
clccided success; but they allowed the opportunity to slip
by, and when the winter of 1877 began the Russians had
srlccecded in arraying roo,ooo men b e t w e n Erivan and
' 0 . It must be remembered that this was only accomlAished under co~upulsion and by a great effort. Yet the
concentration of troops was on th? nearest frolllier of Llle
Russian donlinions, and the b l o to
~ be struck was against
an erlelny within 150 miles of Tiflis. Any campaign
ag:linst IIerht-for if war ensues Russia's objective \\.ill, of
of course, be the town o n the I-Ieri-rrid-would
bc o f - a n
entirely different cl~aracter. H e r i t is 1,200 miles from
Tiflis, and nearly 400 fi-om Askabad; and although an
army might be sustained once Herdt is rcachcd, niost of
the supplies for this force en m r t e would have to be carried
with it, after making the most liberal allowance for what
might be drawn from Meshed and Northern Persia. The
Russians, it is true, have 4,ooo men on the MurghAb and
nearly 5,000 between Askabad and Zulfagar, and those two
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corps, ii~crcnscd 1 y n I:lrgc Turkomnn gnlhcring from
klcrv, woulcl undoubtccllg sufice a t this momcnt to owrcome nll o p p o s i k n outside the mnlls of Hcrit. h t in
thc e \ m t of Russia committing liersclf to tlic i r ~ c \ ~ o c a l ~ l c
stcp of an act of hostility ngninst tlie Amir, it is clear
that, allliorlgh nii initial success might I,c s c o ~ ~ citl , would
be a nlnttor of cstreme diffkulty, if not nn utter i m p s s i bility, to raise the n:lvnncccl nrmy to anything like tllc
large numlm.s tlint \vould be ncccssnry in h c c of the
joint opposition of thc :\Fglinn and Indinn armies. I\.e
escludc from our calculntion~ti\:: c f k t thst would be produced by an Anglo-'rurkish n1li:lncc 2nd tlic alq~cnrnncc
or 20,000 En,:lish troops in Atmcnin. 'l'herc i i nothing
cliimcricnl in either propositiol~, nntl the army of tlic
Caucasus is so Fnr isol:ikd that its commnnicntions with
tlic rest of Russia arc cscceclingly diilicnlt and su1,jcct t o
interruption. 'I'lic arm); or thc Ciucnsas
somc (1:~)'IIL:
more forn-~idablc thnn it is no\\,, nnrl \hen thc rnil\vay
system on the W s t c r n side of tllc Caspinn ns \ \ d l 3%on
tlie enstern is complete, it mny be possiblc for Knssi:~
to throw tlic \vliolc of hcr military rcsourccs into tlic cffc~rt
to place roo,ooo nlcn on thc Afgli;ui bordcrs. A t prcscnt
SIX could d o nothing of tlic kind wen \ v ; ~ l it\vclve months'
prcpnration. T i ~ cconviction that tl~csc G~cts:lrc patent
at 'l'iflis nlust strengthen the I)clicr in n pacific sL:ttlclucnt
or tlic prcscnt difficulty, nl l l ~ csnmc time tll:rt tiley s1iou7
[lint Russin has not the n\.nil:il)lc po\vrr to ~ n ; i i ~ ~ t nt iln~ c
aggressive position she 1 ~ 1tnkcn
s
up on the rivers 1lurgli:il)
nncl I-Icri-rdd, ancl Llint a c have only to be firm in out
cleclnmtions and lo stand slanclily hy h e ilmcer, to irisrrre
the spcecly cvncuation of thosc ~ ~ l n c csouth
s
of S.i:xkl~s
and I'ulntnn \vIikl~ Genwnl Iiomnroff and Coloncl
Alikhanoff hnvc within the Inst four months npprcprintcd
by force."
\\lill
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rrhcsentcnces in this paper \\~liichappefir to me to invite
sl)fCial attention, are those which speak of the difiiculties
mllicl~liussia would encounter in the even1 of her precipitating hostilities wilh t h e Amir. These diflicul~ies m ~y
thus be classified :

T h e raising of the advanced army to anything like
the large numbers that would I)e necessary in
face of the joint opposition of the Afg1i:in and
Indian armies.
2, Tllc danger that tllc TZussinn army might be isoIntctl.
3. l'hc difliculty of f ~ ~ r n i s h i nitgwith supplies.
1.

I propose to consider these three points i n detail.
1,eaving Cor consideration further on tlie question of the
entire force disposable in India, I would ask the reader to
accept with me for a moment the statements which liavc
reached us from that country by telegram, that tlierc is at
thi; moment n force of 30,000 men inethe Pishin valley
ready to advance by way of l<anclahar as soon as they
shall receive thc order from Head
Accelpting
tllis stntcmcnt, we must ask these t v o questions : what is
the distnncc to bc travcrscd ; and how long will it take to
traverse it.
The distance from the present advnncccl posts of the
Anglo-Indian army to Kandahar is about 145 ~ n i l e s ;from
I < i d - h : i r to H e r i t is 369 miles. I t is not easy ninrching,
even when there is no enemy to be looked for. I n the
second ASghdn \var Stewart found the march even to
Kandahar n very ~ryingone. Unfortunately tlie intcrvening time has not bccn eniployecl in the manner to which
it might have been s o usefully devokcL-the making of a
railway. Our armics 1\41 have to ~narch as they did in
1839 a n d 1879-So. 'I'lic clifficulties, especially in the way
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of collecting carriage for s ~ ~ cal iforce, will I)e a s great lionr
as t h y wcrc hen. 'I'hosc wlio recollect how in I SS I
I'liayrc's forcc was delnincd in inaction, at a critical
iiiomcnl, for tlie wnnt of carriage, will npprccinlc the grcnt
eslent of those difliculties.
Tlie rond to Iiandaliar is nrell lanow to our generals and
our soldiers. I think that, having rcgnrd Lo the initial
difficulties of starling, tlie best of thesc would d m i t tliat if
lie were to reccive the order to advance to-n~orrow,lie
\vould tliinlr a fortnight not a day too long to enable him to
reach I<nndd~arwith 30,000 nicn. Sir John ICcaiic, in ~ S j c ) ,
marching as rapidly as hc couid march, took ninctccii days
to accomplish the distancc from Qucth. Thencc to Herit
the road is less known, but it is certainly inlinitelg more
cliflicult. I propose, in a few words, to describe it.
'l'hcrc are three important posts on the principal road
between Kandaliar and Her5t-Girislik, Farmli, and
Sihzwir. The distance by this road is 369 miles.
From Kandah:tr to Girishlc thc clistnncc bnrcly esceeds
75 miles.
'The first march is to Kolidrnn-7
miles. 'I'l~c first
3 niiles of road pass through tlie enclosed gardcns and
suburbs of the city. Tlie road crosses the several canals
dmwn from the Argancldb for irrigating tlie ICandaliar
valley. At Iiolcdwn water is abundant, tlie encampingground is well adapted for a large force, and forage can be
supplicd in sufficient quantities.
T o Sanjd~i-5 miles. The bed of the Argandib is
crossed. Thc river, in the month of June, averages about
two-and-quarter feet in depth, and the passage of it is
easy. There is a ford about thrccquarters of a mile lower
down by which it Bonld be advisible to cross heavy guns.
Beyond tlie river one or two artificial watercourses hnve
to be crossecl. Tlie r o d is stony in some places, but
'
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generally good. 'Therc is escellcnt encamping-ground at
Snnjari ; water is plentilul, and f o q e is suficient.
1 &r~z-i-kladdad K l l i n - r ~ nlilcs. An escellent road
across a brond, hard, level plain. :\ canal runs pnrallel to
thc road tlie wliolc of ~ h nlarcll.
c
The ground for encampiiicnt is good ; water is plentiful l m r the c:tmp; forage for
camels is abundant ; grnss is scarce near the camp, but
plcntifill n few iniles to tlie south of it. There arc several
villages in tlic neighbourhood ; as well as floclcs of sheep
a n d goats.
Rhdshk-i-Nnk11dd-15z
miles. A hard, level, gravel
road without obstacle or difficulty. At ICl~ilsl~l<-i-Nalrli~id
water is plentiful, from two artificial water-courses ; tlie
encampi~~g-ground
is good; fodder for caniels is plentiful ;
b u t grnss, in thc iminediate vicinity of the camp, is scarce.
T o IChalr-i-Cliapaii-9% miles. The road generally good
a n d level, though here and h e r e [lie sand lies deep. The
encamping-ground, thougli somcwhat irregular, could easily
b e occupied by a large force. 'I'herc is a'sufficient, thong11
not over-abundant, supply of water. Forage of all sorts is
less plentiful. There nre, however, villages and cultivatiorl
two or three miles soutl~of the encamping-ground, as me11
as large floclts of sheep.
T o Girishk-not
quite 24 miles. The road to the
left b a n k of the Helinund, about tmenty-t\\ro miles
a n d a half, is generally good and hard, tlie first part
slightly undulating, with one or two sandy patches. There
is a well about midway, but tlie water procurable from it
is insufticient for more than a few travellers. 011 tlie left
bank of the river is an excellent dncamping-ground, with
abundance of water and an ample supply of forage of all
sorts. T h e Helmund is a difficult r i v e ~ t ocross. I n June
its depth is about three feet nine inches ; its width in the
widest branch is seventy yards. The culrent runs at the rate
r
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of three miles an hour. There is a ferry nphich it is sometimes necessary to use. At Girishk the encamping-ground is
suficient, though here and there broken. \,\later and slipplies of all sorts are abundant. I would add that, so far,
thc country is well known to our generals ; it comprehcncls
the districts which, as I have stated in a preceding page,
\vol~lcldevolve llp311 its in the event of n permanent occupation of Kandnhar by the British.
IVhnt Girishk once was may be gathered from the tmditions of the timc of Zarnan S h i h . Even then people
used to say that ' I the Helmund flowed through a garden."
Now, tl~oug11 arable land abouncls, there is but littlc cultivatiqn. I n fact, with the cscoption of the Innd immediately on the bank of thc ri\w-, there is nonc. \:.'it11 pence
and security for l i l the cul~ivntion,llowevcr, would speedily
revive !
T h c fort, though much clilnpidntcd, com~nandsn good
view of tho surroundin;: country. It is not, a t Imsent,
capable of defcnw against artillery, Imt il: might be made
so with a conlparati\~cIysmall expenditure.
From Girishl; to Farmh the distance, b y the route
adoptcd by Ferricr and Marsh, is r a o miles. 'l'here
is a route by S!lordb a n d Hasan Gilan, shorter by
zo milcs, but of this I have been unablc to find any accurate rccord.
C;irishk to Zil-ak-zo miles. 'l'he fir..t six luilcs stony
: ~ n d undulating, the beds of several torrents crossing
thc line. 'I'hc road then beconles levcl and easy till
the fort of Sxaclnt, 18 ~niles fro111 Girishk, is reached.
Sandnt, once a rather strong, but, when Captain Marsh saw
it in 1S7;-1, a deserted and ruined hill fort, has n plenti1111 supply of watcl; l'he road then becomes again undulating :md continues so until close to Zirak. Zirnlc is a
sni;~llvillage situxtecl at tJ1c foot of thc mountains 011 the

right of the road to Herit and oppositc >Iahrnudabad,
described by Captain Marsh as a small village in a 1101]om wntcrcd by an artificial ma~ercourse. At Zirak water
is good and abundant, and forage for canlels and horses is
plentiful.
T o ~ilshalch-12% I I ~ C S . The road hard and level.
IVatcr at the village of Sdr, about half-way. 'l'hc encamping-ground a t Ddshnkllih is good, and foragc for cnmels and
horses is abundant.
T o Biabannk-threc
milcs and n half. Koncl Icvcl,
across n tolcrd)ly linrd plain. Thcrc is an artificial canal
at Biabanali providing plenty of water. Grass and fodder
are abundant.
T o \\'asl1ir-z4
inilcs. About four miles from Eiabnnali tlic road enters a range of hills with n gradua!
ascent to goo feet, presenting no great difficulties. Prom
this point to Washir thc road wincls among clcclivities, nnd follows the bed of watercourses, passing ovcr
much difficult ground. For the last (;. milcs the road
runs Cio~vnn valley, with a gentle slope. I t is hnrcl 2nd
good till within 2 inilcs of Wnshir, when it beco~nes
undulating and stoney. Many villages and gardens,
watered by artificial canals arc passed in this descent.
Ferrier made thc journey by halting ditring the heat of the
day a t Biabnnak and Lhen pushing on ncross lie range,
20 miles, to Painak, but with no advantage over the
route here laid down. At Washir supplies of all sorts,
including water, arc abundant.
'To the IClishrlid river-14
ixiles. The road stoney
and uneven, the last 4 miles being along n dry matcrcourse. The descent into Ihe bed of the Icdshrlid
steep and bad. It is, howver, practicable for artillery.
The river supplies escellcnt water. Forage for camels
abounds, but grass is less plentiful.
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T o Hijf Ibsiihi~ni-1'1 ~nilc's. T l ~ cfording of the
I<:ishrild is at certain scnsons impossible, in consequence
of l l ~ eimpetuosily of thc Lorrent. I n thc 1101 seasoti,
ho\\wer, the depth of t l ~ c water docs not csceccl 18
inches. After crossing thc river the road pursues a
tortuous course among hills for about 3 ~niles;it then
crosses n drcary stcppc till it reaches Hiji 1br:ihinli.
1"crricr stales that bct\vccn I-lijl J.briihimi and l<:islirilcl
tl~ercis not a drop water. \\'aLcr and foriige are both prucurable at the former place.
I-Idji 1br:iliimi to Siah-db-Fcrrier calls this place
Shiaguz-clistance 10 ~niles. Siall-db is t11c p i a t wlicnce
a direct road, avoiding alike I;:rrmh and Salmvar, runs
7 i d Girnneh to I-lerit.
I t is 311 encamping-ground wlicrc
water and forngc are alike available.
Siah-bb to I<liarni:ilik--zz
miles. The first and last
p u t of this stage leads Lhc travrllcr through plui~is,ficlcls,
nncl marshes. 'I'hc intermcclintc part is intc~scctcd by
stony mountai~is,stccply scnrpcd at the siclcs. " lchnrnidlik," writes Captain B*larsll,'Iis situated in a sn~nllgrassy
liollow. A few date-palms and cattle, in tlic inr~ncdinte
neighbourhood of a few mean huts and wall-surrounded
tower, arc dl it posscsscs." \\'ater and forngc are procumllc hcre.
I<harm;ilik ti) I'arrnh-ao
~niles. The road lends
across n c1esol;tte plain ; then, ovcr a low l m s , enters n
stony valley. Numerous ruins near thc road i d i c a t e that
the district was once \ \ d l pol)rilnted. The plain is totally
devoid of clrinlting water.
L I T l ~nppeitr:~nce
e
of Farm11 n short way 011;'' writes
Captain hIarsl1, " is imposing. Its higli embattled and
I~astioncclwnlls, ,its broacl, well-kept clitch, and fine large
gate and drawbridge give it the air of \rcaltli and ease.
:Ih11 \\hat a dclusion is this ! On entering tl)e city T. was

surprised Lo see its fallen state. T h e size of the interior
is, perhaps, t h e third of I-Ierdt ; but it does possess twenty
huts, a n d those a11 in ruins. \\'here is the city of Farrah ?
Na\vherc."
F:irmh on7cs its clestruction to the Persians and the
Afghins. I n rS37 the Persians besieged and laid it waste
bccause it belonged to Afghdnistdn. I n 1 5 5 d l l e Baralizye
A$,$ins
completed its destruction because it was dependent up011 the Saduzye AfghBn rulers of I-Ierat.
Parrall was before the first of these e\wlts Conolly bore
testimony i n 1832, Alter speaking of it as a town possess.
ing two thousand houses, h e adds : 'LTlle land is fertile
and much grain is cultivaLcc1, as the shepherds for many
miles are supplied with it from hence. . . . T h e Furrahr ~ i d" (river of Furrah) " is in spring a wide and deep river,
and there is always sufficient water for much cultivation."
l ' e n years previously 1\41., Frascr had described it as a
city as large a s Nishapur, situatcd in a valley anlong hills
wilh nbout twenty villages a n d many garqens." Again, I
repeat, with peace and security for life and property its
revival \vould be assured.
I havc stated that from Siah-rlb runs the direct road to
I - h i t aid Girdneh, avoiding Farrnh and Sabzwar. I t is
worthy of consideration whether this route might not be
ultimately madc the main line of conlmunication. I t is
shorter ; and a force stationed at Giraneh would conlnland
nlilic Fnrrah and Snbz\var. Ferrier, after alluding to the
strength of the fort as it was five-and-thirty years ago, thus
writes regarding the position. " T h e position is important.
I t co~nnlanclsthe passage of the river and the defiles in
the mountains of the soulh. h snlall forcc quartered there
might maintain its authority in the districts of Sabzwar,
Farmh, I.nusll, EaIt\\x, Gulistan, ~ o ? l r , and Sakltar,
Girdi~elik i n g the central point lound which converge
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these localities-information,"
he empl~aticallyadds, " for
the English and the Russians ! " God grant that our
countrymen may profit by the hint !
I may add that thc road from Giraneli Lo H e r i t runs by
Ab-i-IC~irmal~
and S h i h Jahkn, and joins the Sabzwar road
a t Kash Jabran, a few miles nbuve Sabzwar itsclf. 'The
distances may be thus computed fsom Ferrier's journal.
Prom Kash Jabrlin t o Shdh Jnhin about nine hours calavan Journey, or about zo miles; (som Shah Jnran to
Girdneh 56 miles. T h e country during the greater
part of the way is descril~edI))? Ferrier as \\fell woodccl and
a b o ~ ~ n d i ni ny game, notwithst~nding an almost entire deliciency of \sates.
I return now to the routc by Farm11 and Sabzwdr. T h e
distancc between those two piaces is eighty miles. " 'l'hcre
are," w i t c s Cnptain hlarsli, L L no villages-a vast jumble
of vdleys nncl hills, with small plains, inhabited only by n.
no~nadicpcople. Each p l x e has its name, but if the
lrnvellcr finds tents a t the same place twice h e is lucky."
Captain Marsh accomplishecl the journey in three clays, by
IClilish, Kilnmilsha, and L)nr\vizni. At each of these
l~laceshe found water. Inclexl, after the first 2 5 miles,
the tr;iveller follows, \\fit11 a few deviations, the valley of
the liild-i-hclrashkin. R e p - d i n g his river Furrier observes thal: a n army marching from H e r i t in Lhe summcr
m o n ~ h sshould follow its course, as the commander \vodd
then bc frec fsom ansiely regarding thc supply of w l e r fur
his mcn and cattk. 'The hint should not b: forgotten by
an army which should niarch to Hcrit.
Snbzwdr is cighty miles from Iicrlit. 11 lies at thc extremity of a large oblong plain, ten or Lwclve milcs in
circumference. T h e fort, pret~ilysituated, is not lormidable. 'l'l~c country arouncl it is well cul~i\.uted, a n d
abounds in flocks and herds. \\'atel. and supplies a1.e
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almnclant. A Hincld, who visited it in 1823, compared it,
for fertility, with the best parts of Hincllistin.
'The road bct\veen Sabzwir and Herit needs no specinl
description. I t is good and level and passable for wheeled
cxrr-iages of all descriptions. SuplJies of all kinds are
abunda11t.
T h e following are the stages-easily, if considered advisablc, to be cliviclecl :Sabzwdr to IGsh Jalmin-21 milcs. Midway is a. water
reservoir, now in ruins. At ICdsh J n l ~ i nthe direct road to
Kandahar bmnches off, talcing the route by GirBneh.
T o Adrasl~kdn-I I iniles, about a mile on Lhe Sabz\\lrir
side of the river of the sanle name.
T o S1i:ili Beg or Bad - 23 iniles. Five miles after
crossing the liucl-i-Adrashkin the traveller rcnc:lm the
Rud-i-Gaz, n rapid stream, fiftecn or twenty yards broad,
whose wnlers flow into the Adrashkh a little to the
west of the village of that name. Six miles further the
ruined cwavansarai of Mlr Allah is reached. It is surrounded by cultivatiol~, and n finc stream of water runs
under its ~ralls. Six and a half iniles f~lrthcr, again, thc
traveller passes n spring of sweet water on the left of the
road. 'I'hc d\vnrf reed, which provides sufficient foclder for
horscs, is here nbnnclant; but the food of man has to bc
carricd. Watcr is plentiful at ShBh lkg.
T o Mir Ddild-12
miles. T h e traveller desccnds from
Slid1 Xeg. The dcscent is regular and gradual. 'l'lle
coontry is now uninhabited and uncultivatecl. Red and
grcy partridges al~ouncl. There is an artificial arrangement
Afghiin
for thc supply of water at Mlr Ddlicl, but ~~ncler
rulc it h:ls been but little cnrcd for.
r
.lo Hcl-it-18 miles. A good view of the city is
obtainable from the last-namecl station. l'lw traveller
p~.ocecdsLy a good road, ro milts, LO Rozeh 13Lg11, a royal
7

'

garden-in
older~days planted with Scotch hrs of great
size and beauty. Little morc than 4 niiles further on,
the I-Ierirtid is reachcd. Thc breadth o i the river at this
point is n l ~ o u tn hundred and fifty yards. Its bed is hcare
hollowed out, and its waters run in fifteen separate channcls, twelve fcct wide and very deep, enclosecl between two
embnnl<ments Cornled of the earth tnlcen out for the escavntions. TO t l ~ csouth of the rivcr is a line piece of
pasture-land formerly thickly studdcd with gardens and
villages.
I thitll< that, considering Lhe clifiiculties of the ground
a n d the necessity for carrying all his supplies with him, our
general would be well satisfied if hc could accomplish this
distance in four mcelts.
Gr:unting, then, for thc sake of argument, that thc commander of thc British expeditionary force were to set forth
to relicvc Herit, threatened by the Russians, on the loth
.4pril nest, he could not hope to rcnch that plnce Ixfore
the a z ~ i dMay;? And bc it remembered, h e woulcl nlarcll
at a time of year when the hcat is the nlost terrific, and
the water is most scarce.
What are the chances of I-Icrit being able to hold out
against n ICussian army for three ~ n o n t l s?
I - h i t , it may be said, has held out against a Tksinn
army aided by Russians, for tcn ~nonths. 'That which has
becn acconiplished once may be accomplished :&in.
I shall show, on the evidence of the Inan nlost capable
to give an opinion, on [he evidcncc of Rlclrecl Pottinger
himself, that s l ~ c ha contcnlion, hornever pleasant it may
l ~ ecannot
,
Ix sustxinccl.
I n the first place Russians with ~ h c i rnlodern arms
of inipro\wneld arc inlinikly superior to the Persian
army of ~838-g, with its flints nrd its popguns: in Lhc
second, Elclrcd I'ottingcr dcclarccl Lllat the siege of IS-$-g
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failed solely because the place was not scientifically
attacked.
I t may be taken for grantcd that the defences of HerLt
a r e certainly not better than they were in 1838-9. They
have been occasionally battered since, but they have never
been repaired. \\re may have, then, an absolute conviction
that the account given by IG-tyc;* of the state of the fortifications of H e r i t in 1838 is not underpainted in its application to the present day.
" The city of Hcnit, it has been said, stood within solid
earthen walls, surrouncled by a wet ditch. T h e Tour sides
were of nearly equal length, n little less than :L mile in
cstcnt, hcing ~o\vardsthe four points or the compass. T h e
inost clevatcd quarter of the city \\!as the north.east, fronl
which it gradually sloped down to the south-west corner,
where it attained its lowest descent. 'The real defences of
t h e place were two covercd ways, or fnlusc-brnics, o n the
cstcrior slope of the embankments, one within and the
othcr without the d i ~ c h . T h e lower one \ w s on the level
of t l ~ csurrounding country, its parapet partly covered by a
inound of earth on the counterscarp, the accu~rlula~ion
of
rubbish from the cleansings of thc ditch. O n the nor~hern
side, surroundecl by n wet clitch, Lhc citadel, once Known as
Llie I<ilal~-i-tlkt.ynr->lIdi~i,
but now as the :\rk, overlooked
t h e cily. Ruilt entirely of good brick rwsonry, wit11 lofty
I-amparts n11d numerous towers, it was a place of consiclcra b l e strcngth ; b u t now its defences, long neglected, wcre in
a wretched state of repair. lizdeed, W!ILW, in 1837, t i d i ~ g s
oJ //It nd7~nr~c
of the Pclsinn a r q ~.cnc/rcd Henit, the
7(1/10h e.v/e~z/qf the Jortt&-n/iuns zum C I W N I in
~111
~0 ~dmzy."
~
'['he italics are mine.
Such was, such is, Hesat. Uct, being so, it succc.ssrully
rcsisted n Pcrsian nrmy, aided by Russian officers, for ten
. * History -or the War. in Arghnnistan." By Sir J. W.I h y e ,

?

'

months. Upon that subject Ict us hear the opinion of the
one Englishman \vithin ils \valls, of the man of \vliom
Kaye wrote : " T h c inclomitablc courage of Eldred Pottinger saved the belcagr~ereclcity."
" I t is my lirm Ixlief," mrotc tliat gallnnt Englishman
in his journal, " that Malionled Shrill " (the Shlih of Persia)
'(might have carried the city by assault the very first day
that he reachecl HerAt, and that even when the garrison
gained confidence, and were flushecl with the success of
their sorties, he might have, by a proper use of the means
at his disposal, taken the place in twenty-four hours."
That opinion, the opinion of a conlpetent artillery officer,
who successf~~lly
defended the crunlbling ramparts, appears
to me to be decisive of the question. I t is clear that
under ordinary circomstances HerLt could not, if attacked
now, resist a Russian force till the end of May. T h e only
chance of her being able to do so would be the prescnce
behind her ramparts of Lumsden and his companions.
Lumsden is an experienced officer, and he has a very
gallant following ; but it seems to me, that if the Russians
are proviaed with guns of the modern type, even the skill
and courage of Lumsden and his co~npanionscould effect
little, if it be true, as has been asserted, that the city can
ke commnncled by n hill in its vicinity.
The reply, then, the reluctant reply, Lo the first query
that Herbt, if a:tncked nonr, could not hold out till the
encl of Mny, disposes, it seems to me, of the three
questions raised by the iPiim. For, if the existing
Russian force in the Transcaspian regions can take Herdt
before an English force could arrive before tliat city, and
if, whilst the English force \Ifas advancing Rr~ssianrlcinforcements were likewise being pushed fon~ard,it seems
clear that the Power which has possession of the poitlt
d'nppxi must occupy the position of vantage. For whilst
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the l?,nglish have to traverse 514 miles, over a barren
country, all 1i;ud-mucl~ing,carrying their sapplies, he
Russians havc Lo rnm.cl1 along an cnsy road fronl Kizil
Arvat, only 5 2 3 milcs to Iierdk, drawing thcir supplies all
the may, irom the northern frontier of Persia. 'I'hnt
northern part of Persin is, by the testimony of Nnpicr and
other eye.witnesses, a l r e d y n Russian province, possessing
ngents in every village. T h e march, then, of the Russian
reinforcemenfs from K i d Arvat Lo I-Ierit, Lhougli nine
miles longer, is n
easier march to nccon-~plislithan Lhc
mnrch of Lhe Bri~ishforce irom Lhe Pishin Valley to thc
snmc l~lacc. 1Jnder ordinary circu~nsLnnccs, tlicn, thc
Russian fidvance force, far from being isolated, will bc
supported by n main body as strong ns thc ndvnncing
English army, before that army could reach HerAt !
Nor is thc argument regarding supplies more tcnn1)lc.
T h e base of Russia for supplies will b e the northern
frontier of Persia, between two and three hundred miles
from H e r i t ; the English base for the same+l,orpose would
be the country beyoiid t h e Indus, six hundred miles
distant.
I n connection with this subject-, and as s h o ~ \ ~ i nhow
g
much belter prepared Russia is for her great spring than
the onter world has any idea of, I annex here n letter
written by Sir Edward Ilalnley in reply t o one of the
arguments nsed by he Z h c s , upon which I Iiavc coinnlentcd :'[Seeing how inexpedient it is," wrote Genei-a1 Hamley
on the zznd March, " t o underrate a n enemy, perhaps you
will allow me n few worcls of comment on your contributor's
account of the Army o f Lhe Caucnsus last Friday ; by which
I sl~all also hope to justify my view of &he necessity of
concentrating our resources on a. war will1 Russia, if such
is to be. Accepting your contributor's description of that

arnly, and his estimate of the number of men \\rhicIi it
brought against the Turks in Armenia in IS;;, still t l ~ t
forms no nieasure of the forces \\~liicliKussia could now
assenihle on the Caspian. ,For in 1577 the vast home
army of Russia was entirely occupied in operating against
the Turks on the Danube. I t is now disposable for the
reinforcement of the Army oC the Caucasus. Troops
enlbarkecl at Odessa woulcl reach Batoum in h r o days,
the Caspian in three, and the present end of the Transcaspian Railway at Bani within the week. Nor wot~lclthe
severance of the com~nunicntion across thc Ulnck Sen
prevent thc tmrlsit, for many railways cross Russia to
debouch 011 thc Volgn, which forms a vast highway to the
Caspian. Tlil~s,the trial of strength would be not between
the Artny of the Caucasus and the Army of Indin, but
between the forces which the t\vo Empires could bring to
bear in the theatre of war.
Furthcr, during the war of 1877, Persia, as n neutml,
asse~rrbled an a t n y of 40,000 u c n for thc protection of
her own soil. If that army wcre directed against us, i n
alliance with Russia, it would inarcb by excellent roads
mithih the Persian frontier to Meshed and the FIeri Kud.
I f therc is anything i n the task that would thus be set us to
nr~~horize
thc I~elicfthat, besides dealing with it, we could
also maintain :I British force of the present slrcngtl~in
Egypt, I shall rejoice to hear of it, but I have failed to
6
discover it."
'The argument of this lctler is unanswerable. I t goes to
confirm my conviction that unless an 1Snglish force can
rcacli Herdt before Russia, take possession of that city, the
entire province, which has been for ages the b111mnrk of
India, will be formeverlost.
What, meanwhile, is our position in India? We can
&pose, in that country, of a regular force, inclusive of the

troops which hnve been lent to Englnnd for thc Soudnn,
o f 61,736 European, and 125,695 native troops, counting oficers. The following table shons their component
parts :i r y .
..
Cavalry
.
Infantry .
Sappers and Niners

-

.

.

.
.

IiS35

18,824
101,926
3,110

. --

Total

125,695

BRITISH1\~.\1\',INCI.UDING OFFICERS.
hlatlrns.

2,qgr
956
43
8,2 17

2,786 = I 1,486
478 = 4,s02
48 =
292
8,217.= 45,656

11,707

11,529 = 61,736

I

Bom11:ly.

Total.

Bcngnl,

Artillery
6,209
Cavalry
2,868
Engineers
~ C
Infantry 29,222

- - - 38,500

This is the pence establishment, a total of 187,431, to
guard India, and, we mill hope, to maintain I-Ierdt. Of
colirse it may be greatly increased. I t is satisfactory to
learn that Lord Duferin has already issued orders that two
hundrcd men,shall be added to each regiment, and equally
so that enlisting has again become popular in India. It
is an additional satisfnction to feel that the destinies of
India are in the hands of a mnn who POSSCSSeS the absolute
confidence of the English people.
The esact mode in which tllc nrnly availnble for Iicld
service may be employed must depend an circumstances.
England Itnow that her generals on thc spot, if Irft Llnfettered, will conquer even the impossible. But they may

read, as every one may study, with advantage, thc words
uttered last May on the suhject by our most accon~ylished
strategis1 :" I will suppose Russia," said Sir I~clwnrcl Hamley, " to
have made her nest step-a step which need surprise nobody; many Indians look on it as alrencly virtually accomplished-and
occupied Herit. IVe know when she will
do this-in a moment of perplexity to England. As to
the 11ow, perllaps by first occupying it with a Persian
garrison (not to alarm us too much), and afterwards, by
some subsequently announced Treaty, replacing that gnrrison wit11 Russian troops. This may easily he done before
we are aware, espccinlly if we follo\v the ph11 of rcspccting
Russian susceptibilities so far as not w c n to kccp ourselves
informcd of \vllnt shc niag :,I cluing, And it \\,as 11 fcatnre
of Skobeleff's plan of invasion, now beconie absolutely
feasible, ' to org&e masses of Asiatic cavalry, and hu1Iing
thcm on India as our vanguard, under the banner of blood
and rapine, thus bring back the ti~ncsof l'amerlnne.' We
may therefore wake up to find this programme in execution, with I.<ussian troops to any estent massed along the
line of the 'l'mnscaspian railmay, ready to support those in
front. Now, on our side, we have of late increased the
force at Quetta, and planned a system of local defence for
Beloochistin ; but our comparali\,ely insignificant field
force is 2 2 0 miles from the Helmund. 'I'hat js onc case.
The other is that we had a strong British Governor in
Kandnl~ar,and n strong British force on the Helmund and
on the road to Kabul-the railway completed to Icandahar
-in case of a movement from Turkistan against Kibul, a
force 011 our side on its way to occupy that city, if not
already there, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid
\varlike populations. Surely there can be no question as
to which of these two sets of circumstances mould give us
N

most influence in Afglxinistin, most powcr LO oppose Russi:~,
and to maintain conficlcnce in India. And we must
reme~nberthnt four years ago we could lime done this a n d
more than this. T h e \vhole country \vas going to pieces
for want of strong rule. \\re were actually hunling for
rulers. We set up one at I G i l d , :1nd auothcr at Iinndahnr,
who was soon afterwards removecl, and thc ~vholc country
placed under the present Amir. Berore and sincc that
cvent Lhe unwavering theory of successive Covc'rnmcnts of
I n d i : ~has I ~ c c nLhnt lhc Amir is to be kcpt Srom Russian
influence, and to I x n~ainlninccl and supported in nlliancc
with England. 1 3 ~ 1when wc ask \ h t steps h a w been
talten for carrying this Lheorp into practice, I fcar \re shall
not find much that is salisfaclory. Pcrhnps Lhc ntuiost we
could in prcsent circun~stnncespronlisc o u r s e l \ ~ ~in
s , mceting n Russian advance, would he that a f ~ c rl~cavyl i g h h g
and vast cspenditurc wc sl~oulcl succeccl in gaining Lhose
positions whic11 nrc now open LO our grasp, and our
presence in n~hicliknight obviate the risk 13war.'>
' I I have
said nothing about a Eritish occupation of
Her&. Yet that t o 3 was open ko us four years ago, and
not only open to us, but contemplated, in certain conlingencics, by the Government of India. If I refrain from
speaking of it it is because I fear R L the outset to excite
thc opposition, nncl possible refmsal to consider any forwnrcl
movement, pf those who are already hampered by t l ~ c
opinions they formerly expressed. I nm aware, too, of the
strong reasons thal exist against straining our resources by
embracing points s o distant in o u r first operations. But I
\\dl confess that a s a n alxtract ~nilitaryplan for the defence

"

" Ancl hcrc T may nicnlion Lhnl, sincc [his papcr was printcd, I
linve seen cvidcnce Ihnl most o f Ihc v i e w hcre?rt forth arc shnred by
no Indian Officer whosc nnnlc w o ~ ~ lbe
d at once admitted as of almost
clrcisive inflnence in the queslion."

of India under present conditions, and supposing sufficient
additional troops to bc forthcoming, t l n t wllich most
strongly recolnmends itsclf to m y mind is a strong Eritish
Government at I<andahar, wielding an army whose ndvanced troops should be at ICribul and Ilerrit, 1,aucd on
I<urrachee, with milnray communica~ionat least 1 h c 1 ~ :to
c
I<andah:~1-. I I~elieveit is consiclerctl ~ h n lgreat r~nrtof
such an army could bc supplied from our prcscnt Indian
forces. Honlevel; I will not enlarge on this plan, Lllough
I imagine it is what n strong Ponver, ~hinltingmore or
security than espense, might be cxpectecl to adopt. 13ut,
assuming lllat wc wish to kccp our hold on this ~rnmpartof
India, i t is urgently neccssnry to take s t c p while the
Russian preparations are still u ~ i d e ~ e l o p e d .]Ye must at
once obtain such a seltlement or its boundary as I linve
endeavoured Lo sketch. And military reports on tlic whole
counlry, 1r0111 llik frontier to posilions sccuringr or commanding Hcrht, ancl thence. to thc Helmund, should bc
framed forthwit%. Our ignorance of a11 Lhis is, considering
its imporlance, nstonishing. l\'liile Russian ofticinls linve
explored 1111 Lo and beyond H e r & a n d elsewhere along the
AT~hhn and Indian frontier, our own oficers liave been
discourngccl, indeccl prohibitecl, from obtnining personal
kno\vlcclgc of those rcgions, so that thc scanty information
1 Iinvc been able to give al,out Llic~n is from 1ho:c who
acquired it almost. by s1c:~lth. An cstremr carc not to
wound, b y sho\ving suspicion, the innocent candour ot'
those guileless bci~igs,Russian statesmen, appears Lo liave
been our ruling motivc, and is probably dignilicd by h e
name of diplomacy. T h e frontier is most iniporkml to us,
yct- no oric can s ; ~ y wlierc tllc lixmlier is. I n n fiw ycars
wc may bc 1 i ~ h t R on
1 ~ tllc I-lelmund, 01. the FTcri-r~itl,yet
we know nothing or the military featr~resof tlic rcgion."
One word in conclusion as to the composilion of the
x 2

Anglo-Indian army. Of thc P,~.itish troops I need say
nothing ; but with respect to the Indians I a m glad to be
able to express my nbsolute conviction that a Silt11 regiment,
led by British officers, is quite the equal of a Russian
regiment; that a Gilrkha regiment, similarly led, is likewise, at least the equal of n Russian regiment ; that the
Gdrknhs of Nepil, led by British officers, are equally
a s able to meet the shock ; that the Indian Irregular
Cavalry can successf~~lly
dare the Cossack to any encounter. The rnatcrinl, then, of the force which inay have
t o meet Russia on the frontier of India is all that can
b e desired. T h c only fault is that it is so small. I
repent, then, the advice which has recently been so strongly
urged upon the Governrncnt by the one strategist who 111s
never been at fault: I would urge thcm to abandon the
position in the Soudan, whcre-to
use the words of
Louis SV.at the battle of Laffeldt in 174;'--'' England fights
for all a n d pays for all," to t h e advantage of the "all,"
a n d to transport the arnly employed there'to the spot in
India where the clearest interests of our country are
threatened. I t n,ould be necessary to stipulate, if this
policy were carried out, that the General-in-Chief should be
left behind. Lord Wolseley might replace the heroic
Gordon in a new I<hartoum. We have yet, in India, in
Roberts, in Charles hIacGregor, in Donald Stewart, in
Mncpherson, and in othcrs also on the spot, men mho have
proved, o n the hardest and most trying of fields, that
"whilst no military qualification is wanting, the fount of
honour is full a n d fresh within them." I n England, too, in
the able and cultivated co~ninanderwho stormecl Tel-elKebir, who has studied the question of thc Indian frontier,
in a way such a s n o man but Charles ;lIacgregor has studied
it-in Sir Edward Hamley-we possess a leader the compeer even of such-men a s these !

No cause was ever a d \ m ~ c e dby exaggeration. The cause
I am pleading in this chapter is the calm of the 12nglish
people. Before I conclude it I shall show how their prospelity is bound LIP in the maintenance of our Indian
empire; ho\v the loss of that magnilicent dependency
would nrfect the position of every man, every woman, and
every child in these islands from the highest to t l ~ elowesl.
Convi~~cecl
as I an1 that Lhe occupation by Russia or I-Ierat,
the outlying fortress which covers India, would be l l ~ cprelude to an invasion of India, I shall indicak thc pulpow
which has promptccl the Russian general on the spot to
n~altr:that sudden attack on the ATghnns or Panjcleh which
roused all England to indignation on the morning of
Thursday, the 9th April. And, that I may not be accused
of exaggeration I shall, in clescribing that attack, quote the
words wed in the House of Conmons on Thursday
evening by one who has lost no opportunity of declaring his
faith in Russia : who, addressing his present constituents in
18;g, declared that he had " n o fear of the territorial
extensions of Russia, no fear of them rnhat&w; " that he
thought " such fears old women's fears "--I shall quote
the words used by the Prime Minister of England.
I n a previous chapter I showed that when the Eritish
Commission~r, Sir Peter Lumsden, arrived, in nccordance with an ,+rrangement agreed to by the Government of the Czar, at Panjdeh, h e was not met there by
the Russian Commissioner, but that, shortly after his
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arrival, 1211ssi:inLroops ssizcd t l ~ cposts, imporhnl, LXC;ILISC
,
vnlunld- for :~g;~ressivepurposes, of l'ul-i-Khitun, Zulf.~g:u;nncl I'ul-i-IGshli; that the British Government had
nclclrcssed scrious remonstrances to St. Petersl~urgon the
subjcct; nnd thnt, niter a very slight discussi~mit hncl been
a m n g e d between the two Governn~cntsthat l<ussin sho~~lcl
retain the posilions her troops had occupied, pending the
definition of the frontier by the Commissioners of thc two
n:~linns. 'I'he nrrnngc~ncnt \V:H generally regarded ns :L
~~nsnlisl~~clory
almngcmcnt fur Ihgl:~ncl, 1,111 it h;ld
h e n n i d e I J ~ the I!rilisll ( h - c r n m c n l , ::ml the Ihitisl~
peoplc, wilh n great den1 of smouldering disgust, 2nd will1
a strong conviction that they were being duped, were
oldigcd to await the result.
'The Ministers of Great Dritain duly co~nmunicateclthis
agreement to Sir Petcr Lurn,sclcn. I t mny be presumccl
thnt LIIC Minislers of Rossin likewise duly con~mllnicatetl
thc :I~I-ccmcnt
to tJicir gcnerd on t l ~ espot-the gencriil
curn~nar~cling
nt l'ul-i-lCislili, Gencral Romcroff; although
thnt gcncraliinfor~uedCaptain Ynte Lhnt he had not rcceivecl
it. \\'hcthcr he receivccl i t or not, is n mnltor bchvccn
hi~nselfnntl his Go\wnrner~l. I t is clear that the Ministers
of Ruisin arc rcsponsilde to the hfinis~ersof England for
the due olxer\~nnccof thc arrnngemcnl made IvAwccn the
two ~ d o n s . From Ihosc klinislcrs must the l-lritish
Gc;\:ernmcnt dclunnd reparation.
On the mor:ing of 'I'hursclay, thc 9th April, Lhe public
were startlcd by a n announcement i m d e in the Shzadrzl-d
newspaper ~ h n tthe agree~uent between thc two countries
'
had been violaled, and violated by Russia; that Russian
troops hnd made n premeditated attack upon the Afghins.
Sccond editions of the other 1:lorning papus confirmed
the news ivhich the Skrmhrrd had been the first to
annou~~cc.

b

T h a t s m n c evening tlw P r i m e Minister of Great B r i t a i n
csplnincd the m a t t e r in t l ~ c1To11sco f C o ~ n m o n s , A f i c ~
s o m c i n t r o d u c t o r y remnrlts, hc snid :I n Ihe first plncc I l w c nrc two t h i n g n~l~niltccl-namely, [lint all
:~ll:~cl;w;is nindc on tlie A f g h h s I y the 1Zussin1is :111d that llic
Afg1i;ins were clefentctl. On h o s e two points ll~crcis n o d o ~ l l t
--clclcnlcd, ns we nrc inl'orn~etl, nficr n gnllnnl fifil~t. l ' l ~
1:ussi:i11 nllcg;itio~is:ire 11minly ~IICSC. I \\.ill 1101 a t t c ~ i ~ ptol give
tl1r111in sl.ricL form, I)ut the l l o u s ~1n3y depend npon tlic SIII>SL:IIIC~
o i my recital. T h e Russians nttnchcd the Aigh611s, ns they s M e ,
artcr being provoked 1)). acts o l lioslility so termed-the nature c~l'
wliicl~wc arc not distinctly inforl~~ecl
of--on (lie part o i tlw Afgliins.
When Ihc fighting mas over rlie liussi:i~~s
rctirctl. They rc~iretl,
according Lo n p h m x usctl in one tlocu~ncnt, to their prcviow
~ I ~ c
pohiliuns, nccortling Lo Lhc other tlocumc~~t,
lo lhc lcft ~ J R I Ird
l<liushk. Tlicsc two phmscs lnsy I,c csacOy eqnivnlcnt. I a m nol
prq)nrcd lo sny lhcy arc nol, In11 1 incntion tlicni 1)oLIi I~ecn~lsc
lhry
arc ilsctl in the two accounts n , l ~ i c lInve
~
veaclicd us. IL is next
nllegcd that I5q$sli olficc~sdirected tlic AfgliRns willioot lnl<ing part
i n t l ~ c:ic~ual~ ~ i g . i g ~ ~ i ant1
i c ~ ilinnlly
l,
it is stnlctl that Llic R u s s i n ~I:l-rlii.
~
~ii:i~iclcrsent mi cscor~lo protccl thc Euglish oiliccrs nltcr Il~cA(gli:in.;
wJrc dclcalccl, Imbthnt tlic Eoglisli oniccrs I d thcn~selvcs lclt Ihe
ground mlicn t l ~ cescorl nrrivctl, so llial Llicrc ~ 1 . 110
;
o c c n h ~lc~r
~ i l lo
act. Tlicse are 111eprincipal allcgnlio~istlinL Iinvc reacl~etl us :IS tlic
nllcptinn:; of tlie Rnminn Govemnian~.
'l'hc tlntc of t l ~ ccngngenien! is l l ~ c30th of h,I;ircl~,a11el licrlinps I
niny say lhnl l l ~ cwrlicst i~ilelligenceo l tlic ~ilosl ninterial of the facts
I am about Lo recite only rcncliccl Lord Granville and myself llik
i o i n \Yell, i ~ o r1 conic to Llic :~llcptions made I)y Sir I'cter
n
Lo~iiscle~i
and uur own ofilccrs, to wl~icbI ~iectlscarcely s:ry 111.1t,
111aUerof coorsc, wc g i w credit, ancl \vliich undo~~blcclly
call fnr very
w
grnvc altcnlion. I n the first plnce i t is slatctl Ilnt no rorward I I I C I V ~ .
nicnt of :illy kin11 wns ninclc I)y tlic A r g l ~ i i I~efure
~ i ~ or since L I W ~ y t l ro r
h1:vcli-Ll~c I jtli of hfarch Iring the date of tlie Lclcgrnm I sl~allnow
rccitc. O n Ilic 29th of AInrcl~ we wcrc infor~ncil-nr~d \\then I sny
" urc" I spenl; of Sir Peter I,unistlt.n's t c l c y r n ~
scnt
~ ~ lo u ~ - \ \ ~ ca c r e
inforliietl Lhnl, notxillist:~nrli~~g
tlic l<ussiar~assurances of thc 17th of
AIarc11--this is liw sul~stanccof thc tclcgm~iiwhich Ihc Ilonsc will 110
clcrubt recognize, l>c?nusc it was t l ~ csul,slnlice of tllc stnlc~iicnl~ n a d e
I,y nlc in this ltousc mid sclil Lo St. P e l e r s I ~ ~ and
r g rccognizctl thcrc,
and rctorncd llicncc \\MI a ccrlnin ndtlition stntcd in this 1-louse nt llic

,'

time-on thc 29th of March we wcre infor~nrtlby Sir Pclcr Lunisrlcn
that, " not\vithstanding the Russian nssurnnccs of tlic 17111 of h,I;lrcli
that thc Russinn forccs woeld not ntlvnnce from the position they Lhcn
occupied provicletl h e t\fgh6ns should not ndvnncc nor attnclr Lhem,
o r nnless some cslrnordinnry circuinstance sho111tl happen, such :IS n
clist~~rbnnce
in Pnnjtleh, thc Russinns n.erc drawn np in force nl~nost
within range of tlic AfgIi5n posi~ion,though the :\fgh;ins lint1 neithcr
attacked nor ndvanccd, and I'nl~jdch was perfectly quiet ;" that crcry
ende:~vonrwas heiag n l d e by the Russiens-this is in the nature of n
g ~ n r r n slntement-to
l
induce thc ATgltBns to bcgin h e fight ; nntl ~ h n t
t h e Russian forces hncl nttempletl to forcibly p:iss througlr the Afgliin
pickcts. Thc nest point is III:IL ,111 the fnilurc of tliosc nlle~ii[)ts
Captain Yale ~ n c tLlic chief of tlic I<ussinn slnfl' 11y :11~poinlnicnt,nntl
e n t11131 referred lo in tht
vTns informed that 110 SIIC!~ n r ~ ~ n n g e ~ ~ i:IS
telcgrnm of thc 17th hInrcll ns lo thc non-ndmnce of thc Ilussin~s
hnrl been rccei\~ccl. ( " 011.") This has hecn n~ndethe sabject of
proper cornmunicnlion. Nest, lhnt the chief of llie st:iff, whose Iinme
I do not recollect, would not give mi :lssurnncc to C:lpt:~in Vatc ~ h n t
thc AfghAns would not be attncked withont prcvio~~s
noticc, ar~tl he
clnimcd thc light to turn out the Afghdn posts whenever thcy night
inconvenience the Russians, wilhout rcfercnce lo m y third p l y .
Thnt, of count, must lx taken in conncclion mitli the statement imneclintely precetling-that he h ~ not
d receivcrl from St. Pclersbnrg :nstructions correspontling with the telegrnnl of the btli AI31th. S C S ~
w e lenrnt that on t h e 29th of March Sir Peter Lumsdcn tlesirctl Cnp~nin
Yntc again to see Lhc h s s i n n comlnnntlcr nntl e&ct an n~nic:~llle
nrransemcnt if porsildc. \Ire Icnrnt, on the 7th or-april, thn( tlo\vn to
t h e 30th of &Inrch tlic Aighins li:~d ~ n n d cno fnr\~wtlmovcnicnt I x h e
o r sincc that tclcgrnm of the 17th of March. O n thc 7th of April \re
also lcar~itthat Cnptnin Yale hntl, on the 1st of April, sent n note from
n point which hc had reached with all the IIritish ofticrrs and escort
safely on the previous day a t S I1.Jr. on thc way to GoIran. It stated
thnt the Russiihs hntl attnclml 2nd dcfentcd the Afghlins, nntl hntl
occupied Panjdeli on the 30th. The Afghhs weresnid to hnvc fought
gnllnntly nntl to hnve lost hcnvily, two compnniei being killetl l o n
m n n in their entrenchn~rnts. T h e s~~rvivors
rttrcnted along the
a
h'Iaruchnk road. T h e British ofliccrs w r c ncutral in the engngcmcnt.
T h e I-1011s.ewill not he snrprised when I say, speakins with mcnsurccl
words in cil~cumstnnccsof grcnt grnvity, that to ns, upon the stntements
I have recitctl, this nttnck l m r s the nppenr:\ne? of nn nnprovol;ecl
aggression. (Cheers.) \Ire hnvc nslted for explnnntions from the
Russian Govcrn~nent. Therc has not yct been Linlc to receive such
esplnnations. W e shall cndenrour t o arrive at a just conclusion on the

facts. But before receiving our con~n~unications
ycstertlny, sntl tolio~i
we had not the iniportnnt conimunications or this morning, but somcthing preliminary in the sanw direction, the British A~nbnssndornt St.
Petersburg reported to us last night at forty ~ninutcspnst five in these
words :-" T h e Minister for Foreign ARi~irsexpresses his earnest hope
and that of the Emperor that this unhappy incident may not prevent
the continuance ot the negotiations " (laughter) ; and he also reported
a stntemcnr of hI, tle Gicrs that the Rnssinns re!ired to Lheir previous
positions and did not o c c ~ p yP;injdch. I may say thnt I h a w Itritl
these stalements before the House ns being the incomplete a ~ i dpartial
statements which the very short time thnt hns elapsed sincc the rcccipt
of the news aloue enables me to offer, and they are as much as onr
public cloty will permit us to mnkc ; and I think I may say that thcy
comprise lhe whole of the ~natcrial stntcments of fact which have
rcachctl 11s upon this important, and for the nlonient I may say \ w y
pninful, niattcr.

Later on, during the s a m e cvening, the Prime Minister
srlpplemented the above statement with nnothel.. H e
said :-

,

..
n

" I had intendetl, e i ~ h c ron the motion to report progress or on the
actual report of tlic resolutions with the Speaker in thc chair, to mention that 4nce I 4 p o l w at the comn~encemcnt of the cvening a telcgram has been received from Sir Peter Lnnisden, which conveys what
I m y call a qnalilica(ion of one of the statenients which 11c had made.
The statenicnt I niacle on the authority of Sir Pcter Lnnisden was, as
will be reniembered by the IIousc, because I repented it twice, that
the Afghbns had not mndc nny ncl\*nnce either before or a h the
arrival of the telegram of the I 7th of Mnrch. Bat Sir Petcr Lumsden
stales to us in n latcr telegram that when the Russians imn~edintely
threntenetl an attack on the i \ f g h h position b advancing in forcc to
Ak Tnpn, the d$hins threw out vedcttcs to t{eir &nt and cxtendd
tl!eir pickets to Pul-i.I<histi, on the left bank of the I<hi~slik,nntl
gradually strengthened it u n ~ i lon the 3otli, the bulk of thcir force hnd
becn transferred across the river. Thnt is t l ~ cqualificntion which he
conveys. H e goes on to say that, in his opinion, that does not properly constitute an advancc, but was the occupntion of a more advantngcol~s position. But I presume he evidently considers that the
qnestion might be jaised as to wlint did or did not constit~~tc
an ad\'nnce, nntl he is tlesiror~s thnt the British Governnient shoold be
placed in the possession of n l l ~ h cfacts. I give the qualificntion to the
Horrse precisely as Sir Peter Lan~sdenhas given it."
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the other. 'l'his territory has I~ecnviol:lted in a time or
profound pcacc by n Pomcr which, only fifken months ago,
\\'as far removed from the extremest border claimecl by the
Afghdns, and \vhich has sincc insidiously crept up to that
border.
If such n thing had happeocd in Europe; if, for instance, France, i n 1867-8, had suddenly pounced upon the
Duchy of Luxemburg, which had been given lo her by the
Icing of Holland, would Germany hnve allo\vt.d il for n
moment ? T h e march of a single regiment across rlle border
o f that Iluchy \vould have been acccptecl as a declaration
of war. Why, t h very claim to Luxemburg made by Napoleon 111. very nearly brought about such n result ! I s
there, lhen, to be a Inn1 of nntions in Europe, nncl no Inw
of nations in Asia? Are \\T to bc swift to rcpel on the
onc continent, and to turn our f x c to the smitcr on the
othcr ? 1 adz this ques~ionbecansc wc arc, at this moment,
turning our face to the smitcr on the banks of the Murghib, .and unlesg wc s ~ d d c n l yrccoil, and put down both fcct,
and, pointing to the frontier of 1872-3,say tu the smiter,
" t h w far shalt thou .come I N L no fur the^.," we run the
g~~eatcst
risk of losing India.
l'licse are not empty words: they are words of truth
nncl solemn warning. Any one who chooscs to rend
between thc lines can dctecr: easily eoo ~ g hthe reason for
the action of Get~crnlKonmroti 'I'o t ose0who cannot I
will csplain it.
First, let m c recall to the recollection of the sender the
general principle o f the policy of Russin ns described I,y
the stnteoann of this century r h o knew ller thoroughly, by
the lamcnted Lord P a h e r s t o n . The words are quoted at
pages 38-9 of this volu~ue. Lct the rcndrr apply them to
the action of General Komaroff and the excuses made by
M, d e Giers, as that action nnd those excuses hnvc been

'
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st:ltrcl by Mr. C;lnJstonc. ' I 'l'hc policy of 11ic Kt!:;.ii;111Go.,- "
ernnient," w o t c Lord Palmcrston, " 11nsal\vays hccn 10 i!l!sii
forn~nrdits encroncliments as Elst nnd as far as t1:c . l , ~ ; l h y01\\.nnL of firmness of other Go\,ernments would nllov; II [v go.''
" I n Fiirtlicrnncc of this policy the Russian Gove~!itii~xiitIwr:
nl\vnys two strings to its bow-moclerate Iaiigu;!~:~;.!id ( , i s interested professions nt St. Petersburg and :lt L . \ > I I * \ u ~;I
active aggression by its agents on the scene of opei't~loii~.
If the aggressions succeed locally tlie St, P e t e ~ d ) ~Gi!\
~ ; crii.Incnt nclopts them - 2 s n fni/ nuwv/i wliicli i i ;ilc' ill,L 11:
tcncl, I ~ u tc:i~inot in l i o n o ~ ~reccdc
r
from. 1 1 i~l l : ' ;OI-.I;
agc~ils fail they arc disavowerl and recalld, ;c111i thc
Inngiingc previously licld is appcnlcd to ns a p.::of' ki1i1.1.tllu
.. agents have overstepped their instructions." j 5 i: 1) I A ; ~ I ~
to descri1)e more esnctly, with more nbsolutc 1 ~ " ~.i,l<i,i l l : '
courses wliicli Russia is now pursuing nt L,o~~rll.)n,
n! :;t
Petersburg, and on the Murgl~db? She lias ; ~ t i r ~ i L!IC
~ ~ ~ ( i
agg:essions made by Komnroff as fnih acco~up/ci:r i l i c li;~q,i f
\\.c may believe the St. Petersburg correspondent o f L I I C'TJMS
.
( I I April), collfen-ed decal-nlions rind ~ d ~ i ~ f f ~Bvn JId<:
. , :I : 7 / ~ l i ,
?@ON Z ~ S Cr~/,yngea'; while she lias been assuring u:; .2i x.
-:
Pctcrsburg that such aggressions wcre made i'g. slut.. d hcr
instructions. She ncloptecl t hose xggressions !~~~;.:uisc o : x
Minislers had not tlie " pluck :'-there is no bt~lerword h ~ r
it, and it is n rigbt good English wol.d--to
Lzll ht.1. tl?:::
unless she r-tiredithere would be war !
?h
For., let us consider, \vhy is Russia r n a k i n ~ ~hi^ s i ~ r i ~ l g
just a t this particular moment ? Sh7i1mls fhc ~J;CI OY-/ / i r r r ' ~ .
'J'o gain that city is the end and aim of nll her ; ~ - ~ ~ \ ~ l ~ ~ n -c l , ; s ,
H e r i t is comparatively weak now; her fortifica;icj~,sar,: i n
disrepair; there is n o English force within live !~~in.circL ,
miles of it. I f Russia can only get possession o i L'I; 5.:nc~i':, '
no power on earth will ever take it from her. Thr. pla;:is
and the valleys follow the city. If she can only g2.!11Hcriit

now she gains a new base w!lere s h e can rest and wait for
the opportunity to pounce upon India.
Yes ; that is the cause of these aggressions which in
spitc of their being disavowed a r c invariably accepted ;
is the meaning of the smooth words which serve to
In more and nlore tituc for I<omaroK and ~\likhanoff!
\\'hilst Russia is protesting in Lontlon, her generals arc
: ~ c l v a ~ ; tiown
~ ~ n ~ the I<hushk, the hlurghdb, and the IIerirlid. H e r secret purpose is to seize H e r i l before India is
ready, before British troops can b e sent to the scenc of
action from the Soudan-to seizc it, to for~ifyit, and to
use it as a liltnace to India !
\\'hat tllc effect upon India of the acquisition of Herdt
by Russia vorrld be, I descrihcd in languay to which I
can add littie, in n paper I \\rote for thc l'driotic A h s o cialion in 1879. \\'hat, I asked then, will mean thc ocoup t i o n of Russia by I l e r i t ? I added :
It will mean sinlplp this: that thc gatcirny lcnding into our Indian
Empire has been c?cLIpied h y our cnenly. It will mean that hence.
forth thcrc will lie no peace for the people of India, 110 security for
trade, no money for improvemen~s. The English in Indin will lire
unclcr a conlinoa! Il~rext-not at lirst of invasion, I x ~ tof thc intrijiw
&,ewhich
corrupts their native soldiers, which wins over their native
allies, which mtkrs every man doublh~lof the niorronr. In a word,

?
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!voultl I~ecomc of her ?evcnues t h c n ? Ind~~stry,
the cause of thc
aenllh or nations, wo111dIx pnralyzetl, and a few years wol~ldwitness
n national

.

I n a word, the occupation of H e r i t by Russia would be
a permanent menace to India.
Another attempt is now being m a d e by Russia to hoodwink our minislers, and again have our ministers been
Irpodwinked. They have accepted the assurances from
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St. Petcrsburg that no reply can be received froifi ( : L i ~ c ~ . : ~ l1
Komaroff for seven or eight days. Now, on t1ii.i l;oi,:l. :
have receivcd a com~nunicationfrom a gentlenwi >.VL if
acquainted with thc Trans-caspian rcgioas, whi~:it hr. k t .
permitted me to use. H e writes : . " T h e Doily .'I; ~ t ; y : ? ~ ~ . ' ~
i s right in stating that the Russian telcgrxph l i t i t ~ L ~ . . ! C I I ~ . ' ~
t o \vithin 1 2 0 nliles o f the Russian posts near 1'.7111t?4.
A s the Russian couriers are compelled to travel 3.1 >
:.ifl
of ten miles nn hour ~t is clear that it would I::, 11.k~11111
[welvc lioul-s to rcccive despntclics from St. l'L.~i~r.-ln!tg."
'l'l~c causc of this dcccit is obvious: il: is lo gait1 ti!^!.. I r a
carry out the nefarious design against Herit !
I n a hostile criticism on the lirst ctlition of li~;.;!U~ k ,
the writer, n Blue-ril~bonitc, rc~narltecl that ti~crt.
large a n d growing number of Englishmen \vlirs ::.<Y#. i i t clincd t o regard India a s a dcad weight on the ! w r i j r l c . , I '
thcse islxnds. I t is scarccly neccssnry to relily I , , I ilc
ignor;~ntfolly displayed in such n remark, but ns t ! l t ' i , :O.I~
many \vho are not aware of the manner *in 11 ~ l i r : l l i;.:.,l:
.-islands benefit by the connection, I think a ussl!~ii s l i t [!v:.wi!l bc served if I conclude this :cl~:lptcr wit11 :\:I ~ r \ t t n c t
from a lecture delivered on thc subject in LIIC Ll~e..~l.rc
,:L. ,.
the Society of Ark on the 4th hlnrch, 1881, by c!l!r (I: ihc
mwit acconlplish~d a n d instructed of mcn, SI r. .I. 11.
Rlaclenn.
It is . ~ a ~ d neccssnry,"
ly
said Mr. hlnc:l~.:i~~
in
~ l i cbody L. his [dnlirnblc address, " t o insis1 111nlitllc.
obvious nlnterial gains \\thich accrue to Englanil frnw [.hi.
possession of an Eastern Empire. :\ simple i:i\;~m~iaLIon
of the117 will suffice. I n the lirst plncc it is n2f sli;:!~~:..(!vanlage to us h a t thc Government of India ' d i k b u l . : : ~in~
this country 16 millions slerling a year, out of tl:c. rIhvcllrrc,.
I
collected lrom Indian taspnyers. T h c English ~ i ~ t i o l .,! .
is trrlc, does not take this money li.o~nthe pcopIc r ~ f 'I nilid.
\\dhout giving them something in exchange for i 1 . j ' ,iftr'r
'
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staling the nature of the eschmgc Mr. bhclenn ~lluscontinued :

-

".Tl~cindircct gains of private entcqwisc io India arc also very considerablc. Dritish India ranlts now with France, Gcrmany, and the
Ufltcd Shtcs among o w bcst custo~iicrs. Tlie Unitcd ILingdom supies her with three-Lfdis of hcr wholc i~nportof mcrchanrlisc.
..
-'@<br
do E ~ d i s l ~ n ~nlake
e n lirofik only 011 ~ I I E import i n & into India.
Thc g p ~ ~pcorr h n o l h export trade is controlled by E11glir11I~ouscs,
-<-(I
in Prcsicl~ncy~ O W I I S; ant1 four-lifrlrs of the shipping cn~ngcd
(in ~ 1 1 f~d: l ~ w i n gcoinn~el.ceof 111dia belongs to I!:~~glisl~
owncrs. If
-./~II
trncc the sale of n bnle of India11 cotton csposccl Tor snlc in tlic
Li\.crpool ~~larltet,
you will prol~alilylind that in all its s~~cccssirc
htagcs, after hcing jirown and picltcd I1y thc nativc cldtivator, it has
been ~ n d ercntly and l ~ r o u g l ~tol llic marltct 11y I<nglisl~cnliilal n 1 ~ 1
Inllour. 1\11 English agcnt llns sclcctecl i t in tlic producing rlislricl ; it
y
113s bccn cnrrictl down lo ~ l l csen-coasl by ;L railway c o m p n ~ ~worlting
with Englisl~capital ; an English mercantile firm in I!omlriy has
ll
liressctl it, ant1 sold t l ~ cIill or csc11;ungc against it ~ l u . u ~ ~ gan
Ilngli4i Iroker to nil l<nglish Ixinl< ; n ~ i d i L I I ~ S IIC'CII ~ ~ : I I I S ~ O ~ ~ C I I
from 13o1nllny LO Livcrpiml on Ilonril :un English stenlner. So,
again, with rcgnrd to the piccc goods trntlc from this country.
it is cntil-cly linanccd and ~ n n n a ~ cI)y
d En!ji>ll~ncn till (he I n k s
P ~ S " I ~ O the hnnc?s of thc nnlivc rlcnlcrs iu the I~naanr o r l<o~nl)ny.
\
Yo11 will rcadily calcnlntc Ilow many dilt'crcnt ~irolils tlrii vast Irade
n h i c l ~niay bc vnluetl nL n h~~nclred
nlillions sterling, yicltls Lo all their
'
classes of English n~anufaclurel-s, merclmnts, bankcrs, n~iddlen~cn,
and othcr ~i~cchanical
experts. And when you
i ~ C ~ ^ s l i i l ~ l i eengineers,
rs,
ndd to such ~ncrcnnlile gains Ihc ~xi\'ntc rcn$'hnccs sent!?onlc by
E l ~ g l i s tr;idcsn~en
l~
: ~ n d p r o f ~ l s h i a lnlen scttl' d in 111ilio..hwl lip tlw
''ow inmcnsc,
civil and nlilitnry servanls of thc Crown, p o ~ ~ c; realize
n
in tile aggegatc, mast LC tllc contributions wl~icl\oar g' .at tlcpcntlcncy
an1111allylnakcs LO the \venlth of England. 'l'l~crcI'. not :I town, it
Inny I,e said wilhoul esnggeralion t l ~ a lthere is no1 w e n a Iiamlct, in
this country in \vliich Lhc fructifying influence o( Lhc capitnl Ilu~sncquircd is not felt, althongh it may not bc always rccogniscd ; and I do
not Itnow any indastry in the United K i ~ ~ g d o msmnll
,
01. great, which
\voul~lnot suilcr loss, if the conneclion \villi India were llrokcil o L i '
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These are smne of the henefits resulting to England
<rrosl her connection with India. H o w thc connection is
;;ppreciated hy the native princes and people of India,

even by those who, likc Nepil, do not acknowledge the - ,
'
sovereignty of the Empress, has been made ahundnntly
clear b y thc spontaneous offers of assistance wliiuh the
Inere threat of Russian invasion has evoked. Nothing i s
more manifest than that connection \rill be endangere&,if
Russin be allowed to take Herdt. We must not disgui. 1
*4k4
from ourselves the fact that a loyalty which is fixed as long
as \I-c are \4ctorious is not always p r o d aga: .. ' . ? - ' a y ~ ~ ~
coursc of adversity. I n his eloquent nccoun , > i ' ilic Iii11
of J a ~ n c sII., 3I:lcaulny has dcscribecl ho\v the Prince who -1
glibly uttered his 'est-c~~~.possil,k:~'
as he learned tile defeition
of one great 1101)le after mother, took an opporhaiity
shortly altcrw:irds of decamping himsclL T h x e rt.niairis, . :
thcn, tlic great question-the qucstion llle most inl'jwrtant
of all-how
to preserve 1icrdt for Afghinistin. Rcr'orc
this all other questions sink into insig~~ificnnct:. I n the
prcseencc of a n enemy 5 3 unscrupulous it is n qucstion.. .beset \ v i ~ l difficul~ies.
~
'She very act of repairing the
crumbling wnlls or the town might, on ,, t ! ~I .;-i:lr.ij: l ~
adopted by the wolf towards the I;uilb, be dewc!nr,cd tf
Russin ns an act of hostility. Yet, at all haznrtis and with
all specd it should be nttempted ; ~~ieanwlii!p,we must A
conceapate all oub available troops in thc Pishin \Yd!c>,
ready f&q prornp~&dvn~~ce.
'
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